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ABSTRACT 
A wide variety of chemicals are used in the manufacture of components. Many 
of these chemicals are inherently hazardous and need to be managed in an 
effective manner to reduce costs, protect the environment, ensure health 
safety, enable compliance and sustain future manufacturing requirements.  
Therefore, having a consistent approach to managing chemicals is necessary 
to enable effective, sustainable and the sound management of chemicals.  
This research focuses on downstream users of chemicals and proposes a 
framework for the sound management of chemicals. 
Amongst a wide range of global initiatives, the Strategic Approach to Interna-
tional Chemicals Management (SAICM) provides a robust policy framework for 
achieving the sound management of chemicals. This research has customised 
the SAICM objectives of risk reduction, governance and knowledge manage-
ment to meet the needs of downstream users of chemicals. In doing so, spe-
cific methodologies for assessing the quality of Safety Data Sheets (SDS) and 
conducting a downstream user chemical risk assessment were developed and 
embedded within a framework for achieving the sound management of chem-
icals. The methodology for assessing the quality of SDS was tested on 200 
SDS used in the aerospace industry and the results have been published in 
the Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, 2015.  The methodology for con-
ducting a downstream user chemical risk assessment was applied to a widely 
used metal working fluid. In comparison to existing chemical risk assessments, 
the proposed methodology delivered a robust and comprehensive risk review 
of environment, health and safety risks across the stages of receipt, storage, 
use and disposal of chemicals.  
The proposed framework is the first of its kind to address specific needs of 
downstream users of chemicals. It enables the sound management of chemi-
cals and sustainable development.  
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READERS GUIDE 
This thesis consists of two volumes. Volume one presents the eight – six 
monthly reports submitted to the EngD portfolio from 2012 to 2017. Volume 
one has already been submitted as part of the EngD requirements.  
Volume two presents the main body of the thesis. Volume two consists of 
eleven chapters referred to as sections in the thesis. Chapter one introduces 
the aim of the research, background on the subject area, organisational chal-
lenges, research questions and research plan.  
Chapter two covers the review of literature, which includes evaluation of global 
initiatives aimed at achieving the sound management of chemicals and estab-
lishing the relationship between the sound management of chemicals and sus-
tainable development.  
Chapter three outlines the research methodology including the epistemology, 
heuristics, selection of the research methods, data collection methods, 
strengths, limitations of the chosen research methods. Chapter three also co-
vers content analysis. Chapter four evaluates the management of chemicals 
across the aerospace business function in Rolls-Royce. Chapter five covers a 
study into the management of chemicals by other companies operating in the 
aerospace sector.  
Chapter six defines a methodology to assess the quality of Safety Data Sheets 
and the quality of 200 Safety Data Sheets have been reviewed using the pro-
posed methodology. Chapter seven proposes a methodology to conduct a 
downstream user chemical risk assessment. The proposed chemical risk as-
sessment is further tested on a widely used metal working fluid.  
Chapter eight discusses the conceptual framework for the sound management 
of chemicals and its potential application across various business sectors. 
Chapter nine provides a conclusion to the research and discusses how the 
research questions have been addressed. Chapter nine highlights the connec-
tion between the research and sustainable development. Chapter ten covers 
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the contribution to knowledge, strengths and limitations of the research, 
broader application of the research. Chapter eleven lists the references.  
The data for the SDS study has been listed in Annex one of Volume two. 
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Acronyms & abbreviations 
ALARP    As Low As Is Reasonably Practicable  
BFR  Brominated Flame Retardants 
CEFIC     The European Chemical Industry Council 
CLP        Classification and Labelling of Substances and Mixtures  
                 Regulation  
CMR        Carcinogenic, Mutagenic and Toxic to reproduction 
COSHH   Control of Substances Hazardous To Health Regulations 2002 
CSA        Chemical Safety Assessment 
CSR        Chemical Safety Report 
EC           European Commission 
ECHA      European Chemicals Agency  
EDC  Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals 
EPA         Environment Protection Agency  
ESDS      Extended safety data sheets 
GHG        Green House Gases 
GHS        Globally Harmonised System for the Classification  
                  and Labelling of chemicals 
GPS       Global Product Strategy 
HSE       Health Safety and Environment  
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IBC         Intermediate Bulk Container 
ICCA      International Council of Chemical Associations 
IATA       International Air Transport Association 
ILO      International Labour Organisation 
IMO        International Maritime Organisation 
IOMC      Inter-Organization Programme for the sound management - 
                 of chemicals 
IPCC       Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
MRO       Maintenance Repair and Overhaul  
MWF      Metal Working Fluid 
OECD    Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEM      Original Equipment Manufacturers 
PPC       Pollution Prevention and Control  
PBBs      Polybrominated Biphenyls 
PBT       Persistent Bioaccumilative Toxic 
PCBs     Polychlorinated Biphenyls 
PCTs     Polychlorinated Terphenyls 
POP       Persistent Organic Pollutant 
PRTRs   Pollutant Release Transfer Registers 
REACH  Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of - 
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                  Chemicals Regulation  
RoHS   Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in - 
                 Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
SAICM  Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management 
SDG’s   Sustainable Development Goals 
SVHC   Substance of Very High Concern 
TOR    Tolerability of Risk  
TSCA    Toxic Substances Control Act 
UNEP   United Nations Environment Programme 
vPvB     Very Persistent very Bioaccumulative 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
This research was conducted at the Sustainability for Engineering & Energy 
Systems (SEES), Industrial Doctorate Centre at the University of Surrey and 
Rolls-Royce, Corporate Health Safety and Environmental function commenc-
ing February 2012.  
The aim of this research is to develop a framework for the sound management 
of chemicals applicable to downstream users of chemicals in the manufactur-
ing sector. The research focus was established through consultation with the 
industrial and academic supervisors. Given the broad scope of the chemical 
supply chain (manufacture, distribution, use and end of life stages) and limited 
timescale, this research specifically focuses on the use-stage rather than the 
manufacture or distribution of chemicals. The terms downstream, professional 
and industrial end-users of chemicals have specific definitions. Under the Eu-
ropean, Registration Evaluation Authorisation and Restriction of chemicals 
(REACH) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (European Chemical Agency, 2007-
2015). A downstream user is defined as a ‘company or individual within the 
European Union, who uses chemical substances or mixtures in their industrial 
or professional activities’ (European Chemical Agency, 2007-2015).  End us-
ers are defined under REACH Regulations as ‘downstream users who use 
substances or mixtures but do not further supply them downstream’ (European 
Chemical Agency, 2007-2015). A downstream user also includes a manufac-
turer of articles.  An article is defined under REACH Regulation as an ‘object 
given a special shape, surface or design that determines its function to a 
greater degree than its chemical composition’ (European Chemicals Agency, 
2015). This research focuses on downstream users of chemicals includes end 
users (professional and industrial) of chemicals.  
Over the past decade, there has been increasing focus on understanding and 
managing the impacts of exposure from chemicals to human health and the 
environment (European Communities, 2009; European Environmental 
Agency, 2017). Large scale chemical accidents such as the Seveso disaster 
in Italy in 1976 (European Commission, 2012); the Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984 
and, more recently the BP Deep Horizon oil spill (European Commission, 
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2012) have created international awareness of the severity of impacts on the 
natural environment and communities and renewed focus on the safe and 
sound management of chemicals.  
The uncontrolled and irresponsible use of chemicals can affect society, the 
economy and the environment by deteriorating and destroying basic life sup-
port systems (UNDESA, Stockholm Convention and UNEP, 2010, pp 11-14). 
Nevertheless, the use of chemicals in our daily lives is inevitable and ubiqui-
tous. By developing a framework for the sound management of chemicals, we 
enable the protection of the environment and human health from exposure to 
hazardous chemicals and wastes. The sound management of chemicals is in-
extricably connected to achieving sustainable development as it directly im-
pacts the planet, people, prosperity, peace and partnerships (United Nations, 
2015). 
Increased knowledge of the intrinsic properties of chemicals and their lifecycle 
impacts on terrestrial, aquatic environments and human health (Speight, J.G, 
2017; European Environmental Agency, 2017) has resulted in more accurate 
hazard classification and understanding of the impacts of chemicals. The im-
pacts of chemicals such as Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs); Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOCs); Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), Endocrine Dis-
rupting chemicals (EDC), Brominated Flame Retardants (BFRs) are now more 
widely researched and better understood (Gupta, R, 2014; Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, 2000; Mills and Chichester, 2005).  
Together with the intrinsic properties of chemicals, there is also a greater level 
of understanding of chemical exposure pathways and mobility of chemicals in 
the environment and human health (Fowles, et al, 2017). New scientific infor-
mation on chemical exposure pathways, environmental fate further informs de-
cision making through regulatory controls and restrictions on manufacture and 
placing on the market. An example of this is demonstrated in the regulating of 
Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals under REACH Regulation (EC) No 
1907/2006; Biocidal Products Regulation (No 528/2012– BPR); Water Frame-
work Directive (2000/60/EC), Toy Safety Directive (2009/48/EC) and the Cos-
metics Regulation 1223/2009 (European Parliamentary Research Services, 
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2016). New data from toxicology, eco-toxicology, environmental fate studies of 
chemicals and their exposure pathways is informing the development of more 
rigorous regulatory frameworks.  
Whilst there is increasing regulatory control on chemicals of concern, hazard-
ous chemicals such as polychlorinated biphenyl's, persistent organic pollu-
tants, carcinogens, mutagens are still widely used in industrial applications 
such as hydraulic fluids, electronic equipment, adhesives and various other 
chemical processing aids (Gupta, R., 2014). Furthermore, the regulatory 
framework for manging chemicals is diverse across various geographic loca-
tions. The effectiveness of implementation of regulations is further affected by 
geographic location, regional controls, infrastructure and hazard awareness 
(UNEP, 2013).  Increased awareness on the impacts of chemicals on human 
health and the environment (Selin, 2010; Escobar - Pemberty, N; Ivanova, M 
and Bueno, G., 2017) have also led to the development of a series of interna-
tional and regional regulations, treaties, protocols and conventions. These in-
ternational and regional legal instruments seek to control the risks associated 
with the manufacture and use of chemicals throughout their lifecycle (Selin, 
2010, pp 10- 13; UNEP 2013).  
Although there is consensus and increase in tangible actions on the manage-
ment of chemicals on a global scale, there are still gaps and challenges in the 
sound management of chemicals. These gaps include but are not limited to 
communication of chemical hazards, risk assessment, risk management and 
implementation of regulatory frameworks (UNEP, 2013). The report published 
by UNEP in 2013, "costs of inaction on the sound management of chemicals" 
(UNEP, 2013), discusses the economic, socio-political and environmental im-
plications of the in-action on the sound management of chemicals. There has 
been a lot of effort towards the sound management of chemicals on macro 
(national) level integration. However, there are still gaps and lack of an over-
arching framework for the sound management of chemicals specifically fo-
cused at industrial application and integration for downstream users of chemi-
cals. This research seeks to address this gap by developing a framework for 
the sound management of chemicals applicable to downstream users of chem-
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icals. Such a framework would bridge the gap between public sector and pri-
vate sector initiatives enabling the sound management of chemicals. Chemical 
manufacturers have implemented initiatives such as Responsible Care, Global 
Product Strategy (ICCA, 2012) enabling the sound management of chemicals. 
However, these initiatives are not customised for downstream users of chem-
icals.  The proposed conceptual framework defines methodologies for the 
sound management of chemicals that are customised for downstream users 
of chemicals. This would enable equal participation, competence, knowledge 
transfer from all actors in the chemical supply chain towards achieving the 
sound management of chemicals.  
So far, we have reviewed environmental and societal challenges in managing 
chemicals, the organisational challenges have been covered in the following 
section.   
1.1 ORGANISATIONAL CHALLENGES 
Rolls-Royce Ltd operates in multiple sectors including aerospace, energy and 
marine sectors across the globe with services ranging from manufacturing; 
maintenance, repair and overhaul and customer support. Given, the time re-
strictions and broad scope of research, it was agreed by the industrial and 
academic supervisors that the research should primarily focus on the aero-
space sector.  
 A wide variety of chemical substances and mixtures are used in the aerospace 
sector to increase the performance and enhance the safety of various compo-
nents used to build products manufactured by Rolls-Royce. Many materials 
used in the aerospace sector are subjected to extremely hostile operating en-
vironments. For example, components used to build engines are subjected to 
extremely high temperature and pressures (Mazumdar, S.K, 2001). Materials 
such as super alloys, base metals, carbon composites, carbon fibres, primers, 
coatings, paints, lubricants, electronic equipment, electrical components etc 
used in engines have to meet strict quality and safety performance criteria 
which include:  
- High resistance to variation in temperature  
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- Corrosion resistance to high- temperature   
- Weight  
- Mechanical and physical properties of the materials including tensile strength, 
fatigue, toughness, thermal stability, ductability (Lai, George Y., 2007) 
To address the specific physical and mechanical challenges presented by the 
aerospace, marine and energy sectors, a number of chemical substances and 
mixtures are used across Rolls-Royce. Some of these chemicals substances 
may be highly hazardous to human health and the natural environment (e.g. 
Hexavalent chromium which is used in primers and coatings) even in small 
quantities, whilst other substances could be used in large quantities (greater 
than 10 tons) across the various sectors and presenting challenges in trans-
portation, storage, handling and disposal (Marsh, Phillips, 2012).  Irrespective 
of the type of chemicals used across the company, the sheer quantity of chem-
icals used across Rolls-Royce and the scale and scope of business operations 
makes it necessary to manage chemicals in a safe and sustainable manner.   
Organisational challenges were identified through consultation with the indus-
trial supervisors (Phillips, Marsh 2012 - 2015). The organisational challenges 
are:  
• There is a lack of clear understanding on the sound management of chem-
icals and how this can be achieved.  
• There is lack of understanding on the relation between the sound manage-
ment of chemicals and sustainable development.  
• Due to the scale and scope of Rolls-Royce business operations, the current 
processes for introducing new chemicals into product and manufacturing 
processes is not completely transparent across the company.  
• Currently there are no global processes that affirm the quality of ‘Safety 
Data Sheets’ provided by suppliers to various Rolls-Royce sites across the 
globe (Phillips, 2012).  
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• There is increasing pressure on HSE Advisors to comply with a suite of 
chemical regulations such as the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of chemicals (REACH) Regulations, COSHH Regulations, 
Classification Labelling Packaging (CLP) Regulations and other Environ-
mental Permitting Regulations. Separate health, safety and environmental 
assessments can result in duplication of efforts and potential trade-offs be-
tween the impacts based on the significance of the regulatory requirement. 
• There are a variety of EHS risk assessment tools used across the company 
which can result in quality assurance issues. There is a requirement to de-
velop an integrated EHS chemical risk assessment methodology and as-
sess its effectiveness and application. The methodology should include the 
various stages such as receipt, storage, use and disposal within a manu-
facturing environment. 
• Similarly, if separate health, safety and environmental risk assessments 
are conducted, there is potential for trade-offs between various impacts 
based on prioritisation of risks, how could the trade-offs between EHS risks 
be managed and prioritised? 
Therefore, a framework for the sound management of chemicals is needed 
which addresses the various organisational challenges applicable to down-
stream users of chemicals.    
Whilst, organisational challenges are a key driver for this research, there are 
broader challenges that apply across various sectors in the management of 
chemicals. A wide variety of chemicals are used in the manufacture of compo-
nents. Many of these chemicals are inherently hazardous and need to be man-
aged in an effective manner to reduce costs, environmental, health safety im-
pacts, enable compliance and sustain future manufacturing requirements 
(Wehrmeyer and Phillips, 2012 -2015). There are numerous regulatory con-
trols aimed at the management of chemicals, these regulations focus on spe-
cific aspects of chemical management and compliance requirements can be 
very onerous, and costly to implement (examples include compliance with 
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REACH, COSHH, COMAH, CLP Regulations). Chemical Regulations also fo-
cus on specific impact categories such as health or environment and there can 
be trade-offs in addressing health, safety and environmental hazards and 
risks.  There are also multiple methodologies for conducting risk assessments 
focusing on specific hazards, risks which can add to trade-offs between im-
pacts and assessment of hazards. It can be argued that due to the complexi-
ties, high costs and conflicting requirements mentioned above, having a con-
sistent approach to chemicals management would help.   
This research proposes a procedural framework that deals with all HS&E as-
pects of chemicals risk faced by end-users of chemicals. Similar frameworks 
have been created for manufacturers of chemicals, but this approach is the 
first to tackle chemicals management from the viewpoint of the downstream 
users of chemicals. 
To better understand, evaluate the organisational challenges and develop a 
framework for the sound management of chemicals, a top-level research plan 
and research questions has been developed which provide structure and di-
rection to the research as highlighted in Table 1. 
Table 1: Research questions and research plan 
Research questions Research Plan 
What is the sound manage-
ment of chemicals? What are 
the objectives of the sound 
management of chemicals?  
 
Conduct a literature review 
on: 
• The sound manage-
ment of chemicals.  
• Identify and evaluate 
public and private 
sector initiatives 
aimed at the sound 
management of 
chemicals. 
What is the relationship be-
tween the sound management 
Conduct a literature review 
on sustainable development 
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of chemicals and sustainable 
development? 
and relation with the sound 
management of chemicals  
Identify what gaps exist in the 
management of chemicals 
across Rolls-Royce in compar-
ison with the objectives of 
SAICM? 
Identify the processes for ap-
proval of new chemicals and 
how this compares with the ob-
jectives of SAICM? 
Identify how other companies 
operating across the aero-
space sector manage the ap-
approval of new chemicals? 
Following a review of litera-
ture on the sound manage-
ment of chemicals, define 
the criteria to evaluate the 
current management of 
chemicals across Rolls-
Royce. 
Select a research method to 
assess the management of 
chemicals across Rolls-
Royce? 
Select a research method to 
assess how other aerospace 
companies manage chemi-
cal approvals? 
What is the quality of Safety 
Data Sheets? 
Define a methodology to as-
sess the quality of Safety 
Data Sheets.  
Assess the quality of Safety 
Data Sheets using the de-
fined methodology.  
Define a methodology to con-
duct an integrated EHS, chem-
ical risk assessment. 
Assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the EHS risk 
assessment methodology.  
Conduct a literature review 
on existing chemical risk as-
sessment methodologies.   
Define a methodology to 
conduct a chemical risk as-
sessment which includes 
multiple stake-holders and 
multiple stages in the man-
agement of chemicals. The 
proposed risk assessment 
must include environmental, 
health and safety hazards. 
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Test the risk assessment 
methodology to assess its 
application and effective-
ness.  
How can the conceptual frame-
work for the sound manage-
ment of chemicals be applied 
to other industries? 
What are the limitations of the 
framework? 
How do we assess the effec-
tiveness of the framework? 
 
Define a conceptual frame-
work for the sound manage-
ment of chemicals applicable 
to down-stream users of 
chemicals.         
Discuss applications, limita-
tions and effectiveness of the 
pro-posed framework 
The research questions and research plan provide direction to the research 
and support the development of the proposed framework for the sound man-
agement of chemicals.  The layout of the thesis has been discussed in section 
1.2. 
1.2 LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
The literature review in chapter 2 sets the foundation for the research. The 
purpose of the literature review section is to address the research questions 
highlighted in Table 1. The literature review section focuses on the following 
subject areas: 
• Identify and evaluate the definition of the sound management of chemicals.  
• Evaluate the various international, national and industrial initiatives aimed 
at achieving the sound management of chemicals. 
• Evaluate the relation between the sound management of chemicals and 
sustainable development.   
Chapter 3 provides the overarching research methodology for addressing the 
research questions highlighted in Table 1. Chapter 3 provides an overview of 
the epistemology, heuristics, selection of the research methods, data collection 
methods, data analysis, strengths, limitations of the chosen research methods. 
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Chapter 4 provides a review of the management of chemicals across Rolls-
Royce. The SAICM objectives are used as a baseline to evaluate the manage-
ment of chemicals. The management of chemicals covers both corporate and 
site based (manufacturing) policies, procedures and challenges in managing 
chemicals across Rolls-Royce.  
Chapter 5 provides a snapshot of how other companies operating in the aero-
space sector approve the use of new chemicals. Chapter 5 also evaluates 
challenges faced by the aerospace sector in the management of chemicals. 
To analyse the management of chemicals across companies manufacturing 
specialised products operating in critical environments, a case study of the 
Aerospace Defence Security (ADS) and Space Industries trade association 
and hazardous materials (Hazmat) sub group was conducted.  
Chapter 6 focuses on evaluating the quality of hazard communication provided 
by chemical manufacturers and suppliers through Safety Data Sheets. Safety 
Data Sheets (SDS) are a primary source of hazard information for downstream 
users of chemicals (European Chemicals Agency, 2015, pp 8 - 30). The SDS 
are used by downstream users to conduct their own risk assessment, identify 
and define controls and training programmes (United Nations, 2007, pp 35).  
Hence, assurance of the quality of information provided in SDS is imperative 
as they inform us of the quality of information used to conduct risk assess-
ments and define risk controls. A methodology to review the quality of Safety 
Data Sheets was developed and 200 SDS have been evaluated. The method-
ology for assessing the quality of SDS has been published in the Journal of 
Chemical Health and Safety in October 2015.   
Chapter 7 proposes a chemical risk assessment methodology for end-users of 
chemicals and chapter 8 brings together all the research elements to define a 
conceptual framework for the sound management of chemicals.  
The implementation of the solutions at an organisational level can take many 
years and there is not enough research time to measure, monitor the effective-
ness of the solutions. Instead the verification of the proposed solutions has 
been done using a theoretical justification of the how and why the proposed 
framework will enable the sound management of chemicals.  
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Chapter 9 and 10 conclude the findings of the research, contribution to 
knowledge and discuss the broader application of the research.  
Annex II includes the supporting data for SDS study, interview transcripts and 
other supporting material referenced in the research methods.  
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review chapter addresses specific research questions as high-
lighted in Table 1 and forms the foundation for the research. The literature 
review focuses on defining the sound management of chemicals, evaluating 
international, regional, industrial initiatives aimed at achieving the sound man-
agement of chemicals. An evaluation of the principles, objectives of the sound 
management of chemicals can further inform the direction of the research.  
2.1 SOUND MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICALS 
As defined by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UNDESA), Stockholm Convention Secretariat and the United Nations Envi-
ronmental Programme (UNEP) (2010), the aim of the sound management of 
chemicals is to prevent (where possible), reduce and eliminate the exposure 
to human health and the environment from hazardous chemicals and hazard-
ous wastes (UNDESA; Stockholm Convention Secretariat and the United Na-
tions Environmental Programme, 2010).  The protection of human health and 
the environment from exposure to chemicals during all lifecycle stages of pro-
duction, storage, transport, use and disposal is central to the sound manage-
ment of chemicals. By implementing the sound management of chemicals, we 
are referring to the policies, frameworks, actions that eliminate, prevent and 
reduce exposure to human health and the environment from hazardous chem-
icals and hazardous chemical wastes. 
There are a wide range of publications that acknowledge the link between ex-
posure to chemicals and deterioration in living standards, access to clean 
drinking water, deterioration of ecosystems and cumulative impacts to com-
munities associated with the lifecycle of hazardous chemicals (United Nations 
Environmental Programme, 2013). Yet, we continue to use chemicals daily 
and the use of chemicals without effective governance systems, global policy 
frameworks and tangible action can have negative impacts on people, the 
planet, partnership, peace and prosperity, all of these are central to sustaina-
ble development (United Nations, 2015).  The sound management of chemi-
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cals is inextricably linked to achieving the 2030 agenda for sustainable devel-
opment and the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015).  The 
link between the sound management of chemicals and sustainable develop-
ment is discussed in section 2.2.  
2.1.1 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND CHEMICAL REGU-
LATIONS 
Environmental awareness aimed at highlighting the impact of the unsound 
management of chemicals on the natural environment started as early as 1962 
with the publication of Rachel Carson’s -Silent Spring (Schweitzer, L and 
Noblet, J., 2018, pg 261 -290). Since then, there have been numerous initia-
tives (international and regional) focusing on the hazards of certain groups of 
chemicals. The foundation for the sound management of chemicals can be 
traced back to the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972; 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Sum-
mit) in 1992 and the Wold Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (Jo-
hannesburg Conference) (Wexler et al, 2012). The Rio Summit in 1992 laid 
the foundations for global chemical regulations aimed at reducing risks to hu-
man health and the natural environment from the production and consumption 
of chemicals. Specific chapters from the agenda focused on the management 
of chemicals and wastes. Chapter 19 on the environmentally sound manage-
ment of toxic chemicals, including prevention of illegal international traffic in 
toxic and dangerous products (Wexler et al, 2012, pp 39). Chapter 20, envi-
ronmentally sound management of hazardous wastes (Wexler et al, 2012).  
The principles of the Stockholm Conference, Earth Summit and Johannesburg 
Summit further informed the development of international agreements, proto-
cols and conventions targeting specific hazardous chemicals and the entire 
lifecycle of chemicals including raw material sourcing, manufacture, labelling, 
transportation, storage, use and disposal (Selin, 2009, pg 1- 10) 
A series of international chemical regulations have been developed and imple-
mented to address either specific chemicals, tackle pollution of marine and 
terrestrial environments and focus on transboundary impacts of hazardous 
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chemicals and wastes. A few of these chemical regulations have been re-
viewed in detail. 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) was enforced 
in 2004. The convention outlines the control measures for the initial 12 POP’s 
consisting of pesticides, industrial chemicals and by products listed in Annex 
A and C of the Convention. The main industrial chemicals of concern are Pol-
ychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDD), Polychlorinated dibenzofurans 
(PCDF), Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), Hexabromobiphenyl, Hexabromo-
diphenyl ether, Heptabromodiphenyl ether, Pentachlorobenzene, Perfluorooc-
tane sulfonic acid, its salts and Perfluorooctane sulfonyl fluoride, Tetrabromo-
diphenyl ether and Pentabromodiphenyl ether (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2008) 
Rotterdam Convention: The objective of this multilateral convention is to ‘mon-
itor and control’ (Wexler et al, 2012, pp 217) international trade of hazardous 
chemicals. The Rotterdam Convention, Prior Informed Consent in particular 
places an obligation on the exporting and importing parties to share infor-
mation on the hazardous chemical as well as information on the current ban 
and restriction of the chemicals in countries. The Convention and the PIC pro-
cedure apply to 43 chemicals out of which 32 are pesticides and 11 are indus-
trial chemicals. The chemicals are listed in Annex III of the Convention. The 
text of the Rotterdam Convention was revised in 2015 (United Nations Envi-
ronmental Programme, 2010). 
BASEL Convention on the control of transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes was enforced in 1989 on the discovery of toxic wastes being dumped 
in developing countries and countries with limited environmental awareness 
and regulations. The main objectives of the BASEL Convention are to reduce 
the amount of hazardous waste generated by introducing environmentally 
sound management of hazardous waste (United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, 2011). Restriction on the transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011). Where the move-
ment of hazardous waste is permissible, a regulatory framework is to be 
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adopted to ensure the environmentally sound management of the hazardous 
waste (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011).   
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone layer (United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2011) lists a number of substances that are 
controlled such as chlorofluorocarbons, halons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, 
bromochloromethane and methyl chloroforms. These substances are still used 
in some parts of the world as refrigerants, degreasers, fire suppressants and 
insulation foam and it is necessary to ensure compliance with the substances 
banned under the Montreal Protocol (Selin, 2010; Escobar - Pemberty, N; 
Ivanova, M and Bueno, G., 2017). 
Chemical regulations further inform the design and manufacturing choices 
taken by companies (Phillips, 2012- 2015). Similarly, by participating in chem-
ical governance, companies inform future chemical regulations to develop 
products and services that are beneficial for human health and the environ-
ment leading to the sound production and consumption of chemicals.  
A fundamental principle for the management of chemicals is the precautionary 
principle which states that “where there are possibilities of large irreversible 
impacts; the lack of scientific certainty should not stop preventive action from 
being taken” (United Nations, 1992). The Precautionary Principle was one of 
the principles of the Rio Declaration in1992 on sustainable development 
(United Nations, 1992). An example of applying the precautionary principle is 
with regard to information provided in Safety Data Sheets. The lack of hazard 
information in Safety Data Sheets should not delay or stop preventive action 
from being taken. This principle is of great significance in countries and indus-
trial sectors where there is limited governance and enforcement to control the 
risks arising from the manufacture and use of chemicals. The precautionary 
principle can also be applied to situations where there is an elevated level of 
uncertainty and the impact of modern technologies and new processes are not 
completely understood (Phillips, 2012 – 2015). The precautionary principle 
should underpin any risk management strategy when there is potential for 
large scale damage to the environment and human health.   
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The Globally Harmonised System for the classification and labelling of hazard-
ous chemicals (GHS) is a global framework developed by the United Nations 
(United Nations, 2017).  The aim of this global framework is to protect human 
health and the environment, support international trade in chemicals by ena-
bling standardised hazard communication and labelling. Once implemented, 
GHS aims to ensure the hazard communication and labelling of a chemical 
substance or mixture is harmonised irrespective of the country of origin or man-
ufacturer. GHS classification and categorisation applies to environmental, 
physical and health impacts of chemical substances and mixtures. The cate-
gorisation of the chemical substance can be further used to rank the level of 
harm that can be caused by the chemical substance.  
Amongst these inter-governmental, global initiatives, the development of the 
Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) (United 
Nations Environmental Programme, 2006) in 2006 was an important milestone 
in establishing an umbrella policy framework for the sound management of 
chemicals (Wexler et al, 2012). One of the main goals of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 was to implement sustainable pro-
duction and consumption of chemicals throughout their lifecycle on a global 
scale by 2020 (United Nations Environment Programme, 2006). SAICM pro-
vides the road map to achieve this goal and provides countries with a strategic 
policy framework and guidance on achieving the sound management of chem-
icals (United Nations Environment Programme, 2006). The objectives of 
SAICM include: 
• Risk Reduction:  The aim of risk reduction is to minimize risks to the natural 
environment and human health throughout the lifecycle of the chemicals.  
• Knowledge and Information: The objective of knowledge management is to 
facilitate the transfer of scientifically accurate information on chemicals 
throughout their lifecycle.   Material safety data sheets are a key tool in the 
transfer of this scientifically accurate information. The objective to transfer 
knowledge and the type of knowledge required is further aided by the Glob-
ally Harmonised System for the Classification and Labelling of Chemicals 
(GHS), (United Nations Environment Programme, 2006) and the European, 
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Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals Reg-
ulation (REACH) (EC) 1907/2006, Annex II on the compilation of Safety 
Data Sheets.     
• Governance:  Governance refers to the legal framework to enable and en-
force the sound management of chemicals on a global scale. Legal frame-
works include international and national level regulations such as the Glob-
ally Harmonised System for the Classification and Labelling of Chemicals 
(GHS); Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Convention, Montreal Protocol, 
REACH Regulation (United Nations Environment Programme, 2006) 
• Capacity Building and Technical Cooperation: Capacity building includes 
competency training, knowledge transfer through collaborations and part-
nerships. Organisations should develop partnerships and collaborations in 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition to promote 
technology growth and share knowledge and expertise on the safe use of 
chemicals through their lifecycle and address the social-economic and en-
vironmental factors of sustainability. The objective of capacity building is 
out of scope of this research due to time restrictions and broad scope of 
the topic.  
• Illegal International Traffic: The purpose of this objective is to eliminate ille-
gal traffic in chemicals. The objective of illegal international traffic of haz-
ardous materials is out of scope due to the broad scope of research in this 
topic.  
The SAICM policy framework and global action plan (United Nations Environ-
mental Programme, 2006) provides structure, vision for the implementation of 
the sound management of chemicals at a national level. The objectives of risk 
reduction, governance, knowledge management, capacity building, and tech-
nical cooperation provide the foundation for the sound management of chem-
icals. The paper published by the European Communities in 2009, “Towards 
2020, making chemicals safer” (European Communities, 2009, pg 8-40), high-
lights the implementation of SAICM principles and objectives by the European 
Union. REACH Regulation can be viewed as the most visible of the policies 
implemented to address the SAICM principles and objectives. REACH Regu-
lation provides a single regulatory framework (European Communities, 2009, 
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pg 8) for managing chemicals across the EU. REACH embeds the objectives 
of knowledge management, information sharing across the chemical supply 
chain, and seeks to reduce the risk associated with the production and con-
sumption of the most hazardous chemicals in the supply chain (European 
Communities and European Chemicals Agency, 2007 -2015).   
Whilst SAICM provides a global policy framework and global action plan for 
the sound management of chemicals, it establishes the objectives, principles 
which provide greater clarity on what and how the sound management of 
chemicals can be achieved. However, there are certain limitations of this global 
policy framework. It primarily focuses on national level implementation. Whilst 
developed countries may have the infrastructure, competence and resources 
available to implement and develop SAICM objectives and principles into tan-
gible actions through various mechanisms (e.g. Creating a single regulatory 
framework such as REACH Regulation), the same does not necessarily apply 
to developing countries (United Nations Environmental Programme, 2013, pg 
15- 20). Developing countries may lack the funding, technical know-how, po-
litical stability, infrastructure to implement or fully address SAICM requirements 
(United Nations Environmental Programme, 2013, pg 15- 20). The SAICM 
global policy framework does not clearly spell-out the inter-dependencies be-
tween various objectives such as risk reduction, knowledge management and 
capacity building. Further, the topics covered in the SAICM objectives have a 
very broad scope of implementation and it is important to define the method-
ology for achieving each objective. 
 SAICM focuses on the lifecycle of chemicals (production, storage, transport, 
use and disposal of chemicals (United Nations Environmental Programme, 
2006). It can be argued that the lifecycle stages of chemical production and 
use are different and require specific methodologies for risk reduction, govern-
ance and knowledge management.  A chemical manufacturer is different from 
an end-user of chemicals (refer to section 2, page 10 for the end-user of chem-
icals definition). The differences between a chemical producer and consumer 
can be illustrated from a compliance perspective.  The European –REACH 
Regulation places specific roles and responsibilities for various actors in the 
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supply chain and distinguishes between a chemical manufacturer and a down-
stream, end user of chemicals (European Chemical Agency 2007- 2015). 
There are differences between a chemical manufacturer and an end-user in 
the approaches to risk assessment and risk management. A chemical manu-
facturer may need to test chemicals and produce technical data on toxicology, 
eco-toxicology, physio-chemical properties (European Chemical Agency, 2017 
– Registration, pg 11- 17). End-users receive consolidated information from 
chemical manufacturers in the form of a Safety Data Sheets (where applicable) 
and conduct their own risk assessment to evaluate the risks in their working 
environment (Health Safety Executive, 2016). 
SAICM does not clearly define how different actors in the chemical supply 
chain should adopt or implement the objectives of risk management, govern-
ance and knowledge management. Where, the SAICM framework is weak in 
providing clear guidelines to implement the objectives of risk management, 
governance and knowledge management, countries such as the European Un-
ion have stepped in to develop comprehensive governance frameworks such 
as REACH to address risk management and knowledge management.  
Chemical manufacturers have also developed initiatives such as Responsible 
Care (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2012) which provide a 
commitment towards achieving the sound management of chemicals. The Re-
sponsible Care is a voluntary initiative launched in 1982 by the Canadian 
Chemical Producer's Association (International Council of Chemicals Associ-
ation, 2012) and widely adopted by chemical manufacturing companies and 
various actors in the supply chain. The main principles of Responsible Care 
are:  
• Continuous improvement of Health, Safety and Environmental perfor-
mance of products and technologies’ (International Council of Chemical 
Associations, 2011). 
• Increasing resource efficiency and minimization of waste (International 
Council of Chemical Associations, 2011). 
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• Transparency in the management of chemical through reporting and shar-
ing of information on risk and safe use of chemical products through the 
value chain (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011). 
• Addressing health safety and environmental risks throughout the supply 
chain.  
• Further develop regulations and standards by engaging with regulators and 
enable greater implementation.   
The principles of Responsible Care were further developed into the Global 
Charter in 2006 for adoption on a global scale to commit its members and their 
supply chains to higher standards for the Environmental, Health and Safety 
Management of chemicals (International Council of Chemicals Association, 
2006). The Global Charter enforces the principles of Responsible Care along 
with product stewardship, product and process safety. Product Stewardship 
refers to the environmental, health and safety management of chemicals 
throughout their life cycle (The International Council of Chemical Associations, 
2011). The Global Product Strategy (GPS) was developed as part of the Re-
sponsible Care initiative to address the SAICM objectives and provides a 
methodology for conducting chemical risk assessments (International Council 
of Chemical Associations, 2011, pg 4). The Global Product Strategy defines a 
harmonized system for conducting chemical risk assessments focusing on 
small medium enterprises (SME’s) and defines a methodology to conduct a 
risk assessment and addresses SAICM objectives on knowledge manage-
ment, capacity building, risk reduction. However, the risk assessment method-
ology in the GPS system focuses on chemical manufacturers and does not 
apply to end-users of chemicals. However, Global Product Strategy provides 
a definitive framework for conducting chemical risk assessment and can be 
adopted to meet the requirements of end-users of chemicals, as proposed in 
this research.  
The overarching objectives and principles of SAICM provide a clear policy 
framework for the sound management of chemicals. However, the objectives 
need to be customised to meet specific requirements of industry or actors (e.g 
downstream users) in the chemical supply chain. These SAICM objectives can 
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be used to evaluate the current management of chemicals and define a frame-
work for the sound management of chemicals applicable to downstream users 
of chemicals.  The SAICM objective of resource efficiency focuses on reducing 
hazard waste. Due to the scope of subject area on hazardous waste manage-
ment, it is not possible to cover it within this research. Illegal international traffic 
is not discussed in this research as it refers to cross border movement of chem-
icals and as such is not applicable to any single organisation (Wexler et al, 
2012). Similarly, the objective of capacity building is applied with a limited 
scope in this research focusing on training and technical know-how.  
The SAICM objectives of risk reduction, governance and knowledge manage-
ment are further evaluated to review their role in the sound management of 
chemicals and application in developing a conceptual framework for the sound 
management of chemicals for downstream, end users of chemicals.  
2.1.1.1 SUMMARY 
A review of inter-governmental agreements and private sector initiatives such 
as the Basel convention, Stockholm convention, GHS, Responsible Care initi-
ative, Global Product Strategy has identified that these initiatives focus on spe-
cific aspects of chemicals management.  For example, the European Agree-
ment concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road 
(ADR) focuses specifically on the packaging, labelling and safe transport of 
dangerous goods. The Basel convention focuses on the transboundary move-
ment of hazardous wastes. GHS focuses on harmonization of classification 
and labelling of chemicals. Amongst these initiatives, SAICM is unique as it 
provides an overarching framework for the sound management of chemicals. 
It does not focus on specific aspects of chemicals but provides objectives to 
achieve the sound management of chemicals. However, SAICM has certain 
limitations, the objectives of risk reduction, governance, resource efficiency, 
knowledge and capacity building and illegal traffic of chemicals are very ge-
neric and have a broad scope of application. There are also linkages between 
the various objectives that need to be clearly defined. There are various actors 
(e.g. chemical manufacturers, formulators, distributors, downstream users) in 
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the chemical supply chain and the SAICM objectives could have different con-
text to each actor. However, the SAICM can be customised and provided the 
SAICM objectives are customised for the needs of downstream users of chem-
icals, they provide a simple, robust and internationally accepted framework for 
the sound management of chemicals. This is what is proposed in this research. 
The SAICM objectives are further reviewed to evaluate their application and 
how they can be customised to meet the needs of downstream users of chem-
icals.  
2.1.2 RISK REDUCTION 
Risk reduction is one of the objectives of the Strategic Approach to Interna-
tional Chemicals Management (United Nations, 2007, pp15). The aim of risk 
reduction is to protect vulnerable ecosystems and provide a high level of pro-
tection to human health and the environment.  Risk assessment and risk man-
agement are critical components to achieving risk reduction (United Nations, 
2007, pp15). Whilst, there is extensive literature on risk assessment frame-
works and methodologies to conduct risk assessments (Aven, T, 2016), the 
focus of this research is on the identification and evaluation of methodologies 
to conduct a chemical risk assessment. The overarching aim of the literature 
review is to inform a novel approach to conducting a chemical risk assessment 
applicable to downstream, end- users of chemicals.  Whilst, the focus is on 
chemical risk assessment, a broader review of advances in the field of risk 
assessment and risk management provides context to understanding the gen-
eral concept of risk.  
Risk, as defined by the Royal Society (1992), is the ‘probability that a specified 
harm will occur as a result of exposure to hazard’ (Rogers M.D, 2002). The 
term ‘hazard’ and ‘harm’ is defined by Tas and Van Leeuwen, 1995 as the 
intrinsic or ‘inherent property of a chemical substance or chemical mixture to 
cause harm to human health or the environment under the conditions of expo-
sure (Tas and Van Leeuwan, 1995). ‘Harm’ is defined as the ‘adverse events 
or injury to human health, activity and environments (Rogers M.D, 2002). Risk 
Assessment is defined by the United States, Environmental Protection Agency 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2012) as the process of characterising the 
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nature and magnitude of risks to human health and ecological receptors (En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 2012)). The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) defines risk assessment as the process 
of estimating the risk to a given target organisms, systems or subpopulation 
(OECD, 2003, pp 16).  
Risk reduction includes both risk assessment and risk management. We have 
completed a review of various chemical risk assessment frameworks. Whilst, 
risk assessment is knowledge and evidence based (Hansson and Aven, 2014). 
Risk evaluation and risk management decisions are influenced by values, pol-
icy and interests of various stakeholders. Hence, it can be argued that various 
private and public organisations and institutions have their own parameters for 
decision making on risk management based on values, policies and stake-
holder interests which are out of scope of this research. Hence, the focus of 
the literature review is on the science-based approach for conducting a chem-
ical risk assessment.  
Both OECD and the EPA identify a generic framework for the chemical risk 
assessment process which includes the stages of hazard identification; hazard 
characterisation; exposure assessment and risk characterisation (EPA, 2012; 
OECD, 2003). The Global Product Strategy (GPS) initiative was developed by 
the International Council of Chemicals Associations (ICCA) in 2006 as part of 
a commitment to SAICM and integrated into the Responsible Care Global 
Charter (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011). The GPS initi-
ative has adopted best practices from several international organisations com-
prising both public and private sectors specialising in the chemical supply 
chain and has developed its own chemical risk assessment framework as high-
lighted in Figure 1. The GPS risk assessment framework is aimed at sharing 
best practices with small medium enterprises manufacturing chemicals or plac-
ing them on the market (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011).  
The GPS risk assessment framework in Figure 1 consists of 4 stages: hazard 
identification; hazard characterization; exposure assessment and risk charac-
terisation (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011). The hazard 
38 
 
 
identification stage involves selecting chemicals for assessment, data collec-
tion on inherent hazards including chemical name, application, toxicology, eco-
toxicology, physical-chemical properties and GHS/ CLP classification (Interna-
tional Council of Chemical Associations, 2011, pgs 8 – 15).  
Figure 1: GPS, risk assessment framework 
 
Source: International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011. Risk assess-
ment framework, pg 9. 
The next step is hazard characterization which is defined by GPS (International 
Council of Chemical Associations, 2011, pg 55) as the process of determining 
the level or magnitude of exposure and the corresponding adverse effects. To 
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determine the level of exposure, the human and environmental endpoints must 
be clearly stated and evaluated under a set of conditions (e.g. determining the 
Lethal Dose, Lethal Concentration). The hazard characterisation stage in-
volves conducting toxicology, eco-toxicology studies, identifying the Derived 
No effect Level (DNEL) and Predicted No effect Concentration PNEC values 
using the Weight of evidence approach), (International Council of Chemical 
Associations, 2011).  The hazard characterisation stage is often referred to as 
the dose- response relationship (International Council of Chemical Associa-
tions, 2011). The next stage in the chemical risk assessment process is expo-
sure assessment. The exposure assessment stage involves identifies the likely 
or anticipated exposure to human and environmental targets (e.g. terrestrial 
ecosystems, marine and fresh water, atmospheric pollution (International 
Council of Chemical Associations, 2011). The exposure assessment stage 
considers the entire chemical life-cycle. Exposure assessment stage depends 
on the various uses of the chemical and involves developing exposure scenar-
ios for the various uses of the chemicals (International Council of Chemical 
Associations, 2011).  The final stage in the chemical risk assessment frame-
work as defined by the GPS initiative is the risk characterisation stage. This 
stage brings together the information from the hazard characterisation and ex-
posure assessment and defines the nature and magnitude of the risk (Interna-
tional Council of Chemical Associations, 2011, pg 20).  
A review of chemical risk assessment frameworks from the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency; The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment; Global Product Strategy have all identified common stages in a chemical 
risk assessment. These common stages include hazard identification, hazard 
characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation as being cen-
tral to conducting a chemical risk assessment.   
However, as a downstream user of chemicals, the methodology applied to con-
duct a chemical risk assessment within these common stages of hazard iden-
tification, hazard characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characteri-
sation will be different. This is because downstream users of chemicals use 
the Safety Data Sheet (SDS) as the starting point for a chemical risk assess-
ment. The SDS is used by the downstream users of chemicals to conduct their 
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own chemical risk assessment specific to their working environment and to 
meet legal requirements (e.g. Control of Substances Hazardous to Health, 
2002) (Health Safety Executive, 2016). A downstream user of chemicals will 
not ordinarily need to get into the level of detail for a chemical risk assessment 
as required by chemical manufacturers.  
Whilst, we specifically focus on chemical risk assessment frameworks, there 
are a variety of methodologies for conducting risk assessments which are 
widely used in the field of engineering, manufacturing, safety critical industries 
(Phillips, 2013). These methodologies are further evaluated for their strengths 
and weaknesses and application within the stages of hazard identification, 
hazard characterization, exposure assessment and risk characterization.   
The British Standards, BS EN 31010: 2010 Standard identifies 31 risk assess-
ment methods (Dallat et al, 2017; British Standards Institute, 2010). These 
methods can be broadly categorised into the following categories (Dallat et al, 
2017; British Standards Institute, 2010): 
• Qualitative risk assessment methods including look up methods and sup-
porting methods  
• Scenario Analysis (British Standards Institute, 2010) 
• Function Analysis (British Standards Institute, 2010) 
• Controls Assessment (British Standards Institute, 2010) 
• Statistical Methods (British Standards Institute, 2010) 
Prior to selecting a risk assessment method, it is important to define influencing 
factors such as level of uncertainty; context of the organisation or business 
function within which the risk assessment is being conducted; objectives for 
conducting the risk assessment; risk scoring criteria including identification of 
tolerability of risk (British Standards Institute, 2010, pgs 22- 80). Uncertainty is 
an important part of risk assessments and should be clearly discussed and 
acknowledged (World Health Organization, 2013). Uncertainty surrounding the 
scientific data or knowledge used in conducting the risk assessment process 
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should be clearly stated to avoid distortion and ambiguity in the risk assess-
ment. The four types of uncertainty highlighted by the World Health Organisa-
tion report on communicating environmental and health risks are: 
• Accuracy- where the outcomes and probabilities are known either due to 
past incidents or scientific confidence in the risk assessment (World Health 
Organization, 2013).  
• Scenario uncertainty- where the outcomes or the impacts are known but 
there is low level of confidence in the probabilities (World Health Organization, 
2013).  
• Recognized ignorance- where both the impact and the probabilities are un-
known. In cases involving new technologies such as nano technology both the 
impact and probability may be unknown (World Health Organization, 2013).  
The uncertainties at each stage of the risk assessment should be clearly 
acknowledged and discussed to inform robust decision making. Prior to select-
ing a risk assessment method, it is critical to identify the risk scoring or risk 
matrices. As low as is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) concept is a critical 
part of the statutory law in the UK under the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 (Health Safety Executive, 2014) which is extensively applied in the 
Health Safety Environmental field for evaluating the acceptable level (reason-
ably practicable) of risk (Health Safety Executive, 2014; Kletz, 2005, pp 81). 
The principle of ALARP is that risk must be reduced to as far as is reasonably 
practicable or to a level that is as low as is practicable (Health Safety Execu-
tive, 1992, pp 5). The term reasonably practicable defines the balance or the 
ratio between the costs and the time and effort involved to reduce the risks.   
The Health Safety Executive publication in 1992 defined a framework for the 
Tolerability of Risks (TOR). Tolerability of risk is defined as the willingness to 
live with the risk in exchange for certain benefits provided the risk is properly 
controlled (Health Safety Executive, 1992, pp 2). The TOR framework broadly 
defines the level beyond which the risk becomes intolerable and below which 
the general principles of ALARP can be applied. The TOR framework consid-
ers both individual risk and societal risks. Individual risks refer to risks that will 
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result in harm to an individual. Societal risk on the other hand looks at the 
impacts at a local, regional and global scale with potential for irreversible dam-
age such as ozone depletion, radiation danger (Health Safety Executive, 1992; 
Walker, 2003).  The risk scoring, risk matrices would also need to consider the 
likelihood or probability estimation. The British Standards, BS EN 31010: 2010 
identify a number of approaches used in estimating probability. These include 
the use of historical data, probability forecasts and expert judgement (British 
Standards Institute, 2010, pg 14). 
There are other factors which need to be considered when selecting a risk 
assessment method, these include the availability of resources including time-
scales, budgetary constraints (e.g. in case any specialist consultancy services 
are required, hire or purchase of specialist equipment) and level of expertise 
required to conduct the risk assessment (British Standards Institute, 2010, pgs. 
22- 80). Qualitative risk assessment methods include structured interviews, 
brainstorming, human reliability analysis, expert judgement and Delphi tech-
nique (British Standards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40). The weakness of qualita-
tive risk assessment methods includes the potential for high level of uncer-
tainty, subjective nature of the risk assessment and potential for bias from the 
stakeholders. The strengths of these qualitative methods include the require-
ment for low- medium level of technical knowledge to conduct the assess-
ments, limited impact on resources such as timescales and cost (British Stand-
ards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40).  
Scenario analysis risk assessment methods include cause and effect analysis, 
fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, toxicological risk assessments British 
Standards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40). The strengths of these risk assessment 
methods include the ability to conduct a scientifically robust risk assessment. 
Scenario analysis risk assessment techniques takes into consideration a wide 
variety of hazards, exposure pathways and can integrate multiple stakeholder 
and multiple categories (e.g. environmental, health and safety aspects) into 
the risk assessment. The weakness of these risk assessment methods in-
cludes the potential for high level of uncertainty, resource constraints including 
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a higher level of skilled people required to conduct these types of assess-
ments. There may also be impacts on timescales and cost constraints (British 
Standards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40). 
Function analysis includes Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Op-
erability (HAZOP) studies, Hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) 
(British Standards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40). FMEA and FTA are widely used 
techniques in failure analysis (Peeters et al, 2018). These methods require a 
high level of skill, time effort and cost. These methods were traditionally ap-
plied in safety critical industries such as oil and gas sector, chemical plants, 
nuclear industries. The strengths of these methods include low- medium level 
of uncertainty and robust risk assessment considering intricate level of detail 
in the process and plant (British Standards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40). 
Controls assessment risk assessment techniques include Layer of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) and bow tie analysis. LOPA is a semi- qualitative risk assess-
ment method which considers the strengths of individual layers of protection 
(Willey, R.J., 2014). In comparison to LOPA, bow tie analysis is a simplistic 
graphical representation of risk scenarios and risk controls. Bow tie analysis 
provides a high-level analysis of exposure pathways and existing risk controls. 
Both LOPA and bow tie analysis require some level of skill to conduct the anal-
ysis. There is medium to high level of uncertainty in the risk assessment. De-
pending on the scope of the risk assessment, the resource requirements such 
as time and money are not as high as function analysis techniques (British 
Standards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40). 
Statistical methods include Markov analysis, Bayesian analysis and Monte- 
Carlo analysis. These methods are used for complex system analysis where 
analytical methods are not practical. These statistical methods require simula-
tions and very highly skilled people including time and software solutions to be 
able to conduct the risk assessment. The strengths of these methods include 
low levels of uncertainty (British Standards Institute, 2010, pg 22- 40). 
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These 31 risk assessment techniques can be used in a variety of industries. 
The selection and application are dependent on the objectives of the risk as-
sessment and resource constraints. The risk assessment techniques can also 
be applied together to address various stages of a risk assessment.  
One of the main objectives of the Strategic Approach to International Chemi-
cals Management (SAICM) is risk reduction. Risk reduction involves protecting 
the environment and human health from exposure to hazardous chemicals in-
cluding hazardous wastes. In other words, it involves preventing chemical ac-
cidents or uncontrolled release of chemicals into the environment. It is widely 
acknowledged in safety sciences that accidents, incidents do not occur on their 
own as isolated incidents (Dekker, 2011). Whilst, our focus I son chemical risk 
assessment methodologies, it is important to gain an understanding of the role 
of systems thinking in defining the broader context and characteristics for an-
alysing risk in sociotechnical systems (Rasmussen, 1997; Dallat et al, 2017, 
pg 2).  
There is limited time to provide a detailed review of systems thinking. However, 
Rasmussen’s risk management framework (Rasmussen, 1997) amongst other 
systems models such as the Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004) are widely used and acknowledged in safety 
sciences (Dallat et al, 2017) for establishing the relationships between various 
parts, layers and stakeholders in accident prevention and causation (Dallat et 
al, 2017).   Rasmussen’s seven characteristics in his risk assessment frame-
work provide a foundation for risk analysis and risk reduction in socio technical 
systems and have been illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     Figure 2: Rasmussen’s seven characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, the Rasmussen’s framework highlights multiple actors, relation-
ships and hierarchies within sociotechnical systems and accidents do not oc-
cur on their own as an isolated event (Dekker, 2011).  The Rasmussen’s seven 
characteristics or tenets focus on multiple actors and levels, multiple contrib-
uting factors or multiple hazards and risks, vertical communication between 
various stakeholders in the value chain, external pressure including regulatory 
requirements, level of flexibility and adaptation to changes within an organisa-
tion and awareness of the context within which the risk assessment is being 
conducted. Rasmussen’s framework takes into consideration stakeholders, 
governance and regulatory requirements (Dallat et al, 2017).  This framework 
is widely applied in safety sciences. However, the Rasmussen’s framework 
does not define the methodology for conducting a risk assessment and hence 
it compliments a risk assessment methodology. The Rasmussen’s seven char-
acteristics can be used to further evaluate risk assessment methods for their 
integration of systems thinking (Salmon et al, 2011). The seven characteristics 
of Rasmussen’s framework can be further applied to assess and select the risk 
assessment methods. 
2.1.2.1 SUMMARY 
Chemical risk assessment is critical to achieving risk reduction. A variety of 
chemical risk assessment frameworks have been evaluated and there are 
common stages to conducting a chemical risk assessment which include haz-
ard identification, hazard characterization, exposure assessment and risk 
characterization. However, the methodologies for conducting these stages in 
a chemical risk assessment are specific to the various actors (e.g. chemical 
manufacturers, formulators, distributors or downstream users of chemicals) in 
the chemical supply chain. The common stages in a chemical risk assessment 
can be applied to a downstream user of chemicals provided the methodology 
is customised. Hence, a review of various qualitative and quantitative risk as-
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sessment methods was conducted to determine their strengths and weak-
nesses for application within the stages of hazard identification, hazard char-
acterization, exposure assessment and risk characterization. 
 A variety of risk assessment methods such as scenario analysis, controls as-
sessment and function analysis can be applied depending on contributing fac-
tors such as level of skills available, level of uncertainty, resource constraints 
and time considerations. These contributing factors could be specific to each 
organisation and provided these factors are established, a combination of risk 
assessment methods can be applied within the common stages of a chemical 
risk assessment framework to meet the needs of downstream users of chem-
icals.  
Whilst, we have discussed risk assessment frameworks and risk assessment 
methods, there is a bigger picture to risk reduction, accident causation and 
prevention. This includes systems thinking to bridge the gap between a risk 
assessment methodology and various parts, layers and stakeholders in soci-
otechnical organisations. The Rasmussen’s risk assessment framework is 
widely acknowledged and used in safety sciences and its seven characteristics 
can be further applied within the chemical risk assessment framework to as-
sess and select the risk assessment methods and embed systems thinking 
into the proposed risk assessment methodology.  
2.1.3 GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS 
Governance is one of the objectives of the Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management (SAICM). Governance refers to the legal framework 
to manage chemicals throughout their lifecycle. From an enduser perspective, 
the regulatory framework for managing chemicals further influences product 
design, material selection, manufacturing process, risk assessment, risk man-
agement and end of life of the product (Phillips, C, 2014). Stockholm, Rotter-
dam and BASEL Conventions along with the Convention on Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) on POP’s are the most important mul-
tilateral agreements for the global governance of chemicals (Helin, 2007). 
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Stockholm, Rotterdam and BASEL Conventions cover the lifecycle manage-
ment of chemicals and outline the control measures for the international use, 
transport and waste disposal of certain hazardous chemicals. These three con-
ventions identify and outline control measures for chemicals that are hazard-
ous to the environment and human health and are applicable globally. Whilst, 
chemicals highlighted in these conventions may not be directly used in the 
aerospace sectors, they could still be manufactured and consumed in the sup-
ply chain (Allen, 2007). The Stockholm, Rotterdam, Basel convention and the 
Globally Harmonised System for the Classification and Labelling of Chemicals 
(GHS) (United Nations, 2017) have been covered in section 2.1 on inter-gov-
ernmental agreements. 
Aside from international conventions and protocols, there are regional chemi-
cal regulations that impact manufacturing industries such as the European Un-
ion’s, REACH regulation (EC) No 1907/2006. REACH regulation brings to-
gether a patchwork of chemical regulations within the European Union to cre-
ate a single regulatory framework. A brief overview of the stages of REACH 
regulation will highlight how the SAICM objectives are being integrated into the 
regulatory framework.  
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) 
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 were enforced in June 2007 (Health Safety 
Executive, 2012). Under REACH Regulation, manufacturers, suppliers, distrib-
utors, formulators and downstream users have certain responsibilities (Euro-
pean Chemicals Agency, 2012). The main aim of REACH Regulation is to pro-
vide the highest level of protection for human health and the natural environ-
ment (European Chemicals Agency, 2012) by ensuring appropriate risk man-
agement measures are taken throughout the lifecycle of the chemical sub-
stance. REACH Regulation applies to chemical substances, preparations in 
articles. An article is defined as an object which during production is given a 
special shape or design which determines its function to a greater degree than 
does its chemical composition (Health Safety Executive, 2012). The various 
stages under the REACH regulatory framework have been discussed in the 
following sections.  
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Registration Stage: Depending on the role in the supply chain the manufac-
turer or importer of a substance >1 tonne/ annum would submit information to 
the European Chemical Agency. The information submitted as part of the reg-
istration dossier includes: 
• Physical and chemical (molecular) structure of the substance (European 
Chemical Agency, 2012). 
• Substance identity (European Chemical Agency, 2012). 
• Ecotoxicology, mammalian toxicology (European Chemical Agency, 2012). 
• Environmental impact including biotic and abiotic degradation (European 
Chemical Agency, 2012). 
• Chemical manufacturing process and uses for the chemical (European 
Chemical Agency, 2012). 
• Risk Management Measures (European Chemical Agency, 2012). 
The registration deadlines under REACH Regulation are listed in Figure 3. In 
addition to the information listed above, all registrants are required to produce 
safety data sheets if their chemical is hazardous as defined by the GHS and 
CLP Regulations. If the substance is manufactured or imported at 10 or more 
tonnes per year, then it is a legal requirement for either the importer or manu-
facturer to conduct a ‘Chemical Safety Assessment’ (CSA) to ‘define the con-
ditions of use under which the risks can be controlled’ (European Chemical 
Agency, 2012). The CSA includes hazard and exposure assessment along 
with risk characterisation. The findings of the CSA are presented in the Chem-
ical Safety Report (CSR).  If the specific use of a substance by a downstream 
user has not be registered by the manufacturer or importer, then the down-
stream user is responsible for carrying out their own chemical safety assess-
ment. The registration deadlines are listed in Figure 3. All actors in the supply 
chain will have certain responsibilities under the REACH registration dead-
lines.  The REACH registration deadline in Figure 3 applies to all actors in the 
supply chain including downstream users.   
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Figure 3: REACH Registration deadline.  
 
Source: European Chemical Agency, 2017. Guidance in a Nutshell. 
Post registration, the next stage is the evaluation process. This stage involves 
evaluation of the registration dossiers and substance evaluation which is con-
ducted by member states to identity initial ‘Substances of Very High Concern’ 
(European Chemicals Agency, 2012). 
Following the evaluation process of a substance, if, it is found to be of very 
high concern, then proposals are put forward to include the classification of the 
substance as a Substance of Very High Concern (SVHC) or proposal for re-
striction of the substance for certain applications (European Chemicals 
Agency, 2012) 
Substances are classified as SVHCs if they meet the following criteria for clas-
sification (European Chemicals Agency, 2012) 
• Carcinogenic, mutagenic, toxic to reproduction (CMR) with a categorisation 
of 1A  or 1B (European Chemicals Agency, 2012) 
• Persistent, Bioaccumilative and Toxic Substances (PBT) 
51 
 
 
• Very Persistent, very Bioaccumilative Substances (vPvB) 
• Case by case review of substances including review of endocrine disrupt-
ing chemicals (European Chemicals Agency, 2007-2017). 
Figure 4 provides an overview of how substances of concern are evaluated 
and regulated under the REACH framework.  
Figure 4: Substances of concern – evaluation process 
 
Source: European Chemicals Agency, 2007 -2017. Substances of potential 
concern. Available at: https://echa.europa.eu/substances-of-potential-con-
cern, n.d.  
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Figure 4 provides an overview of the substance evaluation process. If a sub-
stance is of concern, it is further evaluated and managed through the Registry 
of Intentions process. The Registry of Intentions highlights to interested parties 
that the substance could be added to Annex VI of CLP regulations or to the 
candidate list or REACH restriction list and plans are submitted to ECHA for 
further review and consultation. After the evaluation stage, the next stage in 
the REACH process is the authorisation stage. The aim of the authorisation 
stage is to ensure that the risks from substances identified as SVHCs are ad-
equately controlled throughout their lifecycle. Annex XIV contains the authori-
sation list. Prior to placing a substance on the authorisation list (Annex XIV), it 
is placed on the Candidate List. Once a substance is added to the Candidate 
List, chemical suppliers have immediate legal obligations: 
The supplier of a substance on its own or in the preparation which is listed on 
the Candidate List has a legal obligation to provide Safety Data Sheets (SDS) 
to all the downstream users (European Chemicals Agency, 2017).  Suppliers, 
downstream users also need to communicate safe use information, respond 
to customer requests and notify ECHA if the article contains an SVHC above 
the concentration of 0.1% (w/w) and if the article contains a SVHC above 1 
tonne per producer/ importer (European Chemical Agency, 2017).  The legal 
obligations for SVHC’s in articles and inclusion of a substance in the candidate 
list have been listed in ‘Article 7 (2) - Notification to ECHA’ and ‘Article 33 –
Duty to communicate safe use information’ (European Chemicals Agency, 
2017).  
 
Once a substance is placed on the authorisation list, it cannot be manufactured 
used or imported without authorisation being granted for a specific use under 
specific conditions (European Chemicals Agency, 2012). To apply for authori-
sation, the importer, manufacturer or downstream user will have to either 
demonstrate that the risks arising from the use of the substance are adequately 
controlled or that the socio-economic advantages of the substance outweigh 
the hazardous proprieties of the substance.  
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The next stage is the restriction stage. If a substance poses uncontrolled risks 
to the environment and human health and the authorisation of the substance 
is impractical, then the substance can be restricted. The restriction applies to 
a substance on its own or part of a mixture or within an article. Restriction 
applies to specific use or applications of the substance (European Chemical 
Agency, 2017). Annex XVIII contains the substances on the restriction list.  
 
Whilst REACH Regulation is the most comprehensive chemical regulation in 
the European Union, there are other regulations within the European Union 
which focus on chemicals management. The EU specific regulations include 
Classification Labelling and Packaging of substances and mixtures regulation 
No 1272/2008 (CLP); Seveso Directive III 2012/18/ EU; Restriction of Hazard-
ous Substances Directive 2011/65/EU (ROHS). The CLP regulations imple-
ment the Globally Harmonized System for the classification and Labelling of 
Chemicals (GHS) (European Chemicals Agency, 2015). CLP regulation estab-
lishes the criteria for hazard classification, labelling, pictograms and signal 
words and labelling on packaging (European Chemicals Agency, 2015). The 
aim of CLP regulation is to determine if a substance or mixture is hazardous 
and establish the hazard category and hazard class together with the hazard 
communication and labelling requirements (European Chemicals Agency, 
2015). CLP hazard classes and categories apply to environment, health and 
safety hazards.  
 
Seveso III Directive 2012/18/EU focuses on preventing major accidents asso-
ciated with the storage, use, disposal of dangerous substances. The Seveso 
III Directive primarily applies to industries storing, using large quantities of dan-
gerous substances and is closely linked to the CLP Regulations (European 
Commission, 2017). The Seveso III Directive is implemented within the UK as 
the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 2015 (Health 
Safety Executive, 2015). Schedule 1 of COMAH 2015 Regulation lists the dan-
gerous substances (environment, health and safety hazards) and threshold 
quantities for lower tier and upper tier classification. Depending on the classi-
fication (Lower or Upper Tier) of the industrial plant, the operator of the indus-
trial plant has a wide range of responsibilities including the preparation of a 
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Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP), safety report, demonstration of con-
trol measures, emergency response planning as highlighted in Regulations 5 
to 26 of COMAH Regulations 2015 (Health Safety Executive, 2015, pgs 22 – 
70).  
 
Restriction of Hazardous Substances (ROHS) Regulation 2011/65/ EU re-
stricts the use of certain substances for manufacture within Electrical Elec-
tronic Equipment (National Measurement and Regulation Office, 2015).  
 
Whilst, the European Union has a wide range of substance control regulations 
focusing on the lifecycle of chemicals. Other countries have their own chemical 
regulations.  North America has a very distinctive regulatory system as com-
pared to Europe as both Federal and State legislation applies to industry. The 
Toxic Substances Control Act was enforced in 1976 and covers the production, 
use, disposal, import, export and registration of commercial and industrial 
chemicals (Environmental Protection Agency, 2017).  Under TSCA, compa-
nies that manufacture, import or use and dispose of chemical have certain re-
sponsibilities ranging from: 
• Section 5 of TSCA- Pre-manufacture notification for new chemical substances 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). 
•  Section 4- testing of chemicals if there is concern of exposure from the chem-
icals (Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). 
• Section 12(b) and 13: If importing or exporting chemicals, there are certain 
requirements for reporting and certification (Environmental Protection Agency, 
2017) 
• Section 5 (a) of TSCA: “a manufacturer or processor wishing to engage in a 
designated significant new use must submit a Significant New Use Notice to 
EPA at least 90 days before engaging in the new use” (Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 2017). As of June 2016, the Toxic Substances Control Act was 
amended by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2017).  The new Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety Act provides for an improved risk-based approach for evaluating chem-
icals and approving the use of new chemicals (Environmental Protection 
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Agency, 2017). It is currently not clear how synchronized the Lautenberg 
Chemical Safety Act is to the European REACH regulations to enable a more 
harmonized regulatory landscape between the United States of America and 
the European Union.  
We have briefly covered regional chemical regulations (e.g. European 
REACH, CLP, SEVESO III Directive, Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act), How-
ever, there are also country specific chemical regulations such as the UK, Con-
trol of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations (2002) (COSHH Regula-
tions) (Health Safety Executive, 2013). The UK-COSHH Regulations apply the 
control banding approach for hazard banding and grouping. The control band-
ing approach is used to evaluate the risk and determine suitable control 
measures when conducting a human health- chemical risk assessment (Zalk 
and Heussen, 2011). Hazard banding involves pre- grouping hazard state-
ments into hazard groups based on their toxicological properties using the 
GHS criteria (Zalk and Heussen, 2011; Scheffers, 2015).  The COSHH as-
sessment takes into consideration hazard classification, quantity of the sub-
stances used, volatility, solid dustiness, texture, operating temperature, boiling 
point, routes of exposure to human health to determine the suitable control 
measures (Health Safety Executive, 2009). The hazard groups under the UK, 
COSHH regulations have been illustrated in Figure 5. 
56 
 
 
Figure 5: Hazard Groups  
 
Source: Health Safety Executive, (2009). The technical basis for COSHH es-
sentials: easy steps to control chemicals, pp 5. 
Whilst, COSHH is a UK specific regulation, the control banding methodology 
has been applied on a global scale and developed into an International chem-
ical control tool kit by the International Labour Organisation and World Health 
Organisation (Jackson, 2002; Zalk & Heussen, 2011). The hazard grouping 
and banding approach can also be applied to environmental and safety haz-
ards.  
2.1.3.1 SUMMARY  
A review of global chemical regulations has highlighted that the European 
REACH Regulation (EU) No 1907/2006 is the most comprehensive and ambi-
tious regulatory framework aimed at facilitating knowledge transfer and risk 
management across the chemical supply chain. A review of the global chemi-
cal regulations has also highlighted that regulations tend to focus on specific 
Hazard 
group Type
Acceptable 
Concentration range Units
H-
Statements
Dust > 1 to 10 mg/m3
Vapour > 50 to 500 ppm
Dust > 0.1 to 1 mg/m3
Vapour >5 to 50 ppm
Dust >0.01 to 0.1 mg/m3
Vapour >0.5 to 5 ppm
Dust <0.01 mg/m3
Vapour <0.5 ppm
Dust mg/m3
Vapour ppm
A
B
C
D
E
H304, H315, 
H319, H336, 
EU66
H302, H312, 
H332, H371
H301, H311, 
H314, H317, 
H318, H331, 
H335, H370, 
H373, EU71
H300, H310, 
H330, H351, 
H360, H361 
H362, H372
H334, H340, 
H341, H350, 
EU70
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aspects of chemicals management and they can be very onerous, complex 
and can be confined to a region. Whilst regulations such as REACH apply to 
the chemical supply chain and are aimed at protecting human health and the 
environment, there are still challenges with the complexities of the regulation 
and regional enforcement. Hence, just implementation of chemical regulations 
on their own does not provide a complete solution to the sound management 
of chemicals. Regulatory requirements need to be embedded within a broader 
framework to enable the sustainable development and the sound management 
of chemicals.  
2.1.4 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT  
The SAICM objective of knowledge management seeks to ensure that infor-
mation on the intrinsic hazards, safe handling, waste disposal of chemicals is 
freely accessible and communicated across the chemical supply chain (Unites 
Nations Environment Programme, 2006, pg 16). Knowledge management fo-
cuses on ensuring that scientifically accurate information is made available risk 
assessment, risk management and risk reduction. The objective of knowledge 
management is further implemented by the Globally Harmonized System for 
the Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) (United Nations, 2017, 
pgs 3- 9). GHS provides a consistent system for hazard classification and haz-
ard labelling to facilitate safer global trade of chemicals. Safety Data Sheets 
(SDS) are used to communicate information on the inherent environmental, 
health and safety hazardous properties; safe handling; storage; disposal of 
chemical substances and mixtures; dangerous goods information and labelling 
throughout the chemical supply chain across global markets (European Chem-
icals Agency, 2009). GHS Annex 4 (United Nations, 2017) and the REACH 
regulation Annex II outline the minimum legal requirements for the content of 
an SDS. 
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2.2 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS  
In September 2015, world leaders committed to adopt and implement the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015, A/RES/70/1). 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development builds on the Millennium De-
velopment Goals focuses on planet, people, prosperity, peace and partnership 
and consists of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) and 169 targets 
(United Nations, 2015, A/RES/70/1). Chemicals and waste management have 
a central and critical role in achieving the sustainable development goals and 
are directly linked to people, the planet, human well-being, prosperity, peace 
and partnership (Inter-organization programme for the sound management of 
chemicals, 2018).  
Three out of the seventeen SDG’s have direct targets and indictors related to 
the management of hazardous chemicals and wastes. Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal 3 for good health and well- being has a target and indictor to reduce 
illness and death caused by exposure to hazardous chemicals and wastes 
(United Nations, 2015). SDG 6 for clean water and sanitation has a target to 
eliminate, reduce and minimize pollution from hazardous chemicals and waste. 
SDG 12 for sustainable consumption and production patterns has a target to 
achieving the environmentally sound management of chemicals throughout 
their lifecycles by 2020 (United Nations, 2015). Whilst, three of the seventeen 
SDG’s have targets directly relating to the management of hazardous chemi-
cals and wastes, the overarching management of hazardous chemicals and 
wastes underpins all the Sustainable Development Goals (Inter-organization 
programme for the sound management of chemicals, 2018).  
SDG-1 focuses on ending poverty. People in poverty are more vulnerable to 
exposure from hazardous chemicals and wastes due to poor living conditions, 
sanitation and limited access to clean drinking water (United Nations, 2015, pg 
21). SDG 3 focuses on ensuring healthy lives and promotes well-being for all 
ages. The use of chemicals is embedded within our daily lives including the 
water we drink, medicines, cosmetics and consumer goods. Whilst, chemicals 
are integral to our daily lives, the lack of management of these chemicals can 
result in environmental pollution, contamination and degradation of our basic 
59 
 
 
life support systems (United Nations, 2015 pg 17 -25).  Similarly, SGD 5 for 
gender equality, hazardous chemicals have different physiological impacts on 
men and women (Inter-organization programme for the sound management of 
chemicals, 2018). Chemicals hazards such as toxic to reproduction, endocrine 
disrupting chemicals are suspected of altering reproduction function in men 
and women (United Nations, 2015, pg 17). Pregnant women are more vulner-
able to exposure from hazardous chemicals and wastes as these chemicals 
can be transferred to the unborn child (United Nations, 2015, pg 17). 
SDG 6 focuses on sustainable management of water and sanitation. Chemi-
cals are used in a wide variety of industrial applications including manufactur-
ing, agriculture, mining, power plants, research and development. The release 
of chemicals from manufacturing and other industrial applications as hazard-
ous waste, air emissions, accidental spills can result in contamination of sur-
face and ground water and affect the quality of aquatic ecosystems and sani-
tation. An example of chemical pollutants are organic hydrophobic compounds 
that are not easily soluble in water and tend to bioaccumulate in aquatic biota 
(Schweitzer, L and Noblet, J., 2018, pg 261 -290). Similarly, polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCB’s) are also hydrophobic organic compounds with properties for 
long range transport, bioaccumulation and varying toxicity impacts on various 
terrestrial and aquatic receptors. (Schweitzer, L and Noblet, J., 2018, pg 261 -
290). 
SDG’s 13, 14 and 15 focus on climate change, conservation, protection and 
restoration of marine and terrestrial ecosystems. The sound management of 
chemicals is critical in achieving these targets by managing the production and 
consumption of hazardous chemicals.  
To summarise, the sound management of chemicals is inextricably connected 
to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and has a direct impact on 
the planet, people, prosperity, peace and partnership. Whilst, only three of the 
seventeen SDG’s have direct targets and indicators relating to the manage-
ment of hazardous chemicals and waste, the sound management of chemicals 
underpins all the SDG’s (United Nations, 2015). The in-effective or unsound 
management of chemicals directly impacts aquatic, terrestrial ecosystems and 
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the communities dependent on these ecosystems for their livelihoods. Expo-
sure to hazardous chemicals further impacts men and women in diverse ways 
resulting in gender inequalities. People living in poorer communities may not 
have the infrastructure to deal with hazardous chemical wastes and are more 
vulnerable to chemical exposure. Point source air and water pollution from in-
dustrial, agricultural, mining, power generation activities can result in poor air 
and water quality directly affecting all age-groups in communities (World 
Health Organization, 2018; pg 8 -19). Hence, the sound management of chem-
icals is critical in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.   
2.3 SUMMARY  
The literature review on the sound management of chemicals, its objectives, 
principles and implementation on a global scale further informs the direction of 
the research.  A review of global and inter-governmental initiatives aimed at 
achieving the sound management of chemicals highlighted that these initia-
tives have limited scope of implementation with focus on either certain group 
of chemicals (e.g. persistent organic pollutants, ozone depleting substances) 
or specific lifecycle stages (e.g. transportation of dangerous goods, safe stor-
age of chemicals) (United Nations, 2015). Amongst these initiatives, the Stra-
tegic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) (United Na-
tions Environmental Programme, 2006) stands out with a global policy frame-
work aimed at achieving the sound management of chemicals. Unlike other 
global initiatives, SAICM is not limited in its focus on certain chemicals or lifecy-
cle stages.  
The SAICM framework has been applied by both the public and private sec-
tors. The International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) developed two 
voluntary initiatives, Responsible Care and the Global Product Strategy (Inter-
national Council of Chemical Associations, 2011) as a contribution to achieving 
the SAICM objectives (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011). 
The Responsible Care (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011) 
and GPS strategy have been primarily developed by the chemical industry for 
Small Medium Enterprises (SME’s) operating as chemical manufacturers, im-
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porters and formulators of chemicals. These initiatives have not been custom-
ised for implementation by downstream users (industrial or professional users 
who use chemicals but do not supply them further downstream) of chemicals.   
The SAICM framework and its objectives of risk reduction, governance, 
knowledge management and capacity building provide a framework that can 
be applied to downstream users of chemicals provided the methodology is 
customised. The review of the SAICM objective on risk reduction identified that 
there are common stages in a chemical risk assessment framework. These 
common stages include hazard identification, hazard characterization, expo-
sure assessment and risk characterization. The methodology used in these 
common stages of a chemical risk assessment are different for a chemical 
manufacturer or supplier in comparison to a downstream user of chemicals. A 
downstream user of chemicals will not ordinarily need to get into the level of 
detail for a chemical risk assessment as required by chemical manufacturers, 
suppliers. Hazard information on the chemical is provided to a downstream 
user through a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) (Health Safety Executive, 2016).  
Hence, a downstream of chemicals will not ordinarily conduct detailed studies 
and tests on the physical, chemical properties of the chemical substance or 
mixture as these should be provided in the SDS.  
Aside from the methodologies used by chemical manufacturers in conducting 
a chemical risk assessment, there are other risk assessment tools and tech-
niques that are that can be applied to the stages of hazard identification, haz-
ard characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation. Down-
stream users of chemicals can select risk assessment tools based on influenc-
ing factors such as the objective of the risk assessment, resources, tolerability 
of risk and the acceptable level of uncertainty (British Standards Institute, 
2010).  
The SAICM objective on governance focuses on the regulatory framework to 
manage the production and consumption of chemicals. An example of a gov-
ernance framework is the European REACH Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 
which applies to the entire chemical supply chain. However, regulatory drivers 
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such as REACH, CLP, TSCA can be complex and subject to regional enforce-
ment. Chemical governance frameworks also tend to focus on specific ele-
ments of chemicals management. An example is the UK – Control of Sub-
stances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulation 2002 only focuses on hu-
man health whilst the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres 
(DSEAR) Regulations 2002 focuses on physical hazards (Health Safety Exec-
utive, 2013). Chemical regulations can be subjective and disparate and com-
pliance with chemical regulations on their own does not deliver a holistic solu-
tion to the sound management of chemicals. However, as one of the objectives 
of SAICM, chemical governance is a part of the overarching solution for the 
sound management of chemicals.  
The 2030 agenda for sustainable development builds on the millennium devel-
opment goals and focuses on the needs of the present without comprising the 
future of the people, planet, peace, partnership and prosperity. Whilst only 
three of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) have direct 
targets and indicators relating to the management of hazardous chemicals and 
wastes, the sound management of chemicals is inextricably connected to 
achieving the goals for sustainable development – SDG’s (United Nations, 
2015). The effective management of chemicals helps to progress sustainable 
development goals. However, the in-effective management of chemicals can 
result in deterioration of basic life support systems such as the terrestrial and 
aquatic ecosystems we are dependent on for our livelihoods and wellbeing.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
63 
 
 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter provides an overview of the epistemology, heuristics, selection of 
the research methods, data collection methods, strengths, limitations of the 
chosen research methods. This chapter also reviews the content analysis 
techniques. The aim of this research is to define and develop a framework for 
the sound management of chemicals which would address organisational, en-
vironmental and societal challenges in managing chemicals. Table 1 provides 
the high-level research questions which provide direction to the research. The 
research questions include the following: 
1. What is the sound management of chemicals and what are the objectives 
of the sound management of chemicals?  
2. What is the relationship between the sound management of chemicals and 
sustainable development?  
3. How are chemicals managed across Rolls-Royce? 
4. What are the gaps in the management of chemicals in comparison with the 
objectives and principles for the sound management of chemicals?  
5. What is the process for approval of new chemicals? 
6. How do other companies operating in the aerospace sector approve the 
use of new chemicals? 
7. What is the quality of Safety Data Sheets? 
8. Define a methodology to conduct an integrated EHS chemical risk assess-
ment and evaluate the effectiveness of the methodology? 
The research questions further inform the development of a conceptual frame-
work for the sound management of chemicals applicable to downstream users 
of chemicals. The high-level research questions were established through con-
sultation with the academic and industrial supervisors (Phillips, Wehrmeyer, 
Marsh, 2012 -2015). The research questions provide the context within which 
the research methodology is applied.  
There is extensive scientific knowledge on the inherent hazards of chemicals 
including toxicology, ecotoxicology, dose- response studies. There are also 
regulatory controls focusing on the volume of chemicals manufactured and 
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placed on the market (European Chemicals Agency, 2015). This research is 
not concerned with quantifying the number of chemicals used in the company 
or quantifying certain properties of chemicals. This research focuses on un-
derstanding, reviewing and evaluating the processes developed by people 
(stakeholders) to manage chemicals. Chemical process mapping would in-
volve understanding the experiences, perceptions, challenges, concepts that 
people (stakeholders) are using to manage chemicals daily (Berg, 2009). 
Given the broad scope of the research topic within a large multi-national, multi-
sector organisation such as Rolls-Royce, a more open and exploratory method 
is suited. Qualitative research methods are most suited to the demands of this 
research as it is concerned with understanding the interactions, perceptions, 
challenges faced by people and defining innovative solutions (Moen and Mid-
dleton, 2015; Nagy and Leavy, 2006). Qualitative research is defined by Berg, 
2009 as the innovative method of collecting and analysing qualitative data in a 
natural setting (Berg, 2009). Moen and Middleton, 2015 define qualitative re-
search as providing strategies for exploring phenomena, practices within a so-
cio -cultural environment (Moen and Middleton, 2015, pg 322).  
The epistemology of this research is rooted in empirical research which is 
knowledge gained through direct observation and involvement (Simon, 2009) 
and data collection is essential to empirical research. Empirical research is not 
just mere observation but the art of producing and examining factual and ma-
terial evidence. Empirical research is gained through first hand observation 
and re-examination of data collected by others (Simon, 2009, pp 6-10; Yanow 
and Schwartz-Sha, 2014). The epistemology for this research is empirical re-
search as the researcher is based within the social context of the organisation 
and is involved in studying (evaluation, analysing) social and organisational 
phenomena. 
Heuristics as defined by Clark Moustakas is the nature of experience and de-
velopment of methods and process for investigation (Moustakas, 1990, pp 9-
12). Ralph Hertwig describes heuristics as the bounded rationality behind the 
decisions and choices made in the real world with the given information and 
time (Hertwig et al, 2013, pp 4). The heuristics of this research is analytical 
logic used for decision making due to the qualitative nature of the research. As 
65 
 
 
described by Elliot, Fisher and Rennie (1999), the focus of qualitative research 
is to represent the experiences, knowledge and real-life situations of people 
who are engaged in the context of the subject area being researched. It is the 
aim of the researcher to best describe these experiences from the perspective 
of the people, processes being studied (Elliot, Fischer and Rennie, 1999).  
A fundamental aspect in selecting the research method is the ability to be flex-
ible in the research. Given the nature of the subject area (e.g. risk reduction, 
governance, knowledge management, multiple stakeholders); the flexibility of-
fered by qualitative research enables the researcher to explore areas of inter-
est and apply a variety of data collection methods within established bounda-
ries (Hilden and Middelthon, 2002).  Flexibility in data collection methods has 
practical implications which can enable the researcher to accommodate and 
steer the research around the knowledge and experience of stakeholders 
which provides detailed analysis of complex socio- technical systems (Hilden 
and Middelthon, 2002). 
Qualitative research methods can also involve quantitative methods such as 
statistical analysis (Nachimas, 2008; Wildemuth, 2009). Some quantitative 
methods have been used in this research, e.g. systematic random sampling of 
two hundred Safety Data Sheets to assess the quality of the SDS and non-
probability sampling methods such as snowball sampling were used to identify 
participants for focus group discussions.  Further details on the use of non-
probability samples such as snowball sampling have been covered in detail in 
the Data Collection methods section. 
3.1 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
This section provides an overview of the qualitative data collection methods 
applied in the research. Since the research was conducted both at a corporate 
level and within a manufacturing environment, the data collection methods 
most suited to the working environment, skills and availability of the stakehold-
ers were taken into consideration. Participant observation techniques together 
with other data collection methods (semi-structured interviews, unstructured 
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interviews and focus groups) were selected for research within the manufac-
turing environment.  
As highlighted by Fine, 2015, there are several advantages of participant ob-
servation including richness and validity of the research data (Fine, 2015, pg 
530). Participant observation coupled with other data gathering techniques en-
ables the researcher (who is based in-situ) to provide detailed data on the area 
being researched (Fine, 2015, pg 530). Since the data is gained through direct 
observation of real -life situations, it holds a stronger bearing on the validity of 
the data. Whilst, there are several advantages of participant observation, there 
are also several disadvantages.  
These disadvantages of participant observation can be further categorised into 
proof of data, generalization and bias (Fine, 2015, pg 531). If the study is con-
ducted in a single factory or specific business function, there are concerns 
around how definitive the conclusions are. Similarly, if the research is con-
ducted within the aerospace sector, there are concerns about generalizing the 
findings to other sectors (Fine, 2015, pg 531). Researcher and stakeholder 
bias are embedded within qualitative research (Barbour, 2001; Fine, 2015). 
Irrespective of the study area, the researcher will bring some level of bias, 
personal perspective and conclusions to the study (Goodman, 2011). These 
disadvantages can be addressed by using multiple methods for data collection 
to complement the data gathering process. A theoretical framework can be 
used to generalize the findings from the research and apply it to a wider con-
text.  
A variety of strategies have been applied in participant research. The re-
searcher was placed within the corporate HSE team and had the benefit of 
using the collective knowledge, relationships and networking of the corporate 
team to get access to various manufacturing environments. Prior to visiting a 
site or contacting any stakeholders, a summary of the objectives of the re-
search, data gathering, analysis and reporting processes were shared with the 
respective stakeholders. Fifty- five interviews were conducted in total which 
includes three site visits, EHS chemical risk assessment study and interviews 
with the corporate function. 
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To review and evaluate the management of chemicals across Rolls-Royce, 
three site visits were conducted. Twenty-five interviews were conducted during 
the three site visits. HSE advisors/ managers, operators, chemists from the 
manufacturing laboratories and production supervisors were interviewed dur-
ing the site visits to Oberusal- Germany, Barnoldswick-UK and Ulsteinvik in 
Norway. Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews were used during 
the site visits and the key findings have been summarised in chapter four. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with HSE advisors/ managers 
whilst unstructured interviews were conducted with operators, chemists and 
manufacturing supervisors.  
In addition to the site visit, twenty interviews were conducted at the Inchinnan, 
compressors manufacturing facility to develop and verify the methodology for 
an EHS chemical risk assessment. Site based interviews were further comple-
mented with interviews with the corporate EHS team and corporate chemicals 
management team.  
Ten interviews were conducted with the corporate team including the REACH 
Programme Manager; Chief of chemicals; HSE chemicals manager; HSE Di-
rector; Head of Occupational Health and Safety; Environmental Director; Ma-
terials Technology Specialist and Civil Aerospace- HSE Supply Chain Director. 
Since the researcher was based within the social context of the organisation it 
was not always possible to plan discussions with corporate team members. 
Instead, the ability to have regular interaction with the corporate team helped 
to build rapport and get detailed insight into the daily challenges in managing 
chemicals.  
Interviews are commonly used in qualitative research and include structured, 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews (Courage et al, 2015). During the 
site visits, the facility walkthroughs allowed the researcher to observe real-life 
management of chemicals and provide analytical validity to the research. The 
use of unstructured interviews was beneficial as it allowed spontaneous inter-
action, rich data and flexibility in the discussion around the management of 
chemicals in a busy manufacturing environment. The use of unstructured in-
terviews further enabled the researcher to build rapport with the chemical line 
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operators, supervisors and discuss subjects such as chemical risk and man-
agement topics in a less formal environment. However, there are challenges 
when using unstructured interviews such as the validity of the data, record 
keeping and data analysis (Courage et al, 2015). To address the challenges 
of data validity and data gathering in unstructured interviews, the researcher 
followed up discussions to verify the information gained during the site 
walkthroughs with further face a face meetings and semi-structured interviews 
to discuss topics of interest.   
Semi-structured interviews were commonly applied for data gathering in the 
corporate function and used together with participant observation and focus 
group studies in the manufacturing environment. Semi-structured interviews 
enabled the researcher to use open ended questions allowing the interviewee 
to provide more depth to the discussion (Courage et al, 2015). Semi-structured 
interviews also provided an opportunity for follow up discussions.  There are a 
variety of options for conducting semi-structured interviews including the use 
of emails, face to face meeting, telephone conversations (Berg, 2009; Courage 
et al, 2015). Face to face meetings were preferred where possible. However, 
it was not always possible to meet with certain stakeholders. Email interviews 
were primarily used for verifying facts from previous meetings or introducing 
the research.   An interview guide was prepared prior to conducting semi-struc-
tured interviews which included an introduction to the research, ice breaker 
question and open-ended questions around the subject area (Wilson, 2014; 
Courage, Caine and Baxter, 2015). One of the weaknesses of semi-structured 
interviews include interviewer bias. Bias can manifest itself in the form of lead-
ing questions (Courage et al, 2015). Wherein, there is pre-existing assump-
tions on the responses from the interviewee. Similarly, prestige bias includes 
the interviewee demonstrating authority over the questioning, time and re-
sponses (Courage et al, 2015). Whilst, it is difficult to completely remove bias 
from the interview processes, key techniques such as being neutral on the 
subject area and using loaded questions rather than leading questions can 
help address the issue of bias (Wilson, 2014; Courage et al, 2015).  
It was not possible to record or film any of the interviews due to security con-
cerns and company policy. Instead field notes, transcripts and follow-up emails 
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were used to record data. Selected extracts from the interviews have been 
provided in chapters four and seven.  
Aside from participant observation, semi-structured and unstructured, other 
data collection methods involving focus groups, probability and non-probability 
sampling were also applied. Focus groups were the preferred choice over the 
Delphi method to conduct group discussions. Whilst, both methods require in-
put from stakeholders with specific skills and experience, focus groups provide 
more flexibility on how the group discussions are conducted and enable stake-
holders from a variety of skillsets to participate in a semi-formal environment 
(Goodman, 2011; Wilson, 2014). The use of focus groups allowed stakehold-
ers with experience and expertise to share knowledge, insight and provide 
feedback within the manufacturing environment without causing much disrup-
tion to production requirements. The subject area, research questions for the 
focus group were clearly communicated with the focus group participants. The 
focus group participants were provided with tools (e.g. paper) to record their 
inputs. There were always one moderator present in the focus group discus-
sions. Some of the weaknesses of the focus group method include potential 
for power struggles between dominant individuals; generalizing the findings to 
a broader audience and potential for conflict amongst the group members (Wil-
son, 2014). Ensuring that the objectives of the focus group discussion are clear 
and there is a well-structured discussion plan can offset some of the weak-
nesses in the focus group discussion.   
To identify the target audience for the focus group discussions, a non- proba-
bility snowball sampling technique was selected. Non-probability sampling is 
applied when there is no random selection of the sample size. In the case of 
the Metal Working Fluid study, the target audience were people with specific 
subject matter knowledge and hence selecting random people from the com-
pressor’s factory was not beneficial to the research. The Inchinnan compres-
sors factory has cross functional teams responsible for the management of 
chemicals and it was not possible to pin-point a single individual with overarch-
ing control of the management of chemicals. Hence, the snowball sampling 
technique was applied to allow individual function owners (e.g. manufacturing 
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chemists) to recommend other people with subject matter knowledge on dif-
ferent stages in the management of chemicals (e.g. chemical waste manage-
ment). Two focus group discussions were conducted to inform the develop-
ment and verification of the methodology for an integrated EHS chemical risk 
assessment. Snowball sampling technique was applied to identify the partici-
pants for the focus groups. The first focus group identified the exposure path-
ways for human health and environmental exposure to chemicals. The second 
focus group discussion reviews the controls, mitigation measures for high risk 
exposure scenarios.   
This triangulation of data collection methods provided rich data that off-set the 
weakness of any one method. Aside from the non-probability sampling tech-
nique applied in the Metal Working Fluid study, probability sampling was also 
used in the Safety Data Sheets study. Probability sampling techniques strate-
gies include systematic sampling, cluster sampling, stratified sampling (Wil-
liamson, 2018, pg 359). A systematic sampling technique is applied in the SDS 
study to select SDS from the chemical inventory.  SDS were sorted in alpha-
betical order from the chemical inventory. The top ten SDS in alphabetical or-
der were selected and the process was repeated until 200 SDS were selected.  
The SDS study established a methodology to assess the quality of Safety Data 
Sheets and reviewed the quality of 200 SDS. The SDS study reviews sixteen 
sections of the 200 Safety Data Sheets which have been ranked into ordinal 
data.  A non- parametric test such as Kruskal -Wallis test is most suited to 
analysing ordinal data and identify variance between independent data groups. 
Whilst, the Kruskal Wails test does not specify what is the difference, it high-
lights a difference between the datasets which requires further analytical eval-
uation.   A non- parametric statistical method such as Kruskal Wallis is also 
suited to work with data that is not normally distributed. The data from the SDS 
study has been evaluated and presented in chapter six.  
The data gained from both unstructured interviews and semi-structured inter-
views was further analysed. The use of multiple data collection methods such 
as participant observation, unstructured and semi-structured interviews during 
the site visits, corporate discussions helped to mitigate the weaknesses of in-
dividual data collection methods. The objective of the data analysis is to use 
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the data gained from the interviews, focus group and participant observation 
studies to customise the SAICM objectives for application to downstream 
chemical users. As highlighted by Lazar et al, 2017, there are two approaches 
to data coding – emergent and priori coding (Lazar et al, 2017). The data cod-
ing in this research started from a very basic understanding of the subject area 
to noting interesting concepts, key words, and perspectives instead of using 
established theory. Hence, emergent coding was more suitable. Data gained 
from field notes, transcripts was coded into key words, concepts, perceptions 
and continuously refined to develop conceptual theory. Whilst, interpretation 
of data using emergent coding can be subject to bias and may raise concerns 
regarding validity (Lazar et al, 2017). The use of participant observation and 
focus group studies together with interviews provide rich data which helps to 
address issues of validity, reliability of emergent coding approaches (Stake, 
1995).  
The data collection methods applied to the research questions have been sum-
marised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Data collection methods 
Research questions Data collection and analysis 
methods 
• What is the sound man-
agement of chemicals? 
• What is the link be-
tween the sound man-
agement of chemicals 
and sustainable devel-
opment? 
 A review of literature was 
conducted on inter-govern-
mental and private sector initi-
atives aimed at achieving the 
sound management of chemi-
cals. The strengths and weak-
nesses of these initiatives 
were evaluated.  
A review of literature was con-
ducted on sustainable devel-
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opment and sustainable de-
velopment goals. The links 
between the SDG’s and the 
sound management of chemi-
cals was evaluated.  
• What is the current 
management of chemi-
cals across Rolls-
Royce? 
• What is the approvals 
process for introducing 
new chemicals? 
Following the review of litera-
ture on the sound manage-
ment of chemicals, the SAICM 
objectives were used as a 
baseline to evaluate the cur-
rent management of chemi-
cals across Rolls-Royce.  
The data collection methods 
applied during the site visits 
included participant observa-
tions, semi-structured and un-
structured interviews. Data 
gained from field notes, tran-
scripts was coded into key 
words, concepts, perceptions 
and continuously refined to 
develop conceptual theory.  
• How are chemicals 
managed by other com-
panies operating in the 
aerospace sector 
Semi-structured, telephone-
based interviews were con-
ducted with members of the 
Aerospace Defence and 
Space industries (ADS)- Haz-
ardous Materials Group mem-
bers.  
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• What is the quality of 
Safety Data Sheets? 
A review of literature was con-
ducted on the assessment 
methodologies applied to re-
view the quality of toxicology, 
epidemiology, eco-toxicology 
studies. 
The review of literature in-
formed the development of a 
conceptual methodology for 
assessing the quality of Safety 
Data Sheets. 
A systematic sample of 200 
SDS was selected from the 
chemical inventory and a non-
parametric test has been ap-
plied. A standard Kruskal Wal-
lis statistical test is applied to 
analyse the data. The Safety 
Data Sheets have sixteen 
sections that have been 
ranked into ordinal data. A 
non-parametric, Kruskal Wal-
lis test is most suited for   an-
alysing ordinal data. The 
Kruskal Wallis test highlights 
the differences between the 
various sections of the 200 
SDS.  
• How can inherent EHS 
hazards be integrated 
A review of literature was con-
ducted on existing chemical 
risk assessment frameworks 
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into a chemical risk as-
sessment methodol-
ogy? 
and a chemical methodology 
was proposed.  
The proposed methodology 
was tested on a widely used -
metal working fluid. A Snow-
ball sampling method was ap-
plied to identify stakeholders. 
Once the stakeholders were 
identified, semi-structured in-
terviews and focus group dis-
cussions were used to test 
and verify the various stages 
in the proposed methodology.  
The proposed chemical risk 
assessment was compared 
with the existing chemical risk 
assessments to verify the 
strengths and weaknesses of 
the proposed methodology.    
 The qualitative data collection methods have been further discussed in chap-
ters 4.1, 6.2 and 7.3.1.  
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4.0 MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICALS- AEROSPACE SECTOR 
As highlighted in Table 1, one of the objectives of the research is to identify 
and evaluate the management of chemicals across Rolls-Royce.  The litera-
ture review conducted in chapter 2 provides a baseline for assessing the cur-
rent management of chemicals. The SAICM objectives of risk reduction, gov-
ernance, knowledge and capacity building are used as a baseline to evaluate 
the management of chemicals. The research into the management of chemi-
cals across Rolls-Royce was conducted between 2012 – 2013. The infor-
mation provided in this section has been taken from the EngD 1st year report, 
document no 187830. To evaluate the management of chemicals across Rolls-
Royce, the research was categorised into two groups: focus on corporate and 
site-based (manufacturing environment) activities.  
4.1 RESEARCH METHODS 
The industrial supervisors (Phillips and Marsh, 2012 -2015) provided a list of 
personnel based within the corporate function who were involved in overseeing 
the management of chemicals. Their scope of work ranged from chemical reg-
ulatory compliance to defining corporate HSE standards for managing chemi-
cals. Ten interviews were conducted with the corporate team covering the 
REACH Programme Manager; Chief of chemicals; HSE chemicals manager; 
HSE Directors; Head of Occupational Health and Safety; Environmental Direc-
tor; Materials Technology Specialist and Civil Aerospace HSE Supply Chain 
Director. 
An interview was conducted with the corporate REACH Team in July 2012 
including Steve George and Phil Humphries (REACH Programme Manager 
and Chief of chemicals) to understand the implementation of REACH across 
the business.  
A summary of the discussion and extracts from the interview have been listed: 
 Phil Humphries: The impact of REACH Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 on com-
pany operations has helped to formalize processes and the tools used to 
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gather information from the supply chain and various customer facing busi-
nesses. REACH Regulation has resulted in a higher level of engagement 
and interaction with the supply chain and regulators. The Regulation has 
helped to fast track and finance research and development on alternate 
chemical substances and mixtures. However, the blanket approach under 
REACH Regulation implies that industries manufacturing consumer goods 
such as cosmetics, toys are being compared with the Aerospace sector   which   
has   a   completely   different and unique operating environment. Chemicals 
used in the Aerospace sector have been developed after years of research 
and are rigorously tested for quality and safety standards. Substituting chemi-
cals classified as Substances of very high concern (SVHC’S) does not guar-
antee the safety and performance ability of the product which is very critical for 
aerospace application. Transfer of information on the substances used within 
articles is complex given the global scope of the aerospace sector supply 
chain.  
An extract from the semi-structured interview with Steve George - REACH Pro-
gramme Manager on 12th July 2012 provides information on the impact of 
REACH Regulations on the chemical supply chain across Rolls – Royce and 
the aerospace sector in general.  
Question:  What is the company’s primary role in the supply chain (man-
ufacturer, importer or downstream user) and what is the percentage share of 
each role.  
Answer: This must be answered in context of the definitions in REACH, these 
terms relate to role with respect to chemicals, and note that Downstream 
user is either a formulator of mixtures, or a user of chemicals/mixtures and 
neither describes our role as assembler of products, most of whose compo-
nents are supplied to us. Consequently, my answer would be >80% Pro-
ducer of Articles, 18% End-User of substances/mixtures, <2% Importer and 
<<0.1% Formulator, based on my broad understanding of supply chain value 
and volumes. 
Question: What chemical substances used in Rolls-Royce (EU only) are cur-
rently on the REACH Authorisation and Candidate List? 
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Answer: Used in Rolls - Royce versus our supply chain are different questions.  
The information is coming together gradually and is not complete. The key 
ones are the chromates (Chromic Acid, Chromium Trioxide, Sodium Dichro-
mate, Potassium Dichromate, Strontium Chromate, Lead Chromate, Ammo-
nium dichromate, Lead sulfochromate yellow, Lead chromate molybdate sul-
phate red) Aluminosilicate Refractory Ceramic Fibre, Cobalt (II) sulphate, Bo-
ric acid. Some of these are in Annex XIV (Authorisation). Others are used in 
the supply chain (MDA) and more may be in mixtures we or our suppliers use. 
 Summary: The corporate REACH Team is responsible for the implementation 
of REACH Regulation across the supply chain. However other chemical regu-
lations are managed both at site/plant level with corporate support. To under-
stand the management of safety critical chemicals and materials across the 
aerospace sector, face to face, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with the Application Engineering team.  Safety critical materials including 
chemicals mixtures that are regulated under the European Union- Aviation 
Safety Agency are managed under the Materials Capability Acquisition pro-
cess (MATCAP). An overview of the MATCAP process has been listed below: 
The Materials Capability Acquisition Process (MATCAP) was initiated in 1998 
by Rolls-Royce. The process was designed for the aerospace sector and is a 
gated review of materials. The MATCAP process consists of four stages and 
nine Technology Readiness Levels. Since 2006 the process has been increas-
ingly adopted by other sectors. Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) refers to 
the maturity of a technology to be integrated into the product. The concept of 
TRLs was started by the Department of Defence in the United States (Rolls-
Royce, 2007). The MATCAP process only applies to materials (chemicals, al-
loys, composites) that will be incorporated into the product and does not cover 
the manufacturing process, testing or development process and the use of 
consumables such as industrial solvents. The MATCAP process consists of 
four stages. Each stage in the process involves a health, safety and environ-
mental review. In stage one, the materials technologist fills in an HS&E as-
sessment form and submits it to the Corporate HS&E Team for review. This 
HS&E review covers five environmental and two health and safety aspects 
including air pollution, water pollution, waste, resource efficiency and energy 
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usage, chemical and physical hazards. Stage one HS&E review is a summary 
of the hazards associated with the particular article and does not include a 
comprehensive risk assessment. 
There are three different material application categories used to classify mate-
rials and review them through the MATCAP process. The materials classifica-
tion is done using the Rolls-Royce Global Process C.2.6.1. Materials are clas-
sified as critical, reliability sensitive and unclassified. If the part in which the 
material is used is likely to fail during in flight operations and result in hazard-
ous consequences which includes scenarios such as uncontrollable fires, fail-
ure of parts or loss of control of aircraft. If the failure of the part results in haz-
ardous situations, then the part is classified as a critical part and any materials 
used in the part will go through a major MATCAP review. If the part in which 
the material has been used is unlikely to fail during in-flight operations but in-
stead has an impact on the reliability, cost and operations; then the part is 
classified as reliability sensitive. If the failure of the part does not cause critical 
failure or reliability sensitive failure, then it is categorised as an unclassified 
part. The MATCAP review for both critical and reliability sensitive parts include 
a major review which includes all four stages of review and nine technology 
readiness reviews.  
A summary of the interview with the Material Application Engineers and anal-
ysis of the MATCAP process is provided in the section below: 
• Not all materials that are used in products go through the MATCAP Process. 
• The type of materials requiring MATCAP reviews are clearly identified by 
the ‘level of review requirement’ based on the material category. 
• The HS&E hazard assessment does not provide a comprehensive risk as-
sessment of the control measures required to adequately control the risks from 
the use and disposal of the material. The current system does not include a 
COSHH assessment to be attached to each hazard assessment as part as the 
MATCAP process.   
• It is not clear at what stage a COSHH assessment is carried out and the 
potential uses of the substance are identified and how this information is trans-
ferred between the various sites and sectors. 
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• HS&E hazard assessments along with MATCAP review of materials are 
stored in a database which is managed by the Materials Engineering function 
but is not easily accessible to other businesses. Hence, there is lack of 
knowledge transfer and even if access to the database is provided, it is un-
known how effective the communication will be between application engineer-
ing and plant management to integrate the findings from the HSE assessment  
• It is unknown what percentage of MATCAP reviews have been completed 
by sector over the last ten years. This highlights an issue with knowledge trans-
fer management. 
The interviews with the Material Application Team and REACH Team provided 
an overview of corporate programs to manage compliance and materials ac-
quisition. Further interviews were conducted with the HSE director and Occu-
pational Health Director to review the findings from the site visits. These inter-
views at a corporate level combined with participant observation, interviews 
with key personal at the manufacturing facilities provides a holistic overview of 
the challenges, opportunities and management of chemicals across Rolls-
Royce in comparison with the SAICM objectives.  
To identify and evaluate the management of chemicals across the various 
manufacturing facilities, the industrial and academic supervisors proposed that 
the researcher conduct site visits. Twenty-five interviews were conducted dur-
ing the three site visits. HSE advisors, operators, chemists from the manufac-
turing laboratories and production supervisors were interviewed during the site 
visits.  
The site visits provided the researcher with an opportunity for field-based re-
search and the ability to observe real-life challenges in the management of 
chemicals within a manufacturing environment whilst engaging with a wide va-
riety of stakeholders (machinists, contractors, facilities team and HSE team). 
A variety of data gathering tools were used to accommodate the social context 
of the working environment, skill set of the stakeholders and busy production 
schedules. The SAICM objectives of risk reduction, governance, knowledge 
management and capacity building were used as a baseline to evaluate the 
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management of chemicals across Rolls-Royce. There were other overarching 
organisational objectives as listed below: 
• Evaluate the differences in the management of chemicals between the aer-
ospace, marine and energy sectors (even though the research primarily 
focused on the aerospace sector). 
• Evaluate differences in the management of chemicals between countries. 
• Provide a review of the different chemicals used on site and variety of dif-
ferent chemical process applications (E.g. spraying, brushing, roller appli-
cation). 
•  Regulatory and cultural diversity of the sites and sectors aimed at under-
standing the impact of regulations on the management of chemicals. 
Using the site selection criterion, a list of sites from the civil aerospace, marine 
and energy sectors were identified in Table 3.  
Table 3: Initial site visit schedule 
 
Following the selection of the sites, a business case was forwarded to the sen-
ior management to allocate budgets and approve travel and arrangements for 
the site visits. However, due to restriction in budgets and a new travel policy, 
several changes were incorporated in the site visit schedule. The revised site 
visit and telephone-based interview schedule is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Revised site selection schedule 
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The changes to the site visit schedule were made with expert judgement from 
senior HSE managers. The interview guide for the site visits was designed 
using open- ended questions which provide a level of flexibility to the HSE 
managers to cover a wider range of topics and dwell into subject areas of spe-
cific concern. The questions were designed to cover six key elements for the 
sustainable management of chemicals. These key elements include integrated 
risk assessment and management; lifecycle management of chemicals; regu-
latory governance; training and capacity building and knowledge transfer man-
agement. The interview guide and site visit questions have been taken from 
the EngD 18 month report. The questions have been listed below: 
• Provide an overview of the management of chemicals on site including the 
main uses of chemicals in specific processes and applications.  
• What are the key regulations influencing management of chemicals on the 
site? What is the approvals process for introducing new chemicals in prod-
uct and manufacturing processes? Is this a sector or site-specific process? 
• At what point do HSE first become aware of the intent to use a chemical 
and how is this information conveyed? 
• Do you undertake HSE risk assessments for the whole lifecycle manage-
ment of chemicals within the business, i.e. receipt, storage of chemicals to 
eventual disposal as waste? Are there any gaps that need to be ad-
dressed? 
• What environmental, health and safety aspects are considered for the risk 
assessments? 
• What information on HSE risk assessments are requested by customers 
during client visits (including service and installation sites)? 
• How is the quality and consistency of hazard information (e.g. risk assess-
ment and SDS’s) reviewed within the site and sector? If the consistency of 
SDS is not reviewed, what happens if the hazard rating of the chemical 
changes in line with REACH regulation? How frequently is the inventory 
checked for consistency? 
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• Is there a business wide system for storing hazard information (e.g. SDS, 
risk assessments and chemical safety cards)? If yes, what are the benefits 
of a business specific system? If not, to the best of your knowledge do you 
think one system would be beneficial? 
• Apart from material safety data sheets, does the site or business ask for 
any other information (e.g. lifecycle analysis, control measures information) 
from suppliers? 
• What are the criteria for choosing chemical suppliers? Are chemical suppli-
ers chosen based on their association and endorsement with Responsible 
Care and Global Product Strategy? Is this part of the supplier declaration 
system? 
• To the best of your knowledge, what percentage of chemicals used on the 
site are classified as hazardous (CMR, PBT, vPvB). Do you have any key 
performance metrics for the management of these hazardous chemicals 
and is here regular occupational health monitoring where required? 
• What changes have been made to adapt to the requirements of regulations 
such as REACH? IF changes have been made, have they provided any 
benefits? 
• What do you think are the critical factors affecting the good management 
of chemicals on site and in the business and can these factors be incorpo-
rated into processes and tools? 
The site visit questions were compiled with input from the industrial and aca-
demic supervisors. The SAICM objectives of risk reduction, knowledge man-
agement, governance and capacity building were used as a baseline for the 
research questions. The site visit questions were designed to be open ended 
and exploratory in nature. An interview guide was provided with the site visit 
questions which highlighted the objective of the study. The three sites evalu-
ated in the civil aerospace supply chain include the Rotatives manufacturing 
facility in Oberusel in Germany, Combustion and Casings site in Hucknall and 
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the Fans manufacturing facility in Barnoldswick, United Kingdom. The re-
sponses from the various site visits has been listed below (this content been 
taken from the EngD 18-month report.  
4.1 SITE VISIT -AEROSPACE SECTOR 
Oberusel overview:  The overview of the site visit to Oberusal-Germany is 
based on participant observation, semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
with the HSE team, laboratory manager, site chemists, production leaders, 
machinists and operators.  Due to the data collection policies, the names of 
the people interview on the factory floor have not been recorded. A copy of this 
report was sent to the respective site HSE teams for transparency in data gath-
ering and data analysis.  
Rolls-Royce Deutschland has two sites, Oberusel and Dahlewitz. The site in 
Oberusel is the manufacturing site for the Rotatives function and manufactures 
turbines, blisks, discs. The Dahlewitz site is primarily an engineering and as-
sembly line. An estimated 700 plus chemicals are used in the Oberusel site in 
a wide range of applications involving milling, plasma strays, paint shop jobs, 
etching process lines and galvanising. The site also uses a variety of hazard-
ous substances such as Hydrofluoric Acid, Acetone, Chromium mixtures, Ar-
drox Orthosil and Alondine. The regulatory requirements in Germany are much 
more onerous and the unit production leaders are ultimately responsible for 
the safety of the workplace. The health safety and environmental team is re-
sponsible for providing advice and guidance on hazards and risk management. 
The HSE team on site includes a safety officer, environmental officer, external 
chemical consultancy responsible for providing REACH and other regulatory 
support and two HSE officers including the lead HSE Manager.   
The approval process for introducing chemicals into manufacturing and the 
risk assessment and management process in Oberusel is quite unique. The 
Oberusel site approves all chemicals (including consumables) using SAP soft-
ware which enables better control on the type and quantity of chemicals stored 
and used on site. The approval process involves a tiered approach involving 
expertise and approval from environmental, safety, regulatory and laboratory 
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professionals. Manufacturing laboratories are responsible for testing and ap-
proving chemicals based on quality, performance and reliability. Manufacturing 
laboratories are interested in product integrity and not legally responsible for 
ensuring health safety and environmental risk assessment and management 
of the chemicals which is the role of the HSE team.  All approvals are docu-
mented, and a physical copy of the approval process is kept on site. Anyone 
who needs to buy a new chemical will raise a request for a proxy (initial) part 
number from the SAP system with which the formal approval process starts. 
The approval process includes the safety officer, environmental officer, exter-
nal chemical consultants, laboratory manager and HSE manager. The person 
requesting the chemical must provide an up-to-date safety data sheet to start 
the approval process along with the proxy part numbers. If an SDS is not pro-
vided, then the approval process does not start, and the SAP proxy part num-
ber is not assigned unless the use of the chemical is stated in the manufactur-
ing guidelines for the respective part.   
A generic risk assessment is carried out by the person raising the chemical 
request and is forwarded to the environmental officer, safety officer, external 
chemical consultants and laboratories for comment and approval.  The envi-
ronmental officer evaluates the requirement for environmental permits, waste 
management controls for using the specific chemical. The safety officer eval-
uates the physiochemical risks of the chemical and identifies control measures 
to be incorporated during transportation, storage, use and disposal of the 
chemical. The external chemical consultant provides an overview of the impact 
of REACH regulation and other regulations on the use of the chemical mixture. 
The laboratories are responsible for approving the application of the chemical 
based on product performance, quality and reliability. Once information from 
all the sources has been received, the approval sheet is filled in and evaluated 
by the HS&E team for final approval. The approval sheet consists of authori-
sation by all parties. The approval process in Oberusel has provided the HSE 
team with up- to- date inventory management and the ability to assess and 
adequately manage risks and demonstrate compliance with REACH require-
ments and other local German regulatory requirements.   
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Integrated risk assessment and management: The approval process ensures 
that the health and safety and environmental risks associated with the use of 
chemicals are thoroughly assessed and evaluated prior to a chemical being 
used on site. However, the risk assessment process in Oberusel is driven pri-
marily by the regulatory requirements. In Germany. All manufacturing sites are 
required to report all workplace related injuries (even if it is a small cut or fall) 
and the risk assessment is based around the activities and tasks that the em-
ployees will carry out during their shift. Generic HSE risk assessments are de-
signed around the tasks that the employee will be doing, not around the risks 
associated with the machinery or the process themselves. In this case the em-
ployee is the centre of the risk assessment not the machines. This process 
helps to ensure that all risks associated with the tasks that the employee will 
be doing are assessed and managed. All employee tasks are accompanied 
with a technical work instruction and chemical safety cards which list the haz-
ardous substances, PPE requirements, hazard information using GHS picto-
grams, emergency contact and first aid measures. The use of chemical safety 
cards is a legal requirement in Germany.   
Knowledge Transfer Management: The SAP system used for the approval of 
chemicals supports the maintenance of an up- to date chemical inventory. 
However, there is no Civil Aerospace specific system for storing the risk as-
sessments from all the manufacturing sites across the globe. Hence every site 
locally stores their risk assessments. All Rotatives sites would have the same 
manufacturing standards and similar use of chemicals and are currently dupli-
cating efforts to complete risk assessments. A central database for the civil 
aerospace sector would enable sites to share best practice and view the haz-
ards and risk management controls used across sites in managing similar haz-
ards.   
Regulatory requirements: The regulatory system in Germany is unique and the 
site is regularly inspected by HSE regulators and by the accident insurance 
institutions. The active role of the regulator and insurance institutions can be 
seen as a positive driver for the maintenance of robust risk assessments, up-
to-date chemical safety cards and a robust chemical approval process. The 
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site has good knowledge of the impact of REACH regulation. An external con-
sultant is used to provide expertise on REACH regulation and is an integral 
part of the chemical approval process.  
Governance, training and capacity building: The HSE team in Oberusel is 
unique consisting of an environmental expert, safety officer, 2 HSE team mem-
bers and an external REACH consultancy. The team governance structure 
provides them with the skills necessary to demonstrate compliance with Ger-
man regulatory requirements and REACH. Furthermore, the availability of in-
house expertise on environmental and safety (physiochemical) impacts asso-
ciated with the use of chemicals provides good control and robust risk assess-
ment and management techniques. The structure of the team is also central to 
the approvals process working.   
Lifecycle management of chemicals (use- stage only):  Risk assessments are 
done for chemical lifecycle stages as part of the approval process. The risks 
in storage, use, and disposal are assessed and managed. However, there is 
no integrated tool for the lifecycle management of chemicals. Hence, risk as-
sessments for each stage are conducted separately which may not provide an 
overview of the overall risks and costs associated with the use of specific 
chemicals.   
Hucknall overview: Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews to-
gether with participant observation was used for data collection during the 
Hucknall site visit. The interviews were conducted with the HSE Managers, 
chemical operators and manufacturing laboratory chemists. 
The Combustion and Casings business function manufactures a variety of 
components including compressors, turbines, fuel spray nozzles and fuel dis-
tribution systems (Rolls-Royce Plc, 2013). The manufacturing site in Hucknall 
uses a wide variety of chemicals. Many of these chemicals are toxic but are 
critical to the development of the product. Chemicals are primarily applied us-
ing plasma sprays, high pressure applications and a variety of heat treatments 
on metal alloys. Example of heat treatment on alloys is the use of hydrofluoric 
acid. A wide variety of coatings are also used which contain a range of CMR/ 
PBT and vPvB chemicals which are essential for the product to function.  There 
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are 3 materials testing laboratories in combustion and casings function which 
are responsible for the testing of all new chemicals in the business. They are 
the first point of contact for chemicals and authorise the use of any chemical 
in product and manufacturing process. The site HSE governance structure in-
cludes an HSE lead and advisor for a manufacturing site consisting of 1250 
people. An extract from the interview and fieldnotes with the HSE Managers 
provides and overview of the business and the management of chemicals at 
the site-  
Question from researcher -Please provide an overview of the management of 
chemicals on site including the main uses of chemicals in specific process lines 
and applications. 
Answer from Alex Livesey and Kev Riley (HSE Manager and advisor for Bar-
noldswick and Ghyll Brow)- Barnoldswick has two manufacturing sites which 
are Bankfield and Ghyll Brow. The sites manufacture Hollow Fan Blades, Front 
Bearing Housing and Tail Bearing Housing for the engines. To manufacture 
the honeycomb fan blade, the titanium alloys go through several stages during 
which a variety of industrial chemicals are used. The chemicals are primarily 
used in processing solutions. The chemicals used include nitric acid, hydroflu-
oric acid, hydrochloric acid and industrial methylated spirits.  A large volume 
of chemicals are used across various process lines in Bankfield and Ghyll 
Brow.  
Question - What are the key regulations influencing management of chemicals 
on site? What is the approvals process for introducing new chemicals in prod-
uct and manufacturing processes? Is this a sector specific or site-specific pro-
cess? At what point do HSE first become aware of the intent to use a chemical 
and how is this information conveyed? 
Answer from Alex Livesey and Kev Riley:  Both the sites in Barnoldswick are 
classified as Lower tier sites under the Control of Major Accident Hazards 
(Amendment) Regulations 2005. Lower tier sites are required to prepare a Ma-
jor Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP). The site is regulated by the Environ-
mental Agency, Health Safety Executive and the County council. The site also 
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must comply with other HSE permits and licensing requirements such as dis-
charge permits, RIDDOR, CDM, air emissions and water discharge permits.  
Chemicals are authorised for use on site through the laboratories which are 
the first point of contact. All consumables are controlled by the Rolls-Royce 
Material Specification MSRR or the Commercial Supply Specification (CSS). 
The labs follow the laboratory approval and control procedure for consumable 
materials which includes the approved products listed in the Manufacturing 
Laboratory Catalogue 104. The laboratory approval and control procedure re-
quire the labs to consult with HSE and carry out a COSHH assessment before 
any material is approved even for trail evaluations. However, the exact level of 
compliance with this process is not clear. The Labs are primarily focused on 
product integrity. The control of change process and the RPS963, CSS200 is 
primarily an areocentric process for Gas Turbine Manufacture.  
Question- What environmental, health and safety aspects are considered for 
the risk assessments?   
Answer from Alex Livesey and Kev Riley  The site uses the ENVAID system 
hence all environmental aspects on the ENVAID system are considered. The 
site HSE risk hazards for health and safety are also identified. The site has its 
own process safety performance indicators which is quiet unique from other 
sites as it is not a requirement by corporate HSE. The site has leading and 
lagging indicators for various chemical process lines. The performance indica-
tors have been chosen from the site risk register and prioritised based on the 
hazard rating. This use of process safety indicators has been encouraged by 
the Health and Safety Executive.  Failure mode and effects analysis  (FMEA) 
and HAZOP’s technique has been used to identify points of failure in the vari-
ous process lines. After identifying points of failure, the second step was to 
identify how data would be captured on these potential failure points. Process 
safety performance indicators have been used for the Hydrogen storage area, 
LPG bulk carriers and HF delivery pipes. Performance indicators are primarily 
used on the acid delivery pipe networks where the potential for accidental spill-
age and exposure has been identified.  
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Question -How is the quality and consistency of hazard information (e.g. risk 
assessments and SDSs) reviewed within the site and sector? If the con-
sistency of SDS is not reviewed, what happens if the hazard rating of the chem-
ical changes in line with REACH Regulation? How frequently is the inventory 
checked for consistency?  
Answer from Alex Livesey and Kev Riley:  The site uses CHEMEDOX for stor-
ing SDS. However, the sites also depend on CHEMEDOX to inform them if the 
status of any SDS had changed. If a substance has been added to REACH 
candidate, authorisation list, the site depends on communication from the sup-
plier or CHQ for details. The Chemedox system is not completely transparent 
and updates on changes to the SDS are not automatically notified. Hence, 
there is potential for the hazard information not being up to date.  
 Question -Is there a business wide system for storing hazard information 
(SDS, risk assessments, chemical safety cards)? If yes, what are the benefits 
of a business specific system? If not, to the best of your knowledge do you 
think one system would be beneficial? 
Answer from Alex Livesey and Kev Riley: The site uses a system called 
RAATS (Risk assessment action tracking system) to store risk assessments. 
However, there are plans to move towards a central database specific to the 
Fans function across the aerospace supply chain. Having a common system 
for sharing risk assessments and SDS would be useful to avoid duplication of 
efforts and provide consistent risk and hazard rating across the function. 
Summary of the chemical approval process at Barnoldswick: The approval of 
all chemicals (except facilities) used on site is done by the material laboratories 
(labs) in co-ordination with the HSE team. The labs inform the HSE team when 
a new chemical is being introduced and COSHH assessments are completed 
for the chemicals. However, labs are primarily interested in the product integ-
rity and the performance of the material. One of the key aspects of the approval 
process is the relationship between the labs and the HSE team. If there is a 
breakdown in communication, this process will not work and there is no inte-
grated tool which stops the labs from bypassing HSE and introducing chemi-
cals without mandatory HSE checks. Another observation is that health risks 
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are given priority in COSHH assessments. However, environmental hazards 
and impacts are harder to measure and require expertise even when the infor-
mation is available in a SDS. These environmental impacts are associated with 
the accidental release, regular emissions and discharge during the transporta-
tion, storage, use and disposal of the chemicals.   
Risk assessment and management:  The site uses the Rolls-Royce standards 
for risk assessments- Rolls-Royce Health Safety and Environmental Risk Man-
agement Standard and Guidance (HS&E –IS-P.01). One of the crucial control 
aspects in the risk assessment and management process is the risk rating. 
The risk assessment for a specific task or chemical process line is done by a 
safety champion and checked by the production lead. If the initial hazard rating 
is not given adequate priority or cross verified, then there is the potential for 
serious environmental, safety and health risks to be missed and not given ad-
equate attention or allocation of resources. The perception of risk also de-
pends on the skill set of the individual. There is requirement for further research 
to clearly identify how the risk assessment process is verified. The site HSE 
team prioritises risks for actions based on the risk rating (hazard and exposure 
potential).  
Knowledge Transfer management: The site stores its risk assessments locally.  
Governance, training and capacity building:  cultural issues towards HSE man-
agement of chemicals are an area of concern wherein the shop floor employ-
ees are slowly grasping the impact of some of the chemicals they are using 
daily. This could be due to the culture and the lack of simple processes, tools 
and communication systems used in the past which have not been easy to 
grasp. The HSE cultural issues could also be attributed to the manner in which 
the business has functioned over the years. The combustion and casings man-
ufacturing site in Hucknall has not been a high production volume site, but this 
setup is rapidly changing due to the requirement to fulfil order obligations which 
is highlighting HSE issues and weaknesses in the existing system for manag-
ing chemicals (e.g. lack of central hazard communication systems is resulting 
in more resource involvement). There is also a lot of focus on improving pro-
cesses whilst human error is not always directly addressed. Sometimes an 
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efficient HSE process may be changed to meet the requirements of one indi-
vidual who may have never followed or understood the process even though 
training has been given.  The cultural issues could also be attributed to lower 
levels of ‘workplace situation awareness’ (Sneddon, Mearns and Flin, 2013). 
Barnoldswick site overview: The Barnoldswick site has two manufacturing 
sites- Bankfield and Ghyll Brow. Both of the sites have been classified as lower 
tier under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 
2005. Lower tier sites are required to prepare a Major Accident Prevention 
Policy (MAPP). The site is regulated by the Environmental Agency, Health 
Safety Executive and the County council. The Barnoldswick sites manufacture 
Hollow Fan Blades, Front Bearing Housing and Tail Bearing Housing for Trent 
engines. To manufacture the Hollow Fan Blades; titanium alloys go through a 
number of stages which include forging, chemical machining, coatings, bond-
ing, and calibration. A number of chemicals are used during these stages to 
acquire the desired mechanical, structural and chemicals properties of the al-
loy. The chemicals are primarily used as processing solutions. The chemicals 
used include nitric acid, hydrofluoric acid, hydrochloric acid and industrial 
methylated spirits. Increase in productivity on sites has resulted in an in-
creased use of chemicals and requirement for sustainable management of 
chemicals.  
Approval process: The material laboratories are the first point of contact for the 
approval of chemicals. The labs follow the laboratory approval and control pro-
cedure for consumable materials which includes the approved products listed 
in the Manufacturing Laboratory Catalogue 104. The laboratory approval and 
control procedure require the labs to consult with HSE and carry out a COSHH 
assessment before any material is approved even for trail evaluations. How-
ever, the exact level of compliance with this process is not clear. The Labs are 
primarily focused on product integrity. The control of change process and the 
RPS963, CSS200 is primarily an areocentric process for Gas Turbine Manu-
facture. Furthermore, the document is outdated and there is no control mech-
anism for ensuring the HSE are consulted on the approval of chemicals.   
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Risk assessment and approval process: Risk assessments are done for each 
process line and for separate stages of the lifecycle of chemicals. For example, 
suppliers of hydrofluoric acid are chosen based on their transport of dangerous 
goods safety and reliability performance. COSHH and risk assessments are 
used for various process lines and the site risk register is created. Due to the 
classification under COMAH, the site has developed process safety perfor-
mance indicators for the acid delivery supply network where there is high pos-
sibility for leakage and accidental release. The key performance indicators fo-
cus on the failure points in the supply pipe networks which can lead to acci-
dental spillage and exposure. However, there are no integrated risk assess-
ment tools used for the whole lifecycle management of chemicals   
Knowledge Transfer management: The site maintains its own risk database 
known as the risk action tracker system (RAATS). The site also developed 
process safety indicators in coordination with the regulatory authorities.   
Governance, training and capacity building: The HSE team is responsible for 
the management of 2 sites which are classified as high risk. Hence, there is 
strain on existing resources to maintain HSE processes on site. The manage-
ment of chemicals from the time of entry into the site to the eventual disposal 
of hazardous waste requires co-ordination between various teams and the 
ability to report and record risk assessments and alerts on an automated sys-
tem which is not available as a tool to the sites. 
 Regulatory requirements: The HSE team identified that there was limited im-
pact of REACH regulation on the site operations and not many changes had 
been incorporated in the HSE processes to deal with REACH regulatory re-
quirements (e.g. registration, notification of SVHC’s). The site HSE team had 
good awareness of UK regulatory requirements. However, when the site visit 
report was forwarded to the HSE Corporate head office, the response was that 
Barnoldswick was one of the first sites in Rolls-Royce to be impacted by 
REACH regulatory requirements and the first sites to get authorisation for the 
use of DEHP (Marsh and Phillips, 2013). A possible reason for the HSE team 
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to undermine the impact of REACH regulations could be attributed to the la-
boratories having central control over the management of chemicals on site 
and the level of understanding and REACH training given to the HSE teams 
 Information from the field notes and semi-structured interviews was further 
analysed Emergency coding (Lazar, Feng, and Hochheiser, 2017).  Key words 
and texts were analysed to better understand the context within which they 
were used. For example, the transcript from the Oberusel site visit revealed 
the frequent use of the term regulatory requirements and the HSE team. The 
context within which these key words were used were further analysed to high-
light their underlying meaning. Similarly, in Barnoldswick, the keywords culture 
and high hazard were used numerous times.  Refer to the EngD 18-month 
report, annex II for the table on content analysis.   
4.2 SUMMARY OF THE SITE VISITS – AEROSPACE SECTOR 
The civil aerospace manufacturing sites based in Oberusel, Hucknall and Bar-
noldswick have been evaluated based on the tools and processes in place to 
address the SAICM objectives of risk reduction, governance, knowledge man-
agement and capacity building. A variety of qualitative methods were used for 
data gathering including semi-structured, unstructured interviews and partici-
pant observation.    
The aim of managing chemicals in the manufacturing sector is to ensure high 
level of protection for human health and the environment. Hence the choice of 
chemicals used in manufacturing processes and as process aids is critical. 
Whilst various control measures can be adopted for reducing exposure to 
chemicals, the primarily objective should be to reduce the use of hazardous 
chemicals hence reducing the need for risk control systems (Health Safety Ex-
ecutive, 2013). However, the choice of chemicals is driven by the desired per-
formance requirements and given the high-risk operational environment in the 
aviation sector, products need to meet strict quality and performance criteria 
thus resulting in the use of chemicals that can provide the level of performance. 
An example if Hexavalent chromium Cr (VI) used in variety of coatings pro-
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vides the necessary anti-corrosion protection.  Whilst, Cr (VI) offers anti corro-
sion properties, it is an occupational carcinogen and toxic to the environment 
(Centers for disease control and protection, 2013). The use of hazardous 
chemicals in the aerospace sector makes it necessary to manage risks 
throughout the various lifecycle stages of the chemicals such as transportation, 
storage use and disposal.  
The site visits identified several common themes. Cultural issues in the man-
ufacturing environment were regarded as a key challenge in the management 
of chemicals. Issues such as shop floor employees eating next to chemical 
process lines or human error could be attributed to two aspects. The first as-
pect could be related to ‘workplace situation awareness’ as defined by Endsley 
(1988, p.97) as the ‘perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of space and time, the comprehension of their meaning, and the pro-
jection of their status in the near future’ (Sneddon et al, 2013).  
Employees working on the shop floor are involved in a variety of high-risk tasks 
involving extremely hazardous substances and advanced machinery. Further-
more, shop floor workers could carry out several tasks during a shift. Both Bar-
noldswick and Hucknall sites highlighted that there has been a significant in-
crease in production over the past five years. This could result in stress and 
fatigue amongst the shop floor workers. As highlighted by Sneddon et al, 
(2013), there is limited empirical research on the impact of stress and fatigue 
on the levels of ‘workplace situation awareness’.  However, stress and fatigue 
can be a contributing factor to low levels of workplace situation awareness 
(Sneddon et al, 2013). Both stress and fatigue are also associated with low 
levels of alertness and concentration which are critical when handling hazard-
ous chemicals during transportation, storage, use and disposal. The second 
aspect could be related to ‘hazard fatigue’ (Hesterburg et al, 2012). When there 
is overwhelming information on the hazardous nature of a product, consumers 
may be ‘overwhelmed with the information and become fatalistic’ (Hesterburg 
et al, 2012) or complacent. Shop floor workers in the aerospace sector are 
surrounded by hazardous substances, highly advanced machinery and need 
to mentally process vast amounts of information on the risks and hazardous 
nature of the materials; hence there is possibility of developing hazard fatigue 
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which can result in complacency further resulting in accidents and harm to hu-
man health and the environment.  
All three sites have developed their own site-specific risk assessment pro-
cesses to evaluate the risks associated with chemical process lines or tasks. 
The hazard rating is a critical part of the risk assessment process as the allo-
cation of resources and priority to risks is based on the hazard rating. The 
Rolls-Royce HSE standard for risk assessment provides a risk rating using the 
formula  
Risk rating = Probability of exposure x severity of exposure.  
 The first step in the risk rating process is to determine the hazard and the 
route of exposure to the hazard. The site visits identified that the initial risk 
assessments were carried out by either risk assessors or safety champions on 
site who were trained on risk assessment. Following the initial assessment, 
the hazard ratings were checked by the production leaders. However not all 
risk assessments are checked by the HSE teams. There is possibility that the 
initial hazard rating does not cover potential environmental hazards associated 
with the use of certain chemicals such as solvents, antifouling paints, and 
phthalates, chromium and cadmium compounds. Further, if the initial hazard 
rating is low, then the risk is not given any priority. Therefore, it is critical that 
the risk assessment process is verified at every stage by a team with right level 
of skills, competence. Furthermore, the risk assessment processes in Hucknall 
and Barnoldswick were based around the chemical process lines and the 
tasks. However, the risk assessment process was based around the employee 
carrying out multiple tasks. This difference in the risk assessment process 
could be driven by regulatory requirement but highlights differences in as-
sessing and managing risks.  
Several observations were made on the process for introducing new chemicals 
into manufacturing. Both Hucknall and Barnoldswick identified the laboratories 
as the first point of contact for introducing chemicals. The approval process 
was dependent on the laboratories informing the HSE team on the new chem-
icals. In the absence of an automated tool, there is no system of ensuring that 
the labs do not bypass the HSE team. However, Oberusel has a system which 
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involves a team responsible for the approval of chemicals. The team consists 
of a safety officer, environmental officer, external REACH consultants, HSE 
team and the labs and uses the SAP tool to support the change process. The 
approval process ensures up-to date inventory management and good control 
over the type and quantity of chemicals used on site.  
The observations from the site visits have been summarised below:  
• Each site has its own risk assessment process and site-specific database for 
storing risk assessments. There is no reason to suggest that a site-specific risk 
assessment process is not robust. However, different approaches to risk as-
sessment can result in different risk scoring and risk control measures. Differ-
ent risk assessment templates, methodologies can further result in different 
risk control strategies applied across various countries. If the same product is 
being manufactured across a variety of countries, having different risk assess-
ment methodologies can result in different risk control strategies with potential 
trade-offs between environment, human health hazards.   
• All sites do carry out risk assessments for the stages of chemical transport, 
storage, use and disposal. However, there is no integrated risk assessment 
process which identifies EHS hazards in a single assessment during transpor-
tation to site, storage, use and disposal.  If the focus is on human health, then 
there is potential for trade-off between environment and safety hazards in com-
parison with human health impacts. Further, conducting separate EHS risk as-
sessment can result in duplication of effort.  
• Most of the sites depended on the material laboratories to inform them if a new 
chemical was to be introduced onto the shop floor. There is no automated tool 
which requires mandatory HSE verification. Hence, the system is based on 
relationship between the labs and the HSE team.  
• In the absence of a common framework for managing chemicals, the various 
sites have developed best practices in managing chemicals as demonstrated 
by the Oberusel site in their change process.  
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The site visits highlighted that various objectives of SAICM were being ad-
dressed. However, in the absence of a common framework for management 
of chemicals, there is potential for trade-offs between environmental, health 
and safety risks. There is potential for different risk control strategies to be 
applied across different countries. Different regional chemical regulations drive 
the risk assessment and risk management process. There are also differences 
in enforcement of chemical regulations depending on the geographical loca-
tion. Whilst, various components are manufactured and assembled in a global 
environment, differences in risk assessment methods, regulatory enforcement, 
could result in different risk management strategies which undermines the con-
cept of sustainable development and the sound management of chemicals. 
 The review of management of chemicals across Rolls-Royce further affirms 
the importance of this research and the need for a framework for the sound 
management of chemicals applicable to downstream users of chemicals. 
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5.0 APPROVAL OF CHEMICALS, AN AEROSPACE PERSPECTIVE  
One of the organisational level challenges highlighted in Table 1, is the lack of 
an insight into how other companies operating in the aerospace are approving 
the use of new chemicals and what challenges exist in the management of 
chemicals. To analyse the management of chemicals across companies man-
ufacturing specialised products operating in critical environments, a study was 
conducted with the Aerospace Defence Security (ADS) and Space Industries 
trade association and hazardous materials (Hazmat) sub group. The ADS 
group was chosen for this study as its members represent the aerospace man-
ufacturing sector which specialises in the manufacture and assembly of critical 
equipment operating in extreme environments. Outside of the ADS group, it 
would be difficult to access these companies due to the security and sensitivity 
of the manufacturing environment as many of these companies also manufac-
ture components for the military or securities industry. The study with the ADS 
group made it easier to access a variety of aerospace companies.  
Whilst, it can be argued that the ADS, Hazmat group is a specialist group, they 
represent industries that manufacture products with very high safety, perfor-
mance and quality requirements. Hence, sectors aside from the aerospace in-
dustry which have similar product safety, performance and quality require-
ments would also benefit from the research.  
5.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study focused on the criteria and stages involved in the introduction of 
new chemicals and the governance structure for managing chemicals. The ob-
jective of the research, data collection, data analysis, data publishing infor-
mation was circulated to all interested parties in the ADS hazmat group meet-
ing. Out of a group of eight members, three members representing three mul-
tinational companies agreed to take part in the study. It is important to note 
that there are no fixed number of members in the HAZMAT subgroup and the 
number of members can increase or decrease. The three multinational com-
panies represent Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), Component 
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manufacturers and sub-system manufacturers and assemblers. Given the lim-
ited timescale and limited availability of the interested parties, semi-structured 
interviews were chosen for data collection method. Semi-structured interviews 
provide flexibility to discuss the topic of interest and delve into in-depth sub-
jects where required (Courage et al, 2015). The main disadvantages of semi-
structured interviews are in data interpretation as different participants may be 
asked different questions depending on the different perspectives of the re-
spondent. These dis-advantages are mitigated by cross verifying the facts with 
the respondents. An interview guide was prepared with open ended questions 
around chemicals management. The academic and industrial supervisors 
were involved in compiling the interview guide (Courage et al, 2015 and Wil-
son, 2014).  
Given the distributed geographical locations of the participating companies, 
telephone interviews were most suited as they were less expensive, less time 
consuming and provided quick data collection periods (Wilson, 2014). There 
are certain weaknesses of telephone interviews such as keeping participants 
engaged in the conversation if tit over an hour, Other weaknesses such as   
ensuring clear communication, telephone connection are critical to the success 
of the telephone interviews. The researcher agreed the time, contact details 
well in advance of the interview. The interview guide was provided to the three 
participating companies a week before the interview. The interview questions 
and the responses have been listed in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Table 5: Responses from the participants 
Please introduce the 
company and use of 
chemicals? How are 
chemicals managed 
within the company, 
what is the management 
framework? 
Company 1 is a downstream user of chemicals with a European presence in France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Chemicals are primarily used in the assembly line, 
treatment line and laboratory testing. The application of chemicals includes metal treat-
ments, wing spraying, fuel tests, and landing gear tests. 
Company 2 is a global manufacturer of aeroplanes and trains providing a wide range of 
mobility solutions. Aviation products manufactured by company 2 include business, com-
mercial and amphibious aircrafts and the trains sector includes bogies, rail vehicles, and 
transportation systems. Chemicals used include a range of coatings such as paints, cor-
rosion inhibitors, sealants, adhesives, resins, polishes, refrigerants, aviation fuels, inks 
and gases. 
Company 3 is a global organisation specialising in the design and development of high-
performance components and sub-sea systems. Civil Aerospace and military are the 
main markets. 
Please can you describe 
the stages involved in in-
Company 1: The central chemical database (HAZMAT) holds information on the chemi-
cal substances used across the company. The HAZMAT database includes risk assess-
ments, quantity of chemicals used across the company, location and application details. 
Prior to a chemical being added onto the HAZMAT database it is thoroughly assessed 
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troducing new chemi-
cals into product and 
manufacturing stages? 
through a gated process which involves basic level risk assessments, pre- assessment 
of the substance by materials specialists and the qualification stage which involves 
chemical evaluation by the New Substance Committee. All chemicals that are restricted 
by the company are included in the banned, targeted and restricted list. The chemicals 
are compared against this list prior to introduction. 
Company 2: All chemicals are approved by the HAZMAT management committee.  Var-
ious departments bring new chemicals to the committee for approval. The approval com-
mittee includes experts from Occupational Health and safety, REACH and Legal team 
and risk management team. Prior to submitting a request for approval of a chemical to 
the HAZMAT team, the chemical product is tested for suitability (performance, quality 
and product safety) within a controlled environment in the Lab and verified to check 
whether the ‘Best Available Technique’ has been used to check that the chemical is fit 
for purpose. A COSHH assessment is also attached prior to the chemical being sent to 
the HAZMAT committee.  
Company 3: All chemicals are approved by a central team consisting of the HSE Man-
ager, Materials manager, occupational hygienists, and material laboratories. Regulatory 
lists specific to the defence, aerospace sectors and REACH are used to scan the sub-
stance composition of the chemical. The materials managers provide the most up-to 
date SDS, which is reviewed by the HSE team. 
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What is the governance 
structure for introducing 
new chemicals? 
Company 1: The key stakeholders are suppliers, materials specialists. Chemical suppli-
ers seek to work more closely with Airbus to reduce the environmental impact of the 
chemicals used and provide customised solutions for Airbus products and services. The 
main aim of the suppliers is to supply a larger quantity of chemicals and have long term 
contracts. Materials specialists are involved in the assessment and approvals of chemi-
cals. There is increasing interface with the procurement team in the introduction of chem-
icals.  
Company 2:  The governance structure includes, HSE Advisors, Occupational Hygien-
ists, REACH Team, Environmental and the risk management teams.  
Company 3: All chemicals are approved by a central team consisting of the HSE Man-
ager, occupational hygienists, material laboratories. Regulatory lists specific to the de-
fence, aerospace sectors and REACH are used to scan the substance composition of 
the chemical. A COSHH assessment is attached to each chemical approval and all uses 
are authorised. Any changes to process or task must be authorised. 
When introducing new 
chemicals do you con-
sider the whole lifecycle, 
costs and impacts of the 
chemical? E.g. cradle to 
Company 1: The whole lifecycle of chemicals is considered as part of the product con-
struction and is included in the HAZMAT database. Detailed lifecycle of every chemical 
used within the various articles is not considered. 
Company 2: Partial lifecycle of the chemical use within the site is considered, this is es-
pecially done for the disposal stage. The need for evaluating lifecycle costs and impacts 
103 
 
 
grave analysis, if not, are 
there any specific rea-
sons for not considering 
the lifecycle costs and 
impacts of the material 
also depend on the quantity of the chemical that will be used and the application process, 
the hazard rating and the resulting risk management measures. 
Company 3: To the best of my knowledge, the whole lifecycle of each chemical used is 
not considered. 
 
Do you have a standard 
sustainability checklist 
for all suppliers and does 
this checklist include 
product stewardship re-
sponsibilities? 
Company 1: All suppliers need to meet the established company quality parameters 
such as ISO 9001, ISO 14001. 
Company 2: Yes, this is included in the code of ethics and business conduct. 
Company 3: Yes, all suppliers are checked for their accreditation to IS014001, OHSAS 
18001. 
What are the key chal-
lenges in managing 
chemicals in your organ-
isation? Do you have 
any key performance 
metrics for the manage-
ment of chemicals? 
Company 1: Regulations, environmental performance and cost. 
Company 2: HSE risks and management of the chemical being introduced into man-
ufacturing process. 
• Business risk  
• Regulatory impact, cost and availability. 
• Fit for purpose 
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Company 3: The product must be fit for purpose if it is to be used. The environmental 
performance and the regulatory requirements are also critical. Transitioning to the 
new GHS labelling system requires engagement with the factory level employees. 
This involves a significant change in culture. Many of the chemical substances that 
have been reclassified under CLP Regulations have already been in use for many 
years. Hence, communicating the changes involves multiple stakeholder engage-
ment on the factory level. 
Do you have reference 
case studies, best prac-
tise examples for man-
aging chemicals 
Company 1: A clear example of best practise and engagement with the supply chain 
is the use of wipes for cleaning wings. Initially gallons of chemicals were used as de-
greasers. This was replaced with a suite of aqueous solvents. These have now been 
transformed into individual wipes which reduces wastage, VOC emissions and im-
proves HS&E performance and is safer to use.   
Company 2: Sodium dichromate was previously used in powder form and has been 
replaced by gel which reduces the handling, storage and exposure potential. Best 
practice also includes the move from open loop to closed loop systems which re-
duces the exposure. In manufacturing sites, chemicals are mixed in controlled ar-
eas. 
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5.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
The three participating companies are primarily downstream, end us-
ers of chemicals. Most of the chemicals are used in manufacturing 
processes and highly specialised or customised for specific applica-
tions. The use of these speciality chemicals is to manufacture prod-
ucts operating in extreme environments. Two out of the three compa-
nies highlighted that regulation was one of the key drivers for intro-
ducing new chemicals and changing existing chemicals. Regulations 
such as REACH, and RoHS were seen as central drivers for change. 
The specific requirements of the aerospace sector such as stringent 
airworthiness regulations, safety and performance requirements 
meant that chemicals cannot be easily replaced as in with other sec-
tors which do not have such stringent safety and performance require-
ments. One of the participating companies highlighted that whilst reg-
ulation was a driver, it was not the main driver. Health, safety and 
environmental considerations were the primary drivers as it further im-
pacted on costs and over all sustainability of the product.  
All three companies have central teams which approve the use of any 
new chemical being introduced or approval for change to existing 
chemicals. The central approvals team consisted of stakeholders with 
the capability of assessing not only the performance, safety but also 
the HSE performance. HSE performance primarily focused on the fac-
tory level activities rather than the HSE impact on the whole life cycle 
of the chemical. Two out of the three companies did not consider cra-
dle to grave analysis of each individual chemical used. However, par-
tial lifecycle thinking is applied to the chemicals concerning the man-
agement how they are managed within the manufacturing environ-
ment. All the companies have strict supplier code of conduct and sup-
plier verification programmes. However, one company went further to 
assess resilience to climate change and ensure that information in the 
materials safety data sheets was complaint with European require-
ments (such as REACH). Hence, maintaining quality requirements 
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which meet the European requirements for sharing of hazardous in-
formation.  All companies highlighted that supplier verification in-
cluded addressing human rights issues. However, it is not clear how 
these requirements are governed. 
There was variation amongst the participants in their responses to the 
challenges in managing chemicals. Whilst, regulation, environmental 
performance and cost were regarded as familiar challenges, ensuring 
that the product is fit for purpose and has good environmental perfor-
mance and low impact of health was challenging. Ensuring adequate 
risk assessments for all chemicals used was also seen as a challenge. 
Furthermore, implementing new substance control regulations and 
maintaining cost efficiency was a challenge and involved multiple 
stakeholder analysis and communication.  
Hence, the study highlights that companies operating in the aero-
space sector have several challenges in managing chemicals. Regu-
latory compliance was a key driver for change together with product 
safety and innovation requirements. Costs associated with compli-
ance with multiple substance control regulations was a key challenge. 
One common trend was the lack of a single methodological approach 
to assess environment, health and safety risks in a single assessment. 
There are multiple challenges associated with the lifecycle of the 
chemicals, hazard information, innovation, product safety, compli-
ance. Addressing these challenges independently without a holistic, 
integrated approach would result in increased costs, resource use and 
questions the ability to sustain the sound management of chemicals.  
None of the companies referred to either SAICM or Responsible Care 
as an overarching framework for the management of chemicals. 
Whilst, the companies were not prompted to discuss their understand-
ing of SAICM or Responsible Care, it can be noted that REACH Reg-
ulation is a governance policy to address SAICM and the sound man-
agement of chemicals and is a visible driver for change. It can be ar-
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gued that through the regulatory framework, REACH Regulation is en-
abling the sound management of chemicals. However, the three com-
panies use their own risk assessment methodology and not an indus-
try wide (chemical end-user specific) standard for conducing chemical 
risks assessments. Safety Data Sheets are the main source for haz-
ard communication and COSHH regulation is used to conduct a chem-
ical risk assessment focused on health hazards.  
This study highlights that the three companies operating in the aero-
space sector have similar challenges to the organisation level chal-
lenges listed in Table 1. The organisational level challenges are not 
unique to Rolls-Royce. Furthermore, the approvals process adopted 
by the three companies is based on the approval from a committee of 
experts, whilst risk assessment and regulatory requirements are cen-
tral to the approval process, there is no framework used for the ap-
proval process. The use of restricted substances lists ensure that cer-
tain hazardous chemicals are not introduced into the manufacturing 
environment. Whilst, the approval process includes a panel of experts, 
risk and regulatory considerations, the information provided in the 
safety data sheet is the main source of hazard information. There is 
no process to verify the quality of this hazard information.   
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6.0 QUALITY OF SAFETY DATA SHEETS 
One of the objectives highlighted in Table 1 is to evaluate the quality 
of hazard communication provided in Safety Data Sheets (SDS). 
Safety Data Sheets are used to communicate information on the in-
herent environmental, health and safety hazardous properties; safe 
handling; storage; disposal of chemical substances and mixtures; 
dangerous goods information and labelling throughout the chemical 
supply chain across global markets (European Chemicals Agency, 
2009). The SDS is specific to the chemical substance or mixture but 
not to the wide variety of working environments where the chemical 
might be used (European Chemicals Agency, 2014). The SDS is fur-
ther used by downstream users to conduct their own risk assessment 
(Health Safety Executive, 2016) customised to their respective work-
ing environments. If the quality of information provided in the SDS is 
not robust or adequate to the severity of the inherent hazards, this can 
have ripple effects on the quality of the risk assessment and conse-
quent risk management measures.  
 In Europe, the legal requirement for supplying an SDS is regulated 
under the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals Regulation (REACH) (EC) No 1907/2006 (European 
Chemicals Agency, 2014). REACH and the Classification Labelling 
and Packaging of substances and mixtures regulation (CLP) (EC) 
1272/2008 further integrate the new requirements outlined by the 
United Nations, Globally Harmonised System for the Classification 
and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), Version 7, Annex 4 for the prepa-
ration of Safety Data Sheets (United Nations, 2017). GHS Annex 4 
(United Nations, 2017) and the REACH regulation Annex II outline the 
minimum legal requirements for the content of an SDS. However, 
compliance with Annex 4 of GHS and Annex II of REACH regulation 
does not guarantee the quality of the information provided in the SDS. 
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The requirements for producing the SDS remain with the manufac-
turer and suppliers of the substances and mixtures (European Chem-
icals Agency, 2014, pp 17). Various actors in the chemical supply 
chain have obligations to communicate their end use and application 
techniques to the suppliers to enable (where relevant) user specific 
safety information to be included in the SDS.  
In Europe, the provision of an SDS becomes mandatory under certain 
conditions. These conditions include substances that meet the criteria 
of being classified as hazardous from December 2010 (under CLP 
Regulations); for being persistent, bioaccumilative or toxic (PBT) or 
very persistent and very bioaccumilative (vPvB); or if the substance 
has been included in the REACH Candidate List (European Chemi-
cals Agency, 2014). An SDS may also be required if the chemical sub-
stance has a community workplace exposure limit (Health Safety Ex-
ecutive, 2012). There are similar requirements for the provision of 
SDS for certain mixtures under REACH Regulation, Annex II (Euro-
pean Chemicals Agency, 2014, pp 25-27). 
As highlighted by Willey, (2012) very often SDS are prepared with the 
aim of being complaint versus the requirement to inform and protect 
human health and the environment (Willey, 2012). Quality differences 
could arise when an SDS does not provide sufficient detail in relation 
to the severity of the hazardous properties of the substances or mix-
tures. Variations in the content of the SDS could also arise from the 
lack of available information, competency of the person preparing the 
SDS, lack of communication within the supply chains.  
6.1 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Annex 4, version 7 of the Globally Harmonised System for the Classi-
fication and Labelling of chemicals (GHS) (United Nations, 2017) and 
Annex II of REACH regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 outlines the mini-
mum legal information that is to be included in the sixteen sections in 
the SDS (European Chemicals Agency, 2015, pgs 31 -103).  Section 
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1 of the SDS should contain the substance or mixture identification, 
supplier details including address, contact details and common names 
(trade names) used to describe the substance or mixture (United Na-
tions, 2017, pg 379). Section 2 of the SDS should include the hazard 
classification of the substance and mixture in accordance with the 
CLP Regulations (EC) No 1272/2008; label elements including hazard 
statements, hazard pictograms, precautionary statements (European 
Chemicals Agency, 2015, pgs 37 -42). Section 3 should include the 
composition of the chemical mixture or substance with information on 
CAS, EC numbers, REACH registration number if applicable, concen-
tration or percentage of weight in the mixture and CLP hazard classi-
fication (European Chemicals Agency, 2015). Sections 4 – 7 should 
include minimum information on first aid measures (including route of 
exposure, acute and delayed affects); firefighting media; personal pre-
cautions including emergency procedures and containment 
measures. Section 7 to include information on safe handling and stor-
age of the chemical substance or mixture. Section 8 should include 
information on occupational exposure limits, personal and respiratory 
equipment and exposure controls.  Section 8 should also include the 
monitoring methods (e.g. personal, biological and air monitoring) (Eu-
ropean Chemicals Agency, 2015, pgs 62 -70). The content of sections 
4 – 8 in the SDS are influenced by the accuracy of the information 
provided in sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 on the physical and chemical 
properties; toxicology and ecological information (European Chemi-
cals Agency, 2015). Section 9 provides information on the physical 
and chemical properties (United Nations, 2007). Similarly, Section 10 
provides information on the reactivity and stability of the substances 
and mixtures which informs Sections 6 and 7. Sections 11 and 12 are 
relevant to toxicologists, occupational hygienists and medical profes-
sionals (European Chemicals Agency, 2015). Whilst, Annex II of 
REACH regulations and Annex 4, version 7 of GHS have clearly de-
fined the requirements for information in the SDS. Regulation on its 
own does not guarantee the quality of the information. An assessment 
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of the Safety Data Sheets will provide an insight into the quality of the 
content in the sixteen sections in the Safety Data Sheets.  
6.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As highlighted in Table 1, one of the objectives of the research is to 
evaluate the quality of hazard communication provided in Safety Data 
Sheets. Given the importance of the SDS in informing downstream 
user risk assessments and corresponding risk management, it is im-
perative that we assess the quality of this primary source of hazard 
information. The content of the sixteen sections of the SDS have been 
outlined under Annex II of REACH regulation (EC) 1907/2006 and un-
der Annex 4, version 7 GHS system (United Nations, 2017; European 
Chemicals Agency, 2015). However, we are currently unaware of the 
quality of information provided in the SDS. In -order to assess the 
Safety Data Sheets, we require a methodology to assess the quality 
of information in the sixteen sections. There are a variety of tools and 
techniques used to assess the quality of toxicity (in vivo, in vitro stud-
ies) eco-toxicity studies and physical- chemical studies (Sameul, et al 
2016; Schneider, et al 2009; Lynch et al, 2016).  
To develop a methodology to assess the quality of Safety Data 
Sheets, a review of literature on current tools and techniques used to 
assess the quality criteria of toxicology, ecotoxicology and epidemio-
logical studies was conducted. The literature search included the use 
of keywords such as quality criteria in toxicology studies, quality of 
toxicology studies, quality assessments of toxicology studies; quality 
of hazard communication. Eight published papers (Samuel et al, 2016; 
Schneider et al, 2009; Przybylak et al 2012; Johnson et al, 1993; 
Klimisch et al ,1997; Agerstrand and Beronius, 2015; Lynch et al, 
2015; Hulzebos et al, 2015) were reviewed. The quality criterion has 
been discussed in further detail in section 6.3.  
The researcher was based at the Rolls-Royce Inchinnan manufactur-
ing facility at the time of research into the quality of Safety Data 
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Sheets. The researcher initially contacted the HSE Manager to get 
access to the site chemical inventory. The Inchinnan compressors fac-
tory has several business functions operating within one manufactur-
ing plant (e.g. seals, rotors, stators, forge) (Crankshaw; Bothwick 
2013 -2015). The total quantity of chemicals used in manufacturing 
was unclear as not all the business functions provided the researcher 
with their chemical inventories. Further, it was not possible to get ac-
cess to a single contact in the business who managed all the Safety 
Data Sheets as there were separate business within one factory. The 
SDS and COSHH assessments were managed by the individual busi-
ness functions. As it was not possible to provide an exact number of 
chemicals used in the manufacturing facility, 200 is an arbitrary num-
ber but large enough to enable statistical analysis and was used as 
the baseline for collecting SDS for the study into the quality of SDS.  
 A total of 411 chemicals were assessed from the various chemical 
inventories provided by the seals, rotors, stators, forge and laboratory 
business functions and were used to identify the 200 chemicals. An 
analysis of 411 chemicals identified 186 duplicate entries which in-
cluded several similar chemicals used across different business func-
tions (e.g. rotors, seals and stators business). The inventory was re-
viewed with the help of the chemists in the manufacturing laboratories 
(Crankshaw, 2013 -2015). The 186 duplicate entries included chemi-
cals that were supplied under the same chemical identification (trade 
name) but in different quantities (e.g. 1 litre of Adrox to rotors business 
and 15 litres of Ardrox to seals business). Once the duplicates were 
removed, the inventory was further reviewed to identify if SDS were 
available for the chemicals. 25 chemicals were found to have no SDS. 
The 200 chemicals were sorted into alphabetical order.  The top ten 
SDS in each alphabet were selected and the process was repeated 
until 200 SDS were selected.   
200 Safety Data Sheets provide a sample size that can be statistically 
analysed. However, prior to data analysis and selecting a statistical 
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method for analysis, it is critical to define the objectives of the study. 
The objectives of the study are to identify the following: 
• Differences in quality of information provided inherent health hazards 
versus safety and environmental hazards.  
• Identify any regional differences in the quality of SDS.  
• Differences in the quality of information between hazardous and non-
hazardous chemicals. 
• Differences in quality of information provided in various SDS sections 
that are critical to conducting a risk assessment (e.g. SDS sections 6, 
7, 8 and 13). 
The inventory of 200 SDS has been provided in Annex I. The data 
from the review of 200 SDS was further evaluated for statistical signif-
icance. The SDS study reviews sixteen sections of the 200 Safety 
Data Sheets which have been ranked into ordinal data (using Klimisch 
ranking categories). The Kruskal -Wallis test is most suited to analys-
ing ordinal data.  The Kruskal Wallis test offers a simple method for 
analysing two or more independent samples of ordinal data and works 
well with data that is not normally distributed.  The Kruskal-Wallis test 
was done using the SPSS statistical analysis package.  
6.3 ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF SAFETY DATA SHEETS  
To assess the quality of SDS, we need to define a methodology. 
Whilst there is no current methodology for assessing the quality of 
SDS. Toxicity, eco-toxicity studies are used to compile Safety Data 
Sheets. By reviewing the quality criteria used in these toxicity, eco-
toxicity studies, we can evaluate if similar criterion can also be applied 
to assess the quality of SDS. Within toxicity, ecotoxicity and epidemi-
ology subject areas, there are several published studies on the criteria 
and tools used to rank the quality of the data provided, Przybylak et al 
(2012), Johnson et al (1993) and Klimisch et al ,1997). The paper pub-
lished by Fenner-Crisp and Dellarco, 2016, ‘guide for judging the qual-
ity of an assessment’ (Fenner- Crisp and Dellarco, 2016) discusses 
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three key characteristics for assessing the quality of an assessment. 
These characteristics include transparency, reproducibility and use-
fulness (Fenner- Crisp and Dellarco, 2016). 
A study published by Samuel et al, 2016, categorised the assessment 
of quality into methodology used to conduct a study and the quality of 
reporting. In the study published by Klimisch, (1997), Klimisch char-
acterises the quality of data into reliability, relevance and adequacy 
and ranks them using four categories (Klimisch et al, 1997; Schneider 
et al, 2009). The four ranking categories used by Klimisch are: reliable 
without restrictions, reliable with restrictions, not reliable and not as-
signable (Klimisch et al, 1997; Schneider et al, 2009). Reliability is 
defined by Klimisch et al, 1997 as “evaluating the inherent quality of 
the report” (Klimisch et al, 1997, pg 2). Relevance refers to “the study 
or report being appropriate to the level of hazard identification and risk 
characterisation” (Klimisch et al, 1997, pg 2). Adequacy is defined as 
the usefulness of the data for conducting a risk assessment (Klimisch 
et al, 1997, pg 2). Relevance is also defined as the process of evalu-
ating whether a weight of evidence approach should be applied to a 
study (J. Kaltenhauser et al, 2017).  
The review of papers published on the quality criteria for assessment 
of toxicity, eco-toxicity studies identifies common quality characteris-
tics. Fenner-Crisp and Dellarco, 2016, refer to transparency, repro-
ducibility of the study and usefulness of the study as the key quality 
characteristics. Similarly, Samual et al, 2016 refers to the methodol-
ogy and the quality of reporting as key quality criteria. Klimisch et al, 
1997 refers to adequacy, relevance and reliability as the quality crite-
ria. These studies refer to common characteristics: relevance, ade-
quacy and usefulness criteria refer to the ability of the study to be suf-
ficient and appropriate to the level of risk. Similarly, reliability, trans-
parency refer to a robust, scientific, standardised methodology used 
for conducting the study. However, the Klimisch quality criteria go a 
step further and assign ranking categories to the quality criteria which 
makes it easier to assess the quality criteria of different aspects of a 
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study or different sections of a Safety Data Sheet. The Klimisch rank-
ing categories (reliable without restrictions, reliable with restrictions, 
not reliable and not assignable) can be used to rank the quality of the 
various sections in the SDS in comparison with the required quality 
criteria (reliability, adequacy and relevance).  
Aside from the Klimisch categories, there are other methods for the 
assessment of toxicology, epidemiology studies, animal research 
studies such as the Toxicological data Reliability Assessment tool 
(ToxR tool) (European Commission, undated); Animal Research: Re-
porting of In Vivo Experiments  guidelines for animal research (AR-
RIVE) (Kilkenny et al., 2010); Assessment of multiple systematic re-
views system (AMSTAR)  (Shea et al., 2007); The STROBE system - 
“strengthening the reporting of observational studies in epidemiology” 
(von Elm et al., 2007a,b,c,d,e). Whilst, all the methods listed above 
are used for assessment of studies, there are differences in the ob-
jectives of the assessments. The Klimisch and ToxR tool focus on the 
design and methodology used to conduct the study (Lynch et al, 
2016). Whilst, the STROBE and ARRIVE studies focus on the report-
ing criteria used in the study.  
The objective of this research is to assess the quality of SDS. To as-
sess the quality, we need a simple, robust methodology that can be 
applied to Safety Data Sheets.  Whilst there are similarities in the qual-
ity characteristics in studies published by Fenner-crisp and Delarco, 
2016 and Samuel et al, 2016, the Klimisch ranking categories can be 
applied to the SDS study to rank the quality of various sections in 
comparison with the required quality criteria (reliability, adequacy and 
relevance). The Klimisch categories provide a simple, robust and pre-
cise evaluation metric which can be further customised for the ranking 
of various SDS sections. 
The content of SDS sections are governed under the REACH regula-
tions (European Chemicals Agency, 2015) and GHS, Annex 4 (Imple-
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mented in the European Union under the CLP regulations). The Euro-
pean Chemicals Agency has adopted the Klimisch quality criterion in 
its Weight of Evidence approach which is used for evaluating the qual-
ity of chemical data. This provides us with further credibility for using 
and extending the Klimisch quality and ranking categories to as-
sessing the quality of SDS. Adopting the Klimisch criteria also enables 
numerical coding (refer to Table 6) of the various categories which are 
used to assess the variations in quality of the SDS sections. 
Table 6: Numerical coding of the Klimisch Categories 
Klimisch Categories Codes 
Reliable without re-
strictions 
4 
Reliable with restrictions 3 
Not reliable 2 
Not assignable (not used 
in the assessment) 
1 (not used in 
the assessment) 
 
As illustrated in Table 6, only three of the four Klimisch categories are 
adopted for this study as there is limited difference between not relia-
ble and not assignable categories. The Klimisch category of Reliable 
without restrictions is defined as the data or studies generated in line 
with internationally accepted guidelines (Klimisch et al, 1997). Relia-
ble with restrictions refers to the data or studies that have not been 
generated in line with internationally accepted guidelines but are sci-
entifically acceptable. Not reliable category refers to the data or study 
in which the methodology used is not acceptable, relevant or sufficient 
(Klimisch et al, 1997).   
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There are certain key challenges with the Klimisch categories. The 
Klimisch categories have been criticised for not providing the explicit 
criteria for specific reliability, adequacy and relevance quality factors 
(Schneider et al, 2009).  Provided, the explicit criterion for each of the 
categories is defined, the Klimisch categories provide a simple, ro-
bust, quick and efficient methodology for evaluating the quality of the 
various sections of the SDS. 
6.4 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
As a downstream user of chemicals, a number of risk assessment ap-
proaches can be applied to determine the level of human health and 
environmental risk arising from exposure to chemicals. The SDS 
should provide adequate and reliable information to support these risk 
assessment measures. Under REACH Regulation, the environmental 
risk characterisation approach is used to quantitatively assess the risk 
related to specific endpoints.   Environmental risk is calculated as the 
ratio between the actual levels of exposure (referred to as the Pre-
dicted Environmental Concentration- PEC) compared with the thresh-
old levels of exposure (referred to as the Predicted No Effect Concen-
tration) to calculate the Risk Characterisation Ratio (International 
Council of Chemical Associations, 2011, pp 134- 137).  
If the Risk Characterisation Ratio (RCR) is greater than or equal to 1 
for each environmental compartment, then the risk is high and further 
specialized assessments and control measures are required to reduce 
the risk (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011, pp 
135). Similarly, if the RCR is less than 1, then the risk is adequately 
controlled, and no further action is required. 
There are certain limitations when using the risk characterization ap-
proach which are dependent on the Safety Data Sheet providing suf-
ficient information. In the absence of PNEC and DNEL levels from the 
SDS, the risk characterization approach cannot be applied.  However, 
the requirement for providing a PNEC and DNEL is influenced by the 
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legal requirement to prepare a Chemical Safety Assessment under 
REACH Regulations (European Chemicals Agency, 2009). A Chemi-
cal Safety Assessment (CSA) is required for all substances subject to 
REACH registration process if manufactured in quantities of ten tones 
or more per year (European Chemicals Agency, 2009, pp 7-8). If there 
is an exemption from preparing a CSA based on the quantity thresh-
olds (or other criteria) then the SDS may not provide the DNEL or 
PNEC threshold levels.  Further, it may not be financially or technically 
feasible for an industrial end user to calculate the predicted environ-
mental concentrations for every substance used in each environmen-
tal compartment (such as soil, marine sediment, and surface water).  
Another internationally accepted approach to chemical risk assess-
ment and management is the control banding technique (Zalk and 
Heussen, 2011). The control banding approach uses risk phrases and 
hazard statements which are assigned to hazardous chemicals. 
These risk phrases and hazard statements have been pre- grouped 
into hazard groups based on their toxicological properties under the 
UK, Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regula-
tions 2002 (Health Safety Executive, 2009; Jackson, 2002; Zalk & 
Heussen, 2011).).  
The hazard groups only provide a ranking system for the inherent haz-
ards and do not highlight the exposure potential which is influenced 
by factors such as volatility, operating temperature, quantity used 
(Health Safety Executive, 2009). The hazard groups outlined under 
the UK, COSHH Regulations have been illustrated in Figure 6 
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Figure 6: Hazard groups-COSHH regulations  
 
Source: Health Safety Executive, (2009). The technical basis for 
COSHH essentials: easy steps to control chemicals, pp 5. 
In Figure 6, the term R- phrase refers to Risk Phrases and H-state-
ments refer to hazard statements. There are a number of limitations 
in using the control banding approach. If the SDS does not provide 
the R codes or H statements, then it is difficult to use the hazard group 
approach.  Similarly, the lack of information on physical and chemical 
properties in the SDS will affect the ability to calculate the volatility.  
To use either the risk characterisation or the control banding ap-
proach, the Safety Data Sheets needs to provide adequate infor-
mation to enable the downstream user of chemicals to calculate and 
subsequently manage the risk. In the absence of such information, the 
end user will continue to use the SDS without suspicion of the quality 
of information which could potentially compromise the ability to effec-
tively manage chemical risks. Given the regulated nature of Safety 
Data Sheets leads to the assumption that the SDS are fit for purpose 
Hazard 
group Type
Acceptable 
Concentration range Units
H-
Statements
Dust > 1 to 10 mg/m3
Vapour > 50 to 500 ppm
Dust > 0.1 to 1 mg/m3
Vapour >5 to 50 ppm
Dust >0.01 to 0.1 mg/m3
Vapour >0.5 to 5 ppm
Dust <0.01 mg/m3
Vapour <0.5 ppm
Dust mg/m3
Vapour ppm
A
B
C
D
E
H304, H315, 
H319, H336, 
EU66
H302, H312, 
H332, H371
H301, H311, 
H314, H317, 
H318, H331, 
H335, H370, 
H373, EU71
H300, H310, 
H330, H351, 
H360, H361 
H362, H372
H334, H340, 
H341, H350, 
EU70
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– in fact managing chemicals in contradiction to the SDS advice may 
also result in increased liabilities. 
6.5 CONTENT AND RANKING OF THE SDS SECTIONS 
This study focuses on the sections of the SDS that highlight the inher-
ent hazards, storage, handling, use, accidental release measures and 
disposal of the chemicals and hence Sections 2, 6, 7, 8 and 13 of the 
SDS are evaluated for the quality of their content. The minimum legal 
requirements are identified under GHS Annex 4 guidance on the prep-
aration of Safety Data Sheets and Annex II of the REACH Regulation 
(EC) No 1907/2006 for the various sections and subsections of the 
SDS and have been outlined in Table 7. 
The different levels of detail in the SDS sections can be used to as-
sess the quality of information. The three Klimisch categories are as-
signed numerical values in order to calculate a total quality score. 
There is varying level of importance between the various SDS sec-
tions in the ability to inform a risk assessment. The quality of the SDS 
sections has been ranked on their importance to inform risk assess-
ments.  Sections 2, 6, 7, 8 and 13 have been evaluated for their quality 
of content using the Klimisch categories and the numerical codes (re-
fer to Table 7).  The specific criterion for each of the Klimisch catego-
ries has been specified in Table 7. By specifying the criteria for using 
the Klimisch categories, the various SDS sections can be ranked us-
ing the categories of reliable without restrictions, reliable with re-
strictions and not reliable.
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Table 7: Criteria for ranking of the SDS sections 
Sections in the Safety Data Sheet & minimum 
regulatory requirements - GHS Annex 4 and 
REACH Regulation Annex II 
 
Reliable without re-
strictions (Ranking criteria -
4 
Reliable with re-
strictions (Ranking 
criteria -3) 
Not reliable 
(Ranking crite-
ria -2) 
Section 2 (consisting of subsection 2.1 and 2.2): 
Note: This section has not been included in the 
200 SDS review.    
Section 2 shall include details of substance or 
mixture classification according to Regulation 
(EC) 1272/2008 where applicable and classifi-
cation according to Directive 67/548/EEC, 
1999/EC/45 (Until June 2015).  Label elements 
in section 2.2 shall meet the requirements for 
substances under Regulation (EC) 1272/2008. 
 (Europe only) Chemical 
substances are labelled ac-
cording to CLP Regulations 
or the GHS system. Risk 
codes and Hazard State-
ments have been clearly 
stated including hazard pic-
tograms, signal words, haz-
ard statements and precau-
tionary statements. Chemi-
cal mixtures have been clas-
sified according to Directive 
SDS includes the 
relevant risk codes 
and hazard state-
ments with de-
scription of the hu-
man health, physi-
cal and environ-
mental hazards. 
Substance or 
mixture classi-
fied as hazard-
ous or hazard-
ous with no 
other infor-
mation.  
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DPD Directive 1999/45/EC and CLP Regula-
tions conformance for label elements for mix-
tures apply until June 2015. 
1999/45/EC until June 2015. 
Non-European, GHS system 
used for hazard classifica-
tion.  
Section 6 (subsection 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). 
This section shall include information on 
measures to protect human health, environ-
ment and property in case of accidental release. 
Measures should differentiate between large 
and small spills and PPE and RPE for emer-
gency responders. 
Depending on the severity of 
the hazard, at least the fol-
lowing information on the 
evacuation of non-emer-
gency personal, PPE & RPE 
for emergency responders 
should eb provided: 
• Control measures for 
large and small spills 
•  Environmental precau-
tionary measures are 
highlighted by the SDS. 
Where applicable, the 
SDS outlines the tech-
niques or good practices 
At least information 
on spillage control is 
provided, including 
compatible bunding 
materials. Environ-
mental precaution-
ary measures 
stated. Reference to 
other sections pro-
vided.  
No information on 
precautions and 
no reference to 
other sections.  
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for decontamination and 
refers to other sections 
for information.    
Section 7 (subsection 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3). 
This section shall include measures on safe 
handling and storage conditions including rele-
vant standards, specifications, details on gen-
eral hygiene; fire precautions; storage tempera-
ture; explosive atmospheres; incompatibilities 
and specific end use. Depending on the severity 
of the hazard measures could be consistent 
with the hazards outlined in sections 9 and 10 
are commensurate with the severity of the haz-
ard. Measures for safe storage could include 
corrosive conditions, flammability hazards, 
evaporative conditions, ambient pressure and 
measures to maintain the integrity of the sub-
stance and mixture.   
 
Depending on the severity of 
hazard, information on safe 
handling to be provided with 
the relevant CEN/ BSI/ISO 
standards. Measures on the 
storage temperature, incom-
patibility matrix, fire preven-
tion measures, good house-
keeping.  Information in this 
section is to be consistent 
with Section 9 and 10, 11, 
12.  Details on best practices 
and other engineering con-
trols to be provided. Specific 
end use or uses highlighted; 
references to other sections 
clearly highlighted.  
Depending on the 
severity of the haz-
ard, at least infor-
mation on house-
keeping and fire pre-
vention measures, 
storage temperature 
or general hygiene 
and specific end 
use.  
Only head-
ings listed 
with no de-
tail.   
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Section 8 (subsection 8.1 and 8.2). 
This section shall include details on the 
Occupational Exposure Limits (OEL), 
Community Occupational Exposure Limits 
and where available information on the 
Predicted No Effect Concentration and De-
rived No Effect Concentration. Information 
on the substance observation and meas-
uring technique to be included.  Subsec-
tion 8.2 should include details on the Per-
sonal Protective Equipment, Respiratory 
Protective Equipment including relevant 
CEN standards. 
Where applicable, details 
on the OEL for the member 
state in which the SDS is 
provided, relevant monitor-
ing techniques and testing 
standards. Where possi-
ble, PNEC and DNEL infor-
mation provided. Technical 
details on the CEN/ISO 
standards and other inter-
nationally accepted stand-
ards for PPE, RPE and En-
gineering controls. Details 
on the filter specification 
and assigned protection 
factor for RPE. 
Where applicable, 
at least information 
on the OEL with 
relevant CEN 
standards or other 
internationally ac-
ceptable standards 
for PPE and RPE.  
Where ap-
plicable, 
OEL limits 
stated with 
no other in-
formation 
provided.  
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Section 13. 
This section should include details on the 
hazards involved during waste disposal, 
handling and storage. It should reference 
the European Waste Framework and other 
international waste management Direc-
tives and where available information on 
the EU waste codes.   
 
This section shall high-
light the hazards during 
waste disposal, tech-
niques for waste dis-
posal, preferred recy-
cling and recovery 
technique. EU waste 
catalogue number 
where available, refer-
ence to local regula-
tions and details on 
sewage treatment.  
This section 
identifies 
whether the 
waste is to be 
treated as haz-
ardous or not.  
At least refers to 
local regulations 
for waste dis-
posal. 
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As identified in Table 7, the level of detail provided in section 2, 6, 7, 
8, and 13 in the SDS should be commensurate with the severity of the 
hazard (United Nations, 2007, pp 400). The Klimisch categories and 
numerical codes have been applied to the various sections of the SDS 
in order to get a total quality score. The lower the score the poorer the 
quality of information provided in the sections 6, 7, 8 and 13.  
Section 2 of the SDS has not been included in the calculation of the 
total quality score as a number of countries are still transitioning to the 
new GHS system for harmonised hazard classification and communi-
cation and do not meet the classification requirements.  
The 200 SDS selected for evaluation in this study provide an indicative 
sample of the type of chemicals used in aerospace manufacturing en-
vironment, geographic location of suppliers and the content of the 
SDS.  Whilst, these chemicals have been selected from an inventory, 
their use is not specific to a company but more representative of the 
sector.  
Sections 6, 7, 8 and 13 of the 200 SDS have been ranked with the 
Klimisch categories using the criteria for classification under Table 6. 
The total score of the sections provides a total quality score as illus-
trated in Table 8.  
Table 8: Total quality score of the SDS Sections 
Description Total quality score 
Poor Quality  9- 11 
Acceptable Quality  12 
Good Quality  13-16 
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In Table 8, the total quality score has been calculated based on the 
score that an SDS section can be given.  In Table 8, the total quality 
scores have been calculated using ranking of four SDS sections.  A 
minimum of four SDS sections must be checked to apply the total 
quality score. A total quality score of 16 can only be achieved if all four 
SDS sections were reliable without restrictions -4. Similarly, if three 
SDS sections were rated as not reliable -2 and one section was rated 
as reliable with restrictions- 3, then the total quality score will be 9. It 
is possible to assess five SDS sections for quality. If five SDS sections 
are evaluated and ranked using the Klimisch categories then the low-
est score will be 10 and the highest possible score is 20, irrespective 
of the number, the total quality score in Table 8 will still apply. Any 
score above 16 is good quality and  
The SDS has been further categorized into hazardous and non- haz-
ardous chemicals by providing a danger score. The control banding 
approach of using hazard groups (risk phrases and hazard state-
ments) enables the 200 chemicals to be assigned a score for human 
health, environment and safety hazards. For human health, the haz-
ard groups outlined in Figure 6 (COSHH Regulations) are used.  En-
vironmental hazards (H-statements) have been categorized into haz-
ard groups using the GHS classification criteria. The SEVESO Di-
rective is implemented in the UK under the Control of Major Accident 
Regulations 2015 (Health Safety Executive, 2015). Schedule 1 Part 3 
of the COMAH regulations sets out the named substances and prep-
arations and their threshold values which when present at an industrial 
site can result in top or lower –tier COMAH classification. The thresh-
old values listed in Schedule 1 Part 1 of COMAH regulations 2015 
(Health Safety Executive, 2015) combined with the GHS classification, 
hazard statement codes for safety hazards can inform the allocation 
of the hazard groups for physical hazards as illustrated in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Physical Hazard Banding  
Hazard categories in accordance with the 
CLP regulations (GHS is implemented in 
the EU through CLP regulations) 
Qualifying quantity in tons 
of dangerous substances 
for the application of: 
Lower-
tier       
 
Upper- tier  
 
 
GHS Hazard Statements  
 EXPLOSIVES (Unstable explosives, or 
Explosives) Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5 or 
1.6, or Substances or mixtures which have 
explosive properties and do not belong to 
the hazard classes Organic peroxides or 
Self-reactive substances and mixtures; 
Flammable gases, Category 1 or 2; Flam-
mable liquids, Category 1, Self-reactive 
substances and mixtures, Type A or B or 
organic peroxides, Type A or B. 
 
10 50 
H201; H202; H203; 
H205; H220; H230; 
H221; H224; H240; 
H241, H250 
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Explosives, Division 1.4; Oxidizing gases, 
Category 1; Flammable liquids Category 2 
or 3 where particular processing condi-
tions, such as high pressure or high tem-
perature, may create major-accident haz-
ards, or Other liquids with a flash point ≤ 
60°C where particular processing condi-
tions, such as high pressure or high tem-
perature, may create major accident haz-
ards; Self-reactive substances and mix-
tures, Type C, D, E or F or organic perox-
ides, Type C, D, E, or F; Pyrophoric liq-
uids, Category 1 Pyrophoric solids, Cate-
gory 1; Oxidizing Liquids, Category 1, 2 or 
3, or Oxidizing Solids, Category 1, 2 or 3 
50 200 
 
H204; H225; H271; 
H251 
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Flammable’ aerosols Category 1 or 2, con-
taining flammable gases Category 1 or 2 
or flammable liquids Category 1; 
 
150 
(net) 
500 (net) 
H222; H223 
Flammable’ aerosols Category 1 or 2, not 
containing flammable gases Category 1 or 
2 nor flammable liquids category 1; Flam-
mable liquids, Categories 2 or 3. 
 
5000 
(net) 
50,000 
(net) 
None 
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Whilst COMAH regulations schedule 1 and GHS hazard statements 
have been used to inform the grouping of physical hazards into alpha-
betical and numerical codes in Table 9, two exceptions have been 
made from the COMAH threshold application and GHS hazard classi-
fication. In Schedule 1 of COMAH regulations (Health Safety Execu-
tive, 2015, pg 84), explosives division 1.4 has not been classed and 
grouped together with explosives divisions 1.1. – 1.3 and 1.5. Simi-
larly, in GHS classification, explosives hazard category 1.4 has a 
warning label and hazard statement- H204 (United Nations, 2017, pg 
249). In Table 9, explosives division 1.4 has been grouped with all the 
explosive divisions (1.1. – 1.5). It is assumed that use of all explosive 
hazard divisions will require extensive safety controls and robust 
safety information in the SDS. Furthermore, none of the 200 SDS re-
viewed consisted of explosive hazard categories.  
The second exception has been made to hazard grouping of aerosols 
– H222 (Extremely flammable aerosols). H222 has been grouped un-
der hazard group E in Table 10. Schedule 1 of COMAH regulations 
2015 requires a very high quantity of aerosols to be stored and used 
on an industrial site (150 tonnes, net) in order to be classified as lower 
or upper tier. However, within a manufacturing environment, if an ex-
tremely flammable aerosol is to burst or catch fire, it can release ex-
tremely flammable gas with potential high severity impacts to human 
health and safety. Under the Globally Harmonised System for Classi-
fication and Labelling of chemicals (United Nations, 2017, pg 60) an 
aerosol is classified as Category 1, if, it has ≥ 85% flammable compo-
nents and ignition occurs ≥ 75cm (using the ignition distance test) 
(United Nations, 2017, pg 60).  Hence, aerosols, Category 1, H222 
has been grouped the same as H220 in Table 9 and Table 10.   
The purpose of categorizing environment, health and safety hazards 
into hazard bands is to evaluate the correlation between the relative 
level of harm of the chemical and the level of detail provided in the 
SDS. The hazard banding further provides an indication of the level of 
danger and enables the SDS to be categorised into hazardous and 
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non-hazardous. Table 10 brings together environment, health and 
safety hazards in a single hazard banding table and categorises them 
into numerical values (0 -5) with 5 being the highest severity and al-
phabetical values (A- E) with E being the highest severity.  The nu-
merical value of ‘0’ is only used for human health hazards.  The UK, 
COSHH – hazard groups together with the GHS hazard classification 
and COMAH, SCHEDULE 1 hazard classification have been used to 
inform the environment, health and safety hazard banding in Table 10.  
The total score of the chemical hazards are combined and any hazard 
above 7 is categorised as hazardous. For example: the hazard state-
ments for Hydrofluoric acid (0-60%) listed in the SDS includes H300; 
H310; H314; H330; H335 (Brenntag, 2014). Using the hazard groups 
and numerical codes in Table 10, the hazard score for Hydrofluoric 
acid is 5 (D for human health) + 1 (no hazard for environment) +1 (no 
hazard for safety) = 7 (hazardous chemical).  
The 200 SDS have been statistically analysed (Kruskal-Wallis test) 
and the results have been presented in the data analysis section. Ta-
ble 10 presents the Environment, Health and Safety Hazard Groups. 
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Table 10: EHS Hazard Banding 
Hazard 
Groups  
None A B C D E 
Numerical 
codes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Human Health 
hazards/ H-
statements  
None  Maybe harmful if 
swallowed, in-
haled; Maybe fa-
tal if swallowed 
and enters air-
ways; (H303, 
H304, H305, 
H313, H315, 
H316, H318, 
H319, H320, 
H333, H336 and 
all H-numbers). 
Harmful if in-
haled, swal-
lowed or in con-
tact with skin 
(H302, H312, 
H332, H371) 
Toxic; causes se-
rious skin and eye 
damage; skin sen-
sitisation; causes 
damage to organs 
(H301, H311, 
H314, H317, 
H318, H331, 
H335, H370, 
H373 
Fatal if inhaled, in-
gested or in contact 
with skin; sus-
pected of damaging 
fertility or unborn 
child (H300, H310, 
H330, H351, 
H360, H361, H362, 
H372). 
May cause res-
piratory sensiti-
sation; sus-
pected of being 
carcinogenic; 
mutagenic or 
damaging fertil-
ity (H334, H340, 
H341, H350) 
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Environmental 
hazards 
None  None  May cause 
long term ad-
verse effects 
in the aquatic 
environment 
(H413) 
Harmful to 
aquatic life; 
harmful to 
aquatic life with 
long lasting ef-
fects; (H402, 
H412)  
Harms public 
health and the en-
vironment by de-
stroying ozone in 
the upper atmos-
phere; toxic to 
aquatic life; toxic to 
aquatic life with 
long lasting effects. 
(H401, H411, 
H420). 
Very toxic to the 
aquatic environ-
ment; very toxic 
to aquatic life 
with long lasting 
effects (H400, 
H410) 
Safety hazards None  None  Combustible 
liquids  
Self-reactive sub-
stances mixtures, 
organic peroxides 
(Type A, B, C, D, 
E, & F); Self heat-
ing substances 
and mixtures; 
flammable liquids, 
vapours, gases 
and solids; gases 
under pressure; 
corrosive to met-
Highly flammable 
liquids and vapors; 
oxidising liquids 
and solids- strong 
oxidiser; self-heat-
ing substances and 
mixtures (division 
1.1 and 1.2) (H225; 
H271; H251; H252). 
Unstable explo-
sives; explo-
sives (GHS divi-
sions 1.1.- 1.5); 
extremely flam-
mable liquids, 
gases and sol-
ids and aerosol; 
chemically un-
stable gases di-
visions A & B; 
pyrophoric liq-
uids and solids; 
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als; oxidising liq-
uids and solids; 
flammable liquids, 
gases and solids; 
gases under pres-
sure. 
(H200 - H205; 
H220;  H222; 
H224; H230; 
H231; H250. 
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6.6 DATA ANALYSES  
The inventory of the 200 chemicals has been provided in Annex I. 
Kruskal -Wallis test has been used to check for statistical significance 
between SDS sections and hazard groups.  The significance level is 
set as 0.05 and if p< 0.05, then there is statistical significance and the 
results are evaluated and discussed. The 200 Safety Data Sheets 
have been supplied by 89 suppliers.  79% of the SDS are supplied 
from within the European Union, 18% from USA and Canada and 3% 
from Asia- Pacific.  No statistical differences between the quality of 
the SDS and the region of origin have been found. This lack of regional 
significance suggests that there is limited influence of regional regu-
lations on the content of sections 6, 7 and 13 of the SDS. 16% of the 
SDS have been compiled before the year 2010 and 84% have been 
complied after 2010. This time line is relevant under the European 
CLP Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 and the GHS system. The major-
ity of the SDS reviewed in this study have been compiled after 2010 
(84%). However, no significant statistical difference was found be-
tween the quality of information between the Safety Data Sheets com-
piled before and after 2010. Hence, age cannot be an explanatory 
factor for the quality of the SDS.   
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Figure 7: Inherent EHS hazards of the 200 SDS. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the inherent environment, health and safety 
hazards of the 200 SDS. It is important to note that chemical 
substances or mixtures can have multiple environmental, health and 
safety hazards. An example is sodium cyanide (H statements include 
H290; H300; H310; H330; H373; H410) which has high severity health 
and safety and environmental hazards (Brentagg, 2014). Hazard 
group C/4 has 101 SDS with inherent environmental, health and 
safety hazards. The hazard statements for hazard group C includes 
flammable liquids and vapours; skin sensitizers; harmful to aquatic 
life.  
51 of the 200 SDS have inherent hazards categorised under hazard 
group D (H-statements in this group include fatal if inhaled; suspected 
of damaging fertility; highly flammable liquids, gases and strong 
oxidizers). 28  of the 200 SDS have very high inherent environmental, 
health and safety hazards under hazard group E (including H-
statements of suspected of causing cancer, explosives, extremely 
flammable, very toxic to aquatic life). There is significant statistical 
difference (p < 0.05) between the quality of information on human 
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health hazards and safety hazards and between the various hazard 
groups. These differences in quality between the hazard groups and 
health and safety hazards have been explored in Figures 10 and 11.  
Out of the 200 chemicals, 136 have human health hazards; 53 
chemicals have environmental hazards and 42 have inherent safety 
hazards. Chemicals can have multiple health, safety and 
environmental hazards. Figure 8 highlights the differences in quality 
of the SDS between health, safety and environmental hazards. 
Figure 8: Total quality score of SDS sections 
 
As illustrated in Figure 8, chemicals with inherent safety hazards have 
poorer quality of information compared to human health and environ-
mental hazards. Only 2 percent of chemicals with inherent safety and 
environmental hazards have good quality of hazard information in the 
SDS. Environmental hazards have the most acceptable quality of in-
formation in the SDS Sections 6, 7, 8 and 13. The poor quality of in-
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explosive atmospheres; equipment design and maintenance and lack 
of references to industry best practices (European Chemicals Agency, 
2014; Health Safety Executive, 2006). Section 2 of the SDS is not in-
cluded in the analysis of quality of SDS as the global implementation 
of GHS system is still in progress.  
Figure 9 illustrates the differences between the quality of SDS cate-
gorised under hazard groups C, D and E (medium, high and very high 
EHS hazards).  
Figure 9: Quality of information on Hazard Group C, D and E 
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The data in Figure 9 suggests that the lower the hazard group and 
lower the severity of harm for human health, environment and safety 
hazards, the better the quality of hazard information. Figure 9 also 
highlights that there is no good quality of hazard information in hazard 
groups D and E which raises concerns about the downstream user’s 
ability to effectively discharge their duty of care and other health and 
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safety responsibilities. Chemical substances of mixtures categorised 
under hazard groups D&E have high inherent health, safety and envi-
ronmental hazards. These include hazard statements (H – State-
ments) such as extremely flammable, fatal if inhaled, may cause can-
cer, very toxic to the environment. If the hazard information on these 
substances and mixtures (classified under hazard groups D & E) is 
poor, this can further impact on corresponding risk assessment which 
may not fully address the potential consequences, impacts of the 
chemicals on health, safety and environmental receptors. 
The difference between the quality of information provided on the haz-
ard groups also raises concerns on the regulators ability to effectively 
manage hazardous chemicals across the supply chain. The aim of 
GHS, REACH regulations (United Nations, 2017; European Chemi-
cals Agency, 2015; European Communities, 2009, pg 8) is to reduce 
risk by sharing information in the supply chain. If this hazard infor-
mation is not robust, there are questions around how the enforcing 
agencies (regulatory bodies) will manage overall risk.  
The differences between the quality of information on hazardous and 
non-hazardous chemicals has been represented in Figure 10. Of the 
200 SDS, 98 chemicals are hazardous and 102 are non-hazardous. 
There is significant statistical difference in the quality of hazardous 
and non-hazardous chemicals. 46% of the hazardous chemicals have 
poor quality information, 53% have acceptable quality of hazard and 
only 1% of the hazardous chemicals have good quality information in 
the SDS.  
The quality of the SDS of non-hazardous chemicals is much higher 
than the quality of hazardous chemicals. 63% of non- hazardous 
chemicals have an acceptable quality, 12% have good quality hazard 
information in sections 6, 7, 8 and 13 of the SDS.  
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Figure 10: Differences: Hazardous and non-hazardous chemi-
cals. 
 
We found statistically significant differences between the 200 SDS on 
the quality of information on Section 6 (χ2 =75.18, p < 0.05) as illus-
trated in Figure 11. Section 6 of the SDS provides information on ac-
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Figure 11: Quality of Section 6 of the SDS 
 
21% of chemicals with not reliable information in Section 6 of the SDS 
are hazardous chemicals. None of the hazardous chemicals have 
good quality information in Section 6. The presence of not reliable in-
formation in Section 6 could be attributed to the lack of specialist ad-
vice for first responders and information on best practices in managing 
large- and small-scale spills. 
Figure 12 discusses the quality of section 7 which is critical in defining 
the safe use and storage conditions. Section 7 provides information 
that is critical to the risk assessment process and identifies the con-
trols and conditions to prevent dust formation, fire prevention and oc-
cupational hygiene measures (European Chemicals Agency, 2014). 
Depending on the severity and type of hazard, this section should pro-
vide information on explosive atmospheres; corrosive conditions; 
weather control conditions; specific information on design. 
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Figure 12: Quality of information in Section 7 of the SDS. 
 
Statistical significance was found between the quality of hazardous 
and non-hazardous chemicals in Section 7 (p < 0.05, χ2 = 118). Non-
hazardous chemicals have a higher percentage of reliable information 
as compared to hazardous chemicals in Section 7 of the SDS.  
Only 7% of the Safety Data Sheets provided information which is reli-
able without restrictions in Section 8 of the SDS. The areas lacking in 
relevant information for section 8 included limited references to sub-
stance-based monitoring and observation techniques and reference 
to specific regulations and industry best practices. There is significant 
correlation (p < 0.05, χ2 = 9.7) between the quality of information of 
chemicals with DNEL and PNEC values and chemicals without PNEC 
and DNEL values. Only 13% of the European Safety Data Sheets 
have PNEC and DNEL values and 87% do not have PNEL and DNEL 
values. The quality of the content of the SDS of the chemicals with 
PNEC and DNEL levels has been illustrated in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13: Quality of content of chemicals with PNEC/ DNEL lev-
els 
 
In Figure 13, the chemicals with PNEC/DNEL levels have both poor 
quality and good quality information. It is not completely clear if the 
quality of information is increasing with more information on the PNEC 
and DNEL levels. Since, PNEC and DNEL levels inform the risk as-
sessment approach it is not necessary that these levels will influence 
the content of other sections of the SDS.  
6.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A review of 200 Safety Data Sheets has identified significant differ-
ences in the quality of content of the various SDS sections. No statis-
tical significance was found between the quality of the Safety Data 
Sheets based on region of origin and the SDS compiled before and 
after 2010 (other than the hazard classification).  Hence there is lim-
ited evidence to support the improvement in quality of SDS under the 
European CLP Regulation and the GHS system.  
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Statistical significance was identified between the quality of the SDS 
with human health, environmental and safety hazards and between 
the various hazard groups. Chemicals categorised under hazard 
groups D & E have the potential to cause severe damage to infrastruc-
ture, community, human health, and the environment and the poor 
quality of hazard information affects the ability to asses, control and 
manage risks. Many of the named substances under the UK, Control 
of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999 (Health Safety 
Executive, 2013) are categorised under hazard groups D & E high-
lighting the inherent danger. The Safety Data Sheets for hazard 
groups D & E lack basic information on controls for explosive atmos-
pheres, designing and maintaining equipment, eliminating ignition 
sources, preventing fire as outlined under Annex II of REACH Regu-
lations (European Chemicals Agency, 2015).  
There are significant statistical differences between hazardous and 
non-hazardous chemicals. The quality of information for non-hazard-
ous chemicals is better than hazardous chemicals. Given the potential 
impact of hazardous chemicals, the poor and acceptable quality of 
hazard information provided on accidental release measures, safe 
handling and storage, personal protection and disposal, raises con-
cerns on the effectiveness of risk assessment and risk management 
processes. Whilst, hazardous chemicals should only be transported, 
handled by trained staff, the level of training, regulatory framework, 
compliance and hazard awareness can vary between geographic lo-
cations and across sectors in the chemical supply chain (UNDESA, 
Stockholm Convention and UNEP, 2010; United Nations, 2013).  
The quality of information on safety hazards is significantly poorer 
than human health and environmental hazards. The poor quality of 
information on safety hazards suggests that there is either limited 
competency or the assumption by suppliers and manufacturers that 
all end users of chemicals have competent personnel handling chem-
icals during transportation, use and disposal. The poor quality of infor-
147 
 
 
mation on safety hazards also suggests limited engagement of sup-
pliers and manufacturers with end users of chemicals and lack of ref-
erencing of best practices in managing safety hazards.  
The review of the 200 SDS suggests that a majority of the SDS have 
been compiled to meet regulatory requirements and avoidance of lia-
bilities rather than provide primary hazard information to inform risk 
assessment and management measures. Whilst, this study has been 
conducted within the aerospace sector, there is no reason to suggest 
that these results and analyses cannot be duplicated in other sectors 
such as the automobile, cosmetics, electrical and electronic sectors. 
This study provides a snapshot of the quality of SDS in one sector. 
The aerospace sector is a safety critical sector and the use of these 
chemicals is governed by stringent safety, quality and regulatory re-
quirements. However, other sectors having less stringent regulatory 
requirements might have further SDS quality issues.  
The lack of references to industry best practices or industry guidelines 
is a recurring limitation in the SDS Sections such as the lack of sub-
stance-based monitoring techniques in section 8 of the SDS.  These 
monitoring and observation techniques are significant when the occu-
pational exposure limits are low and the inherent health hazards are 
very severe (e.g. fatal if inhaled, carcinogenic). Whilst, it can be ar-
gued that it is the role of an occupational hygienist is to determine and 
recommend the monitoring and observation measures, not all down-
stream users would have access to occupational hygienists.  
Hence the quality of the SDS does affect the ability to effectively man-
age chemicals. Evaluating the quality of information provided in an 
SDS is critical to the sound management of chemicals and must be 
integrated into the proposed framework for the sound management of 
chemicals in section 8.   
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7.0 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY  
As discussed in the literature review in section 2, whilst chemical man-
ufacturers, suppliers have developed their own chemical risk assess-
ment methodology, downstream user of chemicals would conduct a 
chemical risk assessment based on regulatory requirements (e.g. 
COSHH regulations 2002 (amended) (Health Safety Executive, 
2013). Currently, downstream chemical risk assessments focus only 
on health hazards as directed by the country/ state specific regulatory 
requirements (e.g. COSHH regulations in the UK, DSEAR regulations 
2002) (Health Safety Executive, 2013).  One of the key challenges for 
a downstream user is to conduct a chemical risk assessment for inte-
grated EHS hazards including multiple stakeholder groups and multi-
ple stages in the management of chemicals within a manufacturing 
environment. This section proposes a chemical risk assessment 
methodology that addresses these challenges. 
In the UK, there are numerous chemical regulations aimed at reducing 
the risk of chemical exposure to the environment and human health. 
Complying with this large array of regulations can result in resource 
constraints (time, energy and expense), duplication of efforts, addi-
tional costs of compliance, greater need to ensure compliance, possi-
ble contradiction or conflicts between regulation and trade-offs be-
tween various hazards. This is because some regulations such as the 
COSHH Regulations, Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmos-
pheres Regulation 2002 (DSEAR) (Health Safety Executive, 2013) fo-
cus on very specific hazards such as health hazards or safety haz-
ards. Others, for example the European Registration, Evaluation, Au-
thorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation 
1907/2006 seek to eliminate, reduce and replace the risks associated 
with the production and consumption of chemicals (European Com-
mission, 2014). All these regulations aim to reduce the exposure to 
chemicals, but a lack of a methodological approach that is simple, ro-
bust, and can effectively prioritise environment, health and safety risks 
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for further risk management is notable. It is also unlikely as each reg-
ulation focuses on specific risk or environmental or health & safety 
media that is to be protected. The proposed chemical risk assessment 
framework attempts to address this gap by addressing environment, 
health and safety hazards and integrating regulatory tools used in the 
REACH and COSHH assessments.  
7.1 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW  
The aim of risk reduction is to protect vulnerable ecosystems and pro-
vide a high level of protection to human health and the environment. 
A review of chemical risk assessment frameworks by the OECD, 
Global Product Strategy and the EPA identify common stages in a 
chemical risk assessment. These common stages include hazard 
identification; hazard characterisation; exposure assessment and risk 
characterisation (Environmental Protection Agency, 2012; Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003).  
Within these generic stages of a chemical risk assessment, there are 
differences in the methodologies used to conduct hazard identifica-
tion, hazard characterisation, exposure assessment and risk charac-
terisation. These differences in methodology are driven by specific 
roles and legal obligations of various actors in the chemical supply 
chain. This research proposes a methodology to conduct downstream 
user chemical risk assessment within the common stages of hazard 
identification, hazard characterisation, exposure assessment and risk 
characterisation.  
Aside from chemical risk assessment frameworks, a variety of risk as-
sessment tools were also discussed in the literature review section- 
2.1.2. These risk assessment tools are further assessed for integrat-
ing systems thinking and meeting the needs of downstream users of 
chemicals.  
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7.2 PROPOSED CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOL-
OGY 
For manufacturers of chemicals, the stages of hazard identification, 
hazard characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisa-
tion have very specific definitions: Hazard identification is the process 
of determining the inherent hazards of the chemical substances and 
mixtures (International Council of Chemical Associations, 2011, pp 
179). Hazard characterisation, often referred to the dose-response as-
sessment, focuses on estimating the severity of the intrinsic properties 
of the chemical substances and mixtures (International Council of 
Chemical Associations, 2011, pp 179). Exposure assessment is de-
fined as “the process of identifying the extent to which the exposure 
actually occurs” (International Council of Chemical Associations, 
2011, pp 107- 120). Finally, risk characterisation evaluates the infor-
mation from the hazard and exposure assessment stages to deter-
mine the severity of the adverse effects (International Council of 
Chemical Associations, 2011, pp 138-157). Once this information is 
compiled by the chemical manufacturer or supplier, it is disseminated 
further to the downstream user through Safety Data Sheets (SDS) 
(European Chemical Agency, 2010).  
The ability to understand, interpret and effectively apply data provided 
in the SDS is central to effective risk management for downstream 
users of chemicals. The downstream user applies the information in 
the SDS to conduct their own chemical risk assessment based on the 
specific application of the chemicals and the operating environment 
(European Chemicals Agency, 2014, pg 41).  Hence the accuracy and 
completeness of the SDS as a communication tool is central to the 
risk assessment process (Nayar et al, 2015). The hazard statements 
in the Safety Data Sheet are the starting point for the risk assessment 
for downstream user of chemicals (European Chemicals Agency, 
2011).  
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The stages of hazard identification and hazard characterisation re-
quire downstream users to assess the hazards associated with the 
equipment, activities and tasks in which the chemicals are used. 
There are extensive tools for identifying such hazards inherent in plant 
and process including Hazard Operability studies (HAZOP’s), failure 
mode event analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HAZAN) amongst oth-
ers (British Standards Institution, 2010). However, given that chemical 
users may use hundreds if not thousands of chemicals in their pro-
cesses each of which with specific risk profiles, it is economically and 
practically not possible to conduct detailed HAZOPs or FMEA for each 
chemical (Phillips and Wehrmeyer, 2014). This is one of the reasons 
why the REACH process uses descriptor codes to characterise and 
group hazards inherent in plant, equipment and activities.  
The REACH regulatory framework uses process descriptor codes (re-
ferred to as PROC codes) and environmental release categories (re-
ferred to as ERC codes) to evaluate the potential for chemical expo-
sure and identify risk management measures. Environmental Release 
Categories (ERC codes) broadly define the extent to which chemicals 
will be dispersed or released through waste generation or emissions 
to air, water (European Chemicals Agency, 2010, pp 6). The intended 
use of the chemical directly affects its environmental release potential.  
 There is limited application of the PROC and ERC coding system out-
side of the REACH regulatory reporting process. The proposed risk 
assessment framework uses these regulatory tools (such as the 
PROC and ERC codes) and highlights the strengths and weaknesses 
of its application. By using the REACH process descriptor codes and 
environmental release categories, it is therefore possible to character-
ise the hazards inherent in plant and equipment. The use of PROC 
codes enables the risk assessor to conduct an initial screening of the 
machines and processes involved in using the chemical substances 
and mixtures. Similarly, the Environmental Release Categories (ERC) 
defines the characteristics of the use of the chemical from an environ-
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mental perspective (European Chemicals Agency, 2010, pp 6). An ex-
ample of PROC codes is closed systems, continuous processes, cal-
endaring operations and industrial spraying (European Chemicals 
Agency, 2010). PROC codes are used to describe the application 
technique and briefly outline the likelihood of exposure to chemicals 
under normal operating conditions (European Chemicals Agency, 
2010). The use of PROC codes enables the risk assessor to screen 
machines and processes for their potential to cause chemical expo-
sure.  
For a downstream user of chemicals, the exposure assessment stage 
would involve identifying scenarios in which human health and envi-
ronmental exposure is likely and measuring the likelihood and extent 
of exposure in real-life situations. A number of qualitative and quanti-
tative tools can be used to assess the pathways or scenarios for hu-
man health and environmental exposure. These include failure mode 
analysis, fault tree analysis, bow tie analysis and other risk assess-
ment tools.  
As highlighted in section 2.1.2, the selection of the risk assessment 
tool is dependent on a variety of influencing factors including level of 
uncertainty, risk scoring criteria, competency and skills required to 
conduct the assessment, timescales and budgetary constraints.  
Based on discussions with the academic and industrial supervisors, 
the laboratory manager at the compressor’s factory, chemists and 
EHS Manager at the compressor’s factory, the following criterion have 
been used for the selection of risk assessment tools: 
• The tools and techniques used should enable input from multiple 
stakeholder groups and consider multiple exposure pathways.  
• Ease and cost-effectiveness of use. The tools should be easy to use 
and cost effective if they are to be used for regular chemical risk as-
sessments.  
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• The tools should enable risk assessments with low levels of uncer-
tainty.  
• Ease of integration with existing information and management prac-
tices 
Using the criteria listed above, various commonly used qualitative and 
quantitative techniques highlighted in the BSI EN 6010 have been 
evaluated in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Risk Assessment Techniques  
 
Risk assessment technique  
Selection criteria 
Resource  
requirements  
Level of  
uncertainty  
Qualitative 
output  
Level of  
complexity  
HAZOP Medium High Yes High 
HACCP Medium Medium Yes High 
Scenario Analysis Medium High Yes Medium 
Root Cause Analysis Medium Low Yes Medium 
Bow-tie analysis  Low Medium Yes Low 
Failure mode and Event Tree 
analysis Medium Medium No Medium 
Cause and Effect Analysis Low Low Yes Medium 
Markov Analysis  High Low  No High  
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Table 11 highlights that cause and effect analysis (fish bone diagram) 
and bow-tie analysis are the two qualitative tools that best meet the 
criteria (including limitations in resource requirements, uncertainty, 
qualitative output and level of complexity) and can be used in the 
stages of exposure assessment and risk characterisation. The cause 
and effect analysis tool is particularly useful as multiple exposure sce-
narios can be developed involving multiple stakeholders and multiple 
stages in the management of chemicals. This is important as it allows 
participatory risk assessments and group involvement in decision 
making (British Standards Institute, 2010).  
Bow-tie analysis is extensively used in the health and safety sector to 
provide graphical representation of causes and consequences of var-
ious hazards. One of the key strengths of the Bow-tie analysis is that 
it includes control measures and mitigation measures (British Stand-
ards Institution, 2010), an aspect which limits its application of cause 
and effect analyses, identifying the risk management measures in 
place will enable estimation of the exposure in real life situations. 
Together, cause and effect analysis and bow-tie analysis can be used 
to complement each other in the stages of exposure assessment and 
risk characterisation in a chemical risk assessment. The literature re-
view in section 2.1.2 discussed the importance of embedding systems 
thinking in risk assessment methodology. The Rasmussen’s seven 
characteristics can be used to evaluate the cause and effect analysis 
and bow ties analysis tools for integrating systems thinking.  
The Rasmussen’s seven characteristics focus on multiple actors and 
levels, multiple contributing factors or multiple hazards and risks, ver-
tical communication between various stakeholders in the value chain, 
external pressure including regulatory requirements, level of flexibility 
and adaptation to changes within an organisation and awareness of 
the context within which the risk assessment is being conducted. To-
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gether the cause and effect analysis and bow tie analysis meet Ras-
mussen’s seven characteristics. Cause and effect analysis includes 
multiple stakeholder groups, multiple hazards and risks. External 
pressures such as regulatory environment can be factored into bow 
tie analysis and using both tools enables vertical communication be-
tween stakeholder groups.  
The next and final stage of the risk assessment process is risk char-
acterisation. As an end user of chemicals this stage combines the 
hazard characterisation stage and exposure assessment stages to 
identify risks for further management for specialised assessment (In-
ternal Council of Chemical Associations, 2011, pp 132). 
The proposed framework for a chemical risk assessment for an end 
user of chemicals is illustrated in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14: Proposed chemical risk assessment methodology 
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Figure 14 presents the proposed chemical risk assessment. The first 
stage in the proposed risk assessment is hazard identification which 
involves listing the H-statements for environmental, human health and 
safety hazards from the Safety Data Sheet. The UK, COSHH -control 
banding approach uses hazard groups to characterise the severity of 
the hazards and it has been further applied to environment and safety 
hazards to prioritise hazards with a greater level of inherent danger 
(Nayar et al, 2015). On assessing the SDS, if the H-statements from 
the SDS are categorised into hazard Groups A and B (refer to Table 
10) the severity of the hazards are regarded as low and the risk as-
sessment methodology skips to the exposure assessment stage. 
If the H-statements are categorised into hazard groups C, D and E 
(refer to Table 10), then a detailed assessment is required, and the 
next step is hazard characterisation. Hazard groups C, D, E (refer to 
Table 10) refer to hazards with a higher indication of danger to human 
health, environment and safety (Nayar et al, 2015). These hazards 
require further assessment through the hazard characterisation stage. 
This stage includes listing all the stages, stakeholders involved in the 
management of chemicals from the time they are delivered to the 
manufacturing facility to the final disposal. The REACH descriptor pro-
cess (PROC) and environmental (ERC) codes are applied to these 
stages to highlight potential areas of chemical exposure.  
The exposure assessment stage involves identifying potential expo-
sure scenarios for human health and environmental exposure. Cause 
and effect analysis is used to identify the various scenarios which can 
result in human health and environmental exposure to MWF. Sources 
of exposure include all machines, equipment in which the chemicals 
are used. The final stage is risk characterisation stage which involves 
assessing the risk based on the existing and emergency controls.  
The proposed risk assessment methodology differs from other risk as-
sessments as it includes environment, health and safety hazards and 
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enables prioritisation of risks, engages multiple stakeholders and eval-
uates risk through the use of pre-existing regulatory tools such as 
REACH descriptor codes. The proposed methodology can be applied 
to consumable chemicals and integrates multiple stages of the man-
agement of a chemical 
7.3. VERIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED METHDOLOGY  
The proposed framework for conducting a chemical risk assessment 
(illustrated in Figure 14) has been verified by applying it to a widely 
used chemical in the Inchinnan Compressors Factory. The aim of ver-
ifying the proposed chemical risk assessment framework is to discuss 
and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the framework in inte-
grating multiple hazards, multiple stakeholders and multiple stages in 
the management of chemicals.  
7.3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The researcher was based at the Inchinnan compressors factory at 
the time of this study. A review of the 200 SDS had been conducted 
prior to defining a chemical risk assessment methodology and the re-
searcher had established a good understanding of the type and quan-
tities of chemicals used in the compressor’s facility. Based on discus-
sions with the industrial supervisors, HSE Manager, laboratories man-
ager and chief chemists on site, it was suggested that the proposed 
chemical risk assessment framework should be applied to Metal 
Working Fluids (MWF) which are widely used in a range of applica-
tions involving metal shaping, metal and organic deposition, surface 
finishing and assembly and disassembly applications.  An estimated 
20,000 litres of undiluted MWF- Hocut 3380 is used across the com-
pressor’s factory.  Given the quantity and variety of applications, 
Hocut 3380 (referred to as MWF) would be a suitable sample to verify 
the effectiveness of the proposed chemical risk assessment method-
ology.  In this study, Hocut 3380 is referred to as MWF.  
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The first step in the proposed methodology is hazard Identification.   
Hazard identification involves identifying the H- statements from the 
Safety Data Sheet. The most common Hazard (H) statements associ-
ated with Metal Working Fluids (MWF) are H320- causes eye irritation; 
H315- causes skin irritation; H317- may cause skin sensitisation; 
H412- harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects (European 
Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2003; Health Safety Executive, 
2011). As illustrated in Figure 6-COSHH Hazard groups, MWF is char-
acterised in hazard group C with the potential for medium severity im-
pacts on human health and the environment. Hazard Groups C, D, E 
have lower work place exposure limits and can cause more harm 
given the quantity used, application techniques and other factors such 
as operating environment (Health Safety Executive, 2011).  
The next stage is hazard characterisation which identifies the stake-
holders involved in the management of MWF and mapping the inher-
ent hazards in plant and equipment. The stakeholders for this study 
are people involved in the management of MWF. The target audience 
are people with specific subject matter knowledge and selecting ran-
dom people from the compressor’s factory was not beneficial. Hence, 
a non-probability sampling strategy was preferred as there was no re-
quirement for random selection of people from the factory. Since there 
are multiple stages, multiple stakeholders involved in the manage-
ment of MWF and multiple business functions on one site, there was 
no single person who had information on the management of MWF. It 
was also challenging to identify stakeholders who had subject matter 
knowledge on the management of MWF across the site. The snowball 
sampling technique helped to address these challenges and was ap-
plied to allow individual function owners (e.g. laboratory chemists) to 
recommend other people with subject matter knowledge on different 
stages in the management of Metal Working Fluids (MWF). A stake-
holder map was developed using the snowball sampling technique 
has been presented in Figure 15. The first point of contact was the 
EHS Manager and the Lab technologist who further recommended 
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meeting the MWF supplier. The MWF buyer and supplier– Houghton’s 
supplied the majority of MWF for the compressor’s factory. The stake-
holders identified in Figure 15 identified the various stages in the man-
agement of MWF including the daily routines, regulatory and risk con-
trols as highlighted in Table 12. Semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted with the MWF suppliers (Houghton’s), lab technologists which 
helped to identify the other stakeholders involved in the management 
of MWF. The questions for the semi-structured interviews were dis-
cussed and confirmed with the industrial and academic supervisors 
and extracts from the interviews with the MWF supplier -Houghton’s 
and facilities management company – MITIE have been listed. The 
interview with the Houghton’s account manager was conducted on 
16th April 2014 followed by the interview with MITIE on the 17th April 
2014. The extracts from the interview with the Houghton’s Site Man-
ager are listed:  
Question: What is the role of the supplier in the chemical supply 
chain? 
Answer: (Houghton’s Site Manager): Houghton’s is a formulator of 
chemicals. They buy raw materials and formulate mixtures of metal 
working fluids. The company provides a range of products and ser-
vices across industries including the aerospace, automotive and 
deep-water oil and gas industries.  
Question: Where is metalworking fluid used and in what quantity? 
Answer: An estimated 20,000 litres of undiluted MWF is used on site 
per annum. Every litre of MWF is diluted with 8 litres of water. This 
figure includes IBC’s and the barrels. 
Question: What is the flow of chemicals throughout the shop floor? 
Answer: The flow of chemicals throughout the shop floor has been 
mapped in Figure 16. 
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Question: What are the current arrangements for risk assessment, 
governance and meeting regulatory compliance? 
Answer: Houghton’s carries out its own risk assessments depending 
on the tasks and the information available in the SDS. The risk as-
sessment format is provided by Houghton’s. The risk assessment for 
each task is done by the Houghton’s site manager and any changes 
are reviewed. However, it is not currently clear if the risk assessments 
are shared with other stakeholder groups identified in the stakeholder 
map in Figure 15.   Houghton’s is a global leader in MWF and have 
their own product stewardship teams which include laboratories that 
conduct toxicological and eco- toxicological studies on their MWF 
products. Houghton’s also provides biological monitoring and air mon-
itoring for all its products. Governance: the MWF contract is governed 
by the corporate fluid care team. Onsite, the Houghton’s site manager 
reports into the Rolls-Royce manufacturing service head and meets 
weekly to provide updates. Further, the MWF site manager interacts 
directly with the production leaders and the manufacturing laborato-
ries.   
An extract from the interview with the facilities management company 
-MITIE has been listed: 
Question:  What is the role of MITIE in the management of Metal 
Working Fluid? 
Answer (MITIE Site Manager): This compressors site is unique, as 
MITIE is involved in the management of chemicals such as acids, sol-
vents, adhesives.  MITIE provides facilities management services to 
the site which includes housekeeping, management of chemicals in 
the storage area, transfer of chemicals, draining and topping up of 
etchant tanks and other point of use machines, transfer of used chem-
icals to disposal area.  MITIE works to the specification outlined by 
Rolls-Royce. However, in the case of Metal Working Fluids, MITIE has 
a very limited role in the management of chemicals and is primarily 
involved in clean-up of spillages, transfer of IBC’s and barrels from the 
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transport to the external storage area and the transfer of waste met-
alworking fluid to the hazardous waste liquid tank. MITIE also super-
vises William Tracey’s contract on site, William Tracey’s handles and 
disposes of the hazardous and non-hazardous waste on site.  
Question: What happens to chemical waste including MWF and how 
is information on waste gathered? 
Answer: Houghton’s collects the waste products and transfers them 
to a waste station. MITIE collects all hazardous and non-hazardous 
solid and liquid wastes from the waste station and transfers it to the 
waste storage area located outside the factory. The waste liquid is 
mixed in a tank and pumped into a waste carrier tank.  The liquid 
waste tank is then drained by William Tracey’s and taken off-site to be 
recovered and disposed. Since William Tracey’s collects hazardous 
liquid waste from the site they are recognised as a stakeholder group. 
Question: How does MITIE manage governance, risk and regulatory 
requirements? 
Answer: MITIE reports into the site manufacturing services head and 
is managed by Group Property. However, the representation of Group 
property has been reduced on site. Hence the manufacturing services 
team has overall governance over MITIE on site. MITIE has its own 
risk assessments and all method statements have been pre-approved 
with Rolls-Royce. MITIE does not currently carry out any COSHH as-
sessments and does not store a copy of the MSDS. However, the 
method statement includes the PPE and the risk prevention 
measures. MITIE has generic risk assessments for the various tasks 
involved in the management of chemicals.  However, these risk as-
sessments are not categorised into the stages of transportation, stor-
age, use and disposal rather they are based on the individual tasks.  
Summary of the interview with Houghton’s and MITIE: A wide range 
of stakeholder groups are involved in the transportation, storage, 
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transfer, use and disposal of the Metal Working Fluid on site. The ac-
tivities of various stakeholder groups often overlap. An example is MI-
TIE is responsible for the overall housekeeping and cleaning of spill-
ages whilst Houghton’s manages the topping up and removal of waste 
MWF from the various machines which can result in spillages. Each 
stakeholder group has their own risk assessment and management 
measures. However, there is no single risk assessment which in-
cludes all the stages of transportation, transfer, handling, storage and 
disposal of MWF. The lack of an overall risk assessment is not nec-
essarily an issue. However, it is not clear if all environmental, health 
and safety hazards have been considered and tasks in every stage 
have been risk assessed. If, the various stakeholders are using sepa-
rate risk assessment templates, there can be differences in the hazard 
rating and potential trade -offs in prioritising risks.   
As illustrated in Figures 15 and 16 five stakeholder groups are directly 
involved in the management of MWF from the transport to disposal 
stage within the manufacturing facility. These five stakeholder groups 
include the MWF supplier, warehousing company, facilities manage-
ment, waste collection company, production leaders, manufacturing 
services and buyers. The roles and responsibilities of various stake-
holder groups have been listed in Table 12. 
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Figure 15: MWF stakeholder map 
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 Figure 16: Stages in the management of metal working fluid 
 
Table 12: Roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders 
Stakeholders  Roles & Responsibility 
Facilities Management  
Company  
Unload the Intermediate Bulk Containers (IBC’s- 1000KG) 
containing MWF from the transport vehicles and transfer 
to the external storage area. The Facilities Management 
company -MITIE has responsibility for unloading of chemi-
cals from the transport and for maintenance of the com-
pressor’s facility.  
MWF Supplier Transfer of MWF IBC's from the transport area to the stor-
age area inside the factory. 
MWF Supplier Check the concentration of the MWF; maintain the pumps 
for mixing of water and metal working fluid.  The MWF sup-
plier -Houghton’s is responsible for maintaining the quality 
of the MWF. 
MWF Supplier 
Transfer and top-up of machines in the factory with metal 
working fluid using forklift trucks. The MWF supplier is re-
sponsible for the safe and secure transfer and top-up of 
MWF at the point of use. 
Production Super-
visors 
Inform the MWF Supplier when a top –up is required 
in line with consumption. The Production Supervisors 
are responsible for ensuring machines are always op-
erating efficiently.  
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Machine operators  Notify in case of any leakage. The machine operators 
are responsible for notification of faults to supervi-
sors.  
Facilities Management 
Company 
Responsible for clean-up of any spillages and main-
tain housekeeping on site.  Responsible for the overall 
management of facilities. 
MWF Supplier 
Pump out the waste MEF and transfer it to the 
waste station for collection. Responsible for the 
safe and secure transfer of the product from the 
machine to the waste transfer station. 
Facilities Management 
Company 
Transfer from the waste station to the hazardous 
waste mixing tank located in the external yard.  
The Facilities Management company is responsi-
ble for the management of waste. 
Waste Vendor 
Removal and disposal of hazardous waste. 
Waste carrier and disposal services. 
 
The production leaders place the orders for the daily top up of the 
machines, Manufacturing services manage the maintenance of the 
machines in which the MWF is used. Once delivered to the site the 
facility management company transfers the MWF to the storage area 
and cleans up any spillages. The waste management company han-
dles the spent MWF. The MWF supplier performs a number of tasks 
such as mixing the MWF, top up of machines and transfer of the spent 
MWF to the disposal area.  
Other stakeholder groups are involved in the quality, procurement and 
HSE functions. An estimated 20,000 litres of undiluted MWF are used 
on an annual basis in the manufacturing facility. The use of MWF in 
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fifteen machines has been considered to provide an overview of the 
PROC codes in Table 13 
This section outlines the methods used to apply the chemical risk as-
sessment methodology.  As illustrated in Figures 15 and 16, five 
stakeholder groups are directly involved in the management of MWF 
from the transport to disposal stage within the manufacturing facility. 
These five stakeholder groups include the MWF supplier, warehous-
ing company; facilities management company; waste collection com-
pany; production leaders, manufacturing services and buyers (Rolls-
Royce Team). The production leaders place the orders for the daily 
top up of the machines; manufacturing services manage the mainte-
nance of the machines in which the MWF is used. Once delivered to 
the site, the facility management company transfers the MWF to the 
storage area and cleans up any spillages. The waste management 
company handles the spent MWF. The MWF supplier performs a va-
riety of tasks such as mixing the MWF, top up of machines and trans-
fer of the spent MWF to the disposal area.  
Other stakeholder groups are involved in the quality, procurement and 
HSE functions. There are five main stages (Refer to Figure 16) in-
volved in the management of MWF. Once the stakeholder groups are 
identified, REACH Regulation descriptor codes PROC- process codes 
and ERC – environmental release category codes are assigned by the 
responsible stakeholder group to each stage to enable further evalu-
ation and prioritisation of risks. PROC or process codes reflect on the 
operational conditions and the ERC codes reflect on the level of ex-
posure to the environment. The use of PROC and ERC codes identi-
fies stages and processes which are likely to result in potential envi-
ronmental and human health exposure to MWF (refer to Table 13). 
These stages are prioritised in the exposure assessment stage. 
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Table 13:  Process Categories for MWF management on-site 
Stages in the 
management 
of chemicals 
REACH Category   
CODES 
Description of PROC 
codes 
Description 
of ERC 
codes 
Transpor-
tation of 
MWF to 
the factory 
PROC 
1 
NA NA Used in a closed process. 
IBC’s are used for the 
transport of MWF. IBC’s are 
high integrity closed sys-
tems where there is low po-
tential for exposure 
ERC 7: Indus-
trial use of 
substances in 
closed sys-
tems 
Storage 
and Mixing 
of MWF 
PROC 
1 
PROC 
3 
NA Mixing is conducted in a 
closed batch process using 
IBC’s. IBC’s are used for 
the storage and mixing of 
MWF. IBC’s are high integ-
rity closed systems where 
there is low potential for ex-
posure. There may be low 
level of exposure during 
MWF sampling as part of 
quality checks.  
ERC 2: Mixing 
and blending. 
ERC 7: Indus-
trial use of 
substances in 
closed sys-
tems. 
Transfer of 
MWF to 
point of 
use (ma-
chines) 
PROC 
8b 
NA NA Transfer of substances or 
mixture from/to vessels at 
dedicated facilities. Expo-
sure to dust, aerosol, va-
pour or spillage and clean-
ing to be expected. 
ERC 2: Mixing 
and blending. 
Topping up 
of ma-
chines with 
MWF 
PROC 
8b 
NA NA  Transfer of substances or 
mixture from/to vessels at 
dedicated facilities. Expo-
sure to dust, aerosol, va-
pour or spillage and clean-
ing to be expected. 
ERC 2: Mixing 
and blending. 
Use of 
MWF in 
machines  
PROC 
17 
PROC 
18 
PROC 
20 
PROC 17: Lubrication at 
high energy conditions and 
in partly open processes 
where the MWF may form 
aerosols or fume due to 
moving parts.  
PROC 18: Greasing at high 
energy conditions where 
the MWF is subjected to 
high temperature and po-
tential for misting.  
PROC 20: Heat and pres-
sure transfer fluids in dis-
persive, professional use in 
closed systems. Repair and 
maintenance may lead to 
skin contact 
ERC 4: Indus-
trial use of pro-
cessing aids.  
ERC 8a: Wide 
dispersive use 
of processing 
aids in open 
systems.  
ERC 7: Use of 
processing 
aids in closed 
systems. 
Transfer 
from ma-
chines for 
disposal  
PROC 
8b  
NA NA Transfer of substances or 
mixture from/to vessels at 
dedicated facilities. Expo-
sure to dust, aerosol, va-
pour or spillage and clean-
ing to be expected. 
ERC 7: Indus-
trial use of 
substances in 
closed sys-
tems. 
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Table 13 illustrates the PROC and ERC codes applicable to the 
stages of transportation, storage, use and disposal of Metal Working 
Fluids. The use of PROC and ERC codes for the initial risk screening 
of the various stages of MWF movement have highlighted that the 
stages of transfer (PROC 8b), topping up (PROC 8b), use (PROC 17, 
18 & 20) and disposal (PROC 8b) are of priority for further assessment 
in the exposure assessment stage (refer to Figure 19) as there is po-
tential for exposure to MWF. Similarly, the ERC codes for prioritisation 
are ERC 2, 4 and 8a which refer to processing aids, blending and 
mixing operations in open systems with could result in environmental 
exposure.   
To develop exposure pathways using cause and effect analysis and 
bow tie analysis, a focus group consisting of the team leaders from 
five stakeholder groups (refer to Figure 15) were invited to identify po-
tential scenarios or pathways that can result in MWF exposure to hu-
man health and environmental end points. The stakeholders are re-
sponsible for day-to–day management of personnel, machinery, qual-
ity and waste transfer of MWF. The sources of MWF exposure include 
any machines, equipment within which MWF is used in the various 
stages of transfer, topping up, use and disposal stages (identified us-
ing PROC, ERC codes in the hazard characterisation stage).  The 
pathways were categorised into sources of MWF exposure such as 
machines, working environment, method of working, people, and ma-
terial conditions. The exposure pathways for human health and envi-
ronmental exposure have been listed in Figures 17 and 18. 
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Figure 17: Cause and Effect analysis for environmental exposure 
172 
 
 
Figure 18: Cause and Effect analysis for human health exposure.  
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Figures 17 and 18 highlight the various pathways for human health 
and environmental exposure to MWF, Once the human health and 
environmental exposure pathways have been identified, they are eval-
uated for accuracy, completeness and take into account existing con-
trols. A simple 5 x 5 matrix is used for risk scoring. The impact cate-
gories include health, safety and environmental hazards. Information 
from Table 11 (EHS Hazard Banding) together with input from super-
visors and the Rolls-Royce, health, safety and environment risk man-
agement standard and guidance document series, HS&E-IS-P.01, 
2010 were used to compile the risk matrix in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Risk Matrix for EHS hazards 
Human health 
impacts Environmental impacts Safety impacts
Multiple fatalities; 
terminal illnesses 
impacting a number 
of employees. 
Accident resulting in 
HSE investigation 
with significant 
damage to 
reputation. RIDDOR 
reportable
Very toxic to marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems; 
release (emissions or 
runoff) of ozone depeting 
substances or toxic 
chemicals resulting in risk 
to public. Significant 
damage to reputation. 
Substantial cost associated 
with remediation 
operations. 
Widespread 
infrastructure dmage. 
Societal risks arising 
from loss of 
containment. Partial to 
full loss of facility. 5 5 10 15 20 25
Single fatality; 
degenerative 
illnesses; chronic 
illnesses resulting in 
HSE investigation 
with potential for 
damage to 
reputation. RIDDOR 
Toxic to marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems; 
unknown impacts; release 
of PBT, vPvB chemicals; 
increased cost associated 
with the remediation and 
clean up activities. 
Localised factory level 
damage resulting in loss 
of production over one 
week. Signifcant impact 
on cost and delivery of 
orders. 4 4 8 12 16 20
Major injury- RIDDOR 
reportable but may 
not result in HSE 
investigation. 
Potential to cause 
permanent disability. 
Harmful to marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems. 
Resulting in localised 
factory level damage 
with loss of production 
in affected areas. May 
impact delivery of 
orders. 3 3 6 9 12 15
Lost time injury  
resulting in days off 
work.
May be harmful to marine 
and terrestrial ecosystems
Lost time injury; damage 
to assets and may 
impact production 
schedules. 2 2 4 6 8 10
Low severity incident 
including first aid 
injuries (minor cuts No known impacts No impacts on assets. 1 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Rare (May 
result in 1 
incident in 10 
years)
Highly Unlikely 
(once every 3- 5 
years)
Unlikely (once a 
year)
Likely (once a 
month)
Frequent (daily or 
once a week)
Likely Hood
Risk Score
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The risk matrix in Figure 19 is used to screen the exposure pathways 
identified in Figures 17 and 18 in Table 14 to identify medium and high 
risks for the next stage of risk characterisation. The screening of the 
various pathways was conducted with consultation from the stake-
holders – MWF supplier, laboratory chemists and Facilities Manage-
ment Company. Once scored, medium and high risks are further as-
sessed in the risk characterisation stage.   
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Table 14: Screening of exposure pathways 
Endpoint Exposure scenario Likelihood  Severity Risk 
score 
Environmental hazardous 
waste generation and 
treatment. 
Mix of MWF with chemicals spilt on the 
floor. Hazardous waste generation. 
5 1 5 
Environmental hazardous 
waste generation and treat-
ment. 
Toppling of open Intermediate Bulk 
Container (IBC). The IBC contains 
1000 Liters of MWF.  
1 4 4 
Environmental hazardous 
waste generation and treat-
ment. 
Machines leaking oil into the MWF or 
coolant. The coolant will get contami-
nated and will need to be extracted from 
the machine and disposed as hazardous 
waste. 
2 4 8 
Environmental hazardous 
waste generation and 
treatment. 
Cracked hose used for transferring cool-
ant to waste tank will result in spillages. 
Small quantity of MWF may be spilled.  
3 1 3 
Environmental haz-
ardous waste genera-
tion and treatment. 
Overflow of MWF extraction ma-
chine will result in spillages. 
4 2 8 
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Human health and environ-
mental -     Unknown chem-
ical reaction, emissions 
from the container.  
Wrong labels on waste IBC containers 
can result in accidently transferring 
MWF into an empty IBC which contains 
residue of other chemicals (e.g. acids, 
caustics, peroxides) 
3 4  12 
Human health and environ-
mental- Unknown chemical 
reaction, emissions from 
the container. 
Mixing of chemicals in the waste tank. 
If waste MWF is accidently mixed with 
other chemicals in the waste tank, there 
is potential for an uncontrolled chemical 
reaction. 
3 4 12 
Environmental Hazardous 
waste generation and treat-
ment. 
Use of biocides for testing of MWF. Only 
a small sample of MWF is mixed with bi-
ocides for sampling and test purposes. 
4 1 4 
Human health and environ-
mental.  Unknown chemi-
cal reaction, emissions 
from the container 
Mixing of chemicals in MWF waste ex-
traction machine. A waste extraction 
machine is used to pump MWF from the 
machines and transfer to the waste 
tank. If there is leftover chemical resi-
due in the waste extraction machine, 
there is potential for an uncontrolled 
chemical reaction. Occasionally the 
3 4 12 
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waste extraction machines are used to 
pump out chemicals other than MWF.  
Environmental hazardous 
waste generation and treat-
ment. 
Extreme weather conditions can affect 
external storage of IBC and waste tank.  
1 4 4 
Human health impact MWF spillages resulting in slippery sur-
faces. 
5 2 10 
Human health impact- po-
tential skin sensitization.  
Residue from IBC caps and IBC contain-
ers can accidently come in contact with 
the operator’s skin. MWF is a skin sensi-
tizer. 
5 1 5 
Human health impact- 
potential skin sensiti-
zation 
Misting potential when machine doors 
open. Potential for operator to get both 
skin contact ad inhalation of MWF mist. 
5 2 10 
Human health impact- 
potential skin sensiti-
zation 
Splashes of MWF when the machine 
parts are sprayed with compressed air. 
Potential for skin contact. MWF is a skin 
sensitizer.  
5 2 10 
Human health impact. Po-
tential skin sensitization 
MWF residue in mixing, milling and cut-
ting machines. Potential for splashes on 
skin.   
5 2 10 
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In Figures 17 and 18 there are other categories such as work organi-
sation; method of working; human factors; working environment. All 
these categories influence the likelihood of exposure to MWF. How-
ever, these categories are difficult to quantify. A separate human fac-
tors assessment is required to address these factors. This research 
does not go into detail on human factors due to the broad scope of the 
subject area. Instead, organisations can develop their own tool or tem-
plate for considering human factors into the screening process.  
The exposure pathways are screened in Table 14 for accuracy and 
completeness. Using the risk matrix in Figure 19, only risks that are 
medium to high are further evaluated in the next stage of risk charac-
terisation. The risk characterisation stage that follows the exposure 
assessment stage involves assessing the strength of the existing risk 
controls and mitigation measures and categorising them into tolerable 
and inacceptable risks. 
Figures 20 and 21 identify the controls, mitigation measures and pri-
oritise the risks based on the severity and rank them into tolerable 
(acceptable) and unacceptable risks. Bow-tie analysis is used to rep-
resent existing risk management measures, multiple stakeholder 
groups and multiple scenarios resulting in exposure. The focus group 
expertise was used to identify and review existing controls. Tolerable 
and unacceptable risks represent the spectrum of the risk matrix. The 
purpose of the risk matrix is to evaluate the reduction of risk to ‘So Far 
as Is Reasonable Practicable’ (SFAIRP) (Health Safety Executive, 
2003). In the UK, the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 requires 
employers to demonstrate ‘reasonably practicable’, defined as the bal-
ance between time, effort, money spent and the corresponding reduc-
tion in risk. The severity of the hazard dictates the level of risk. For 
example, the risk of an explosion is much higher than the risk of eye 
irritation. The application of bow-tie analysis in Figures 20 and 21 rep-
resent the risk characterisation stage. The assessment of the path-
ways, current controls and mitigation measures enables ranking the 
risk into the reasonably practicable approach. 
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Figure 20: Risk characterisation of environmental endpoints. 
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Figure 21: Risk characterisation of human health end points 
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Figures 20 and 21 outline the various exposure pathways selected 
from the cause and effect analysis to be evaluated based on cur-
rent controls, mitigation measures and impact. The impact is de-
termined by the end points for human health and the environment. 
In the exposure assessment stage, several exposure pathways in-
volve the mixture of MWF with other chemicals in the extraction 
machine and waste tank. The resulting impact of MWF mixing with 
other chemicals could result in an uncontrolled chemical reaction 
with unknown consequences. Current controls such as training, 
method of working and general ventilation may not be robust 
enough to deal with an uncontrolled chemical reaction. Hence, the 
risk is unacceptable and should be prioritised for further risk as-
sessment and risk controls. Another example is a pathway of ma-
chines leaking oil into Metal Working Fluids which will result in haz-
ardous waste generation. Exposure pathways involving spillages 
on the shop floor can be controlled through spill kits and bunding. 
Hence, the risk is regarded as tolerable.  
The use of cause and effect analysis together with bow-tie analy-
sis provides a mechanism to enable systematic, robust review of 
sources, exposure pathways, end points and existing controls.  
7.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The review of existing chemical risk assessment frameworks iden-
tifies an absence a robust methodology for conducting down-
stream user chemical risk assessment. Furthermore, environ-
ment, health and safety hazards are treated as separate hazards 
under regulatory requirements requiring time, effort to duplicate 
the risk assessment process. There is also limited inclusion of mul-
tiple stakeholders or stages in the current chemical risk assess-
ment frameworks applicable to downstream users of chemicals.  
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A review of the existing chemical risk assessments was conducted 
prior to verifying the proposed risk assessment methodology. The 
existing Roll-Royce chemical risk assessment methodology fo-
cuses on human health hazards and risks and only one stake-
holder group – Rolls-Royce.  
In comparison, the proposed methodology enables a multi-faceted 
review of EHS hazards, participation of multiple stakeholders and 
review of multiple stages at comparatively low implementation, op-
erational costs and resource requirements. The proposed meth-
odology also supports and compliments compliance with regula-
tory standards and provides a robust review of potential risks at 
each stage whilst considering existing controls. The use of 
REACH regulation- PROC and ERC codes enables rapid risk 
screening of various stages, tools and machines.  
The allocation of hazard groups to environmental and safety haz-
ards allows prioritisation of inherent hazards based on the severity 
of harm to the endpoints. The proposed methodology for conduct-
ing a chemical risk assessment is different from existing method-
ologies as it considers environment, health and safety risks within 
a single assessment and embeds multiple substance control reg-
ulations in the assessment process.  
The use of qualitative tools such as cause and effect analysis to-
gether with bow-tie analysis has enabled multiple exposure sce-
narios to be evaluated to prioritise high severity risks. The current 
controls and mitigation measures for high-risk scenarios are con-
sidered to highlight the consequences and prioritise risk manage-
ment measures. The proposed methodology can be applied to any 
user of chemicals irrespective of the sector.  
  
184 
 
 
7.0 FRAMEWORK FOR THE SOUND MANAGEMENT OF CHEMI-
CALS 
The top-level research questions set out in Table 1 are: 
• What is the sound management of chemicals and what are the 
objectives of the sound management of chemicals?  
• What is the relationship between the sound management of chem-
icals and sustainable development?  
• How are chemicals being managed across Rolls-Royce? 
• What are the gaps in the management of chemicals in comparison 
with the objectives and principles for the sound management of 
chemicals?  
• What is the process for approval of new chemicals? 
• How do other companies operating in the aerospace sector ap-
prove the use of new chemicals? 
• What is the quality of Safety Data Sheets? 
• How is the proposed risk assessment methodology different from 
other risk assessment frameworks? 
• How can the conceptual framework be applied to other industries? 
These research questions were designed to drive this research 
towards developing a conceptual framework for the sound man-
agement of chemicals applicable to downstream users of chemi-
cals. This has been achieved. The review of literature into the 
sound management of chemicals highlighted that the Strategic Ap-
proach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) provided 
a policy framework which could be adopted provided its objectives 
of risk reduction, governance, knowledge management and ca-
pacity building were defined and customised to meet downstream 
user challenges. The literature review also highlighted that the 
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sound management of chemicals is inextricably connected to 
achieving sustainable development.   
The study into the quality of Safety Data Sheets involved defining 
a methodology to assess the quality of Safety Data Sheets. The 
assessment of the quality of SDS information highlighted the criti-
cal requirement to check the quality of information provided prior 
to introducing the chemical or even considering it for use in any 
process of product.  
To define and develop a risk assessment for downstream users of 
chemicals, a literature review of risk assessment frameworks was 
conducted. A methodology to conduct chemical risk assessment 
applicable to end users of chemicals was proposed and evaluated 
using an example of metal working fluids. The proposed chemical 
risk assessment methodology enables multi-faceted review of 
EHS hazards, participation of multiple stakeholders and review of 
multiple stages at comparatively low implementation as well as op-
erational cost, given its extensive use of existing and / or readily-
available supplementary tools or information sources. This also 
supports close proximity to regulatory standards agencies and 
provides a robust review of potential risks at each stage whilst con-
sidering existing controls. The use of REACH regulation PROC 
and ERC codes enables rapid prioritisation of stages and applica-
tions for further assessment.  
The allocation of hazard groups to environmental and safety haz-
ards allow prioritisation of inherent hazards based on the severity 
of harm to the endpoints. By using the REACH Regulation PROC 
codes, it is possible to consider the activities; equipment involved 
in the stages of transport, storage, handling, use and disposal and 
in a way that is suitable for regulatory considerations, should 
REACH at some point includes the chemicals thus reviewed. The 
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proposed methodology for conducting a chemical risk assessment 
is different from existing methodologies as it considers EHS risks 
in a single assessment and embeds multiple substance control 
regulations in the assessment process. The use of qualitative tools 
such as cause and effect analysis together with bow-tie analysis 
has enabled multiple exposure scenarios to be evaluated to prior-
itise high risks using the risk matrix. The current controls and mit-
igation measures for high-risk scenarios are considered to high-
light the consequences and prioritise risk management measures. 
The proposed methodology can be applied to any user of chemi-
cals irrespective of the sector.  
The process to assess the quality of safety data sheets together 
with the proposed chemical risk assessment methodology are in-
tegrated to define a framework for the sound management of 
chemicals. The proposed framework can be applied when approv-
ing the use of new chemicals or changing existing chemicals. The 
proposed framework for the sound management of chemicals cus-
tomises the SAICM objectives of risk reduction, governance, 
knowledge management applies to the multiple stages of receipt, 
storage, use and disposal of a chemical within a manufacturing 
environment. The proposed framework for the sound manage-
ment of chemicals has been illustrated in Figure 22. 
 
 
187 
 
 
Figure 22: Proposed framework for the sound management of chemicals 
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In Figure 22, the first step in the proposed framework (is the review 
of the quality of safety data sheets. Procedure 1 defines this pro-
cess for reviewing the quality of safety data sheets and is summa-
rised below. The process for approving the quality of safety data 
sheets has also been published in the Journal of Chemical Health 
and Safety (Nayar et al, 2015).  
Procedure 1: 
• Acquire the most up-to-date SDS from the supplier which is 
REACH, GHS compliant 
• Review the quality of information provided in each section against 
the criteria listed in Table 7 
• Rank section 6, 7, 8 and 13 of the SDS into the one of the following 
categories: reliable without restrictions – 4; reliable with re-
strictions- 3 and not reliable -2 using the criteria in Table 7. 
• Add up the total quality score of the various sections. If the score 
is between 9 -11, the SDS is ranked as poor quality. If the score is 
12, the SDS is ranked as acceptable quality. If the score of the 
SDS is ranked >13, the SDS is ranked as good quality. 
Once, the quality of the SDS has been assessed, the next step is 
to conduct a regulatory review. Procedure 2 is the regulatory re-
view. The aim of the regulatory review is to identify chemical sub-
stances that are restricted, banned or of concern due to the inher-
ent ability to cause harm to human health, safety and the environ-
ment. By identifying these hazards, downstream users are able to 
either replace these substances and mixtures with greener op-
tions, decline or review the current risk management measures. 
REACH regulation together with other substance control lists and 
regulations are reviewed in the regulatory review stage. It is im-
portant to note that various sectors, companies will have their own 
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regulatory review procedure and have supplementary tools to 
check and manage legal compliance. A country, industry specific 
legal register can be used to determine the scope of the compli-
ance requirements.  
There are a wide variety of companies that provide consultancy, 
technical know- how on compliance with chemical regulatory re-
quirements (Chemical Watch, 2016, pp 43). Hence, defining a pro-
cess to comply with regulations will not add value to the proposed 
framework for approving chemicals.  
Once the regulatory review has been completed, the substance or 
mixture is either accepted, requires further assessment or is de-
clined. Further assessments are required when the chemical sub-
stance or mixture is safety critical and there are no other viable 
options. If further assessments are required, the company may 
consider various options such as registration, request for authori-
sation, request for exemption.   
The final step is to conduct a chemical risk assessment prior to 
approving the use of the chemical. The chemical risk assessment 
methodology, Procedure 3 is summarised below: 
• Acquire the most up-to date safety data sheet 
• List the environment, health and safety hazard (H) statements 
from the SDS 
• Review the H-statements with the criteria listed in Table 10 (health 
safety and environmental hazard groups) 
• If the H-statements belong to hazard groups A or B, the inherent 
hazard level is considered low and the next step is exposure as-
sessment. If the H- statements belong to hazard groups C, D or E, 
the inherent hazard is considered between medium and high and 
the next step in hazard characterisation.  
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• The hazard characterisation stage for medium to high hazard 
chemicals involves identifying all stakeholder groups involved in 
the management of the chemical. Identify all the stages involved 
in the management of the chemical from receipt to disposal. Iden-
tify all the machines used in the management of chemicals. Apply 
the PROC and ERC codes (European Chemicals Agency, 2008, 
pg. 8, 11- 12) to each stage in the management of chemicals and 
prioritise stages which have a medium to high level of exposure.  
• Exposure assessment stage: The medium to high level exposure 
stages identified in the hazard characterisation stage are further 
used to develop scenarios that can result in human health and en-
vironmental exposure. Cause and effect analysis tool is used to 
represent the various scenarios. The exposure scenarios can be 
further categorised into plant and equipment, work organisation, 
working environment, materials. Once the exposure scenarios 
have been identified for human health and environmental end-
points, the next stage is risk characterisation.  
• Risk characterisation involves the assessment of the probability, 
severity of the impacts whilst considering the current risk manage-
ment controls. A bow- tie analysis is used to review the probability 
and severity of the exposure scenarios. The severity is catego-
rised into the tolerable, not-tolerable scale using the ‘ALARP’ 
model. The severity scale can be modified depending on industry 
specific requirements.  
• Once the risk characterisation stage has been completed, the 
high-risk scenarios are further prioritised for specialised risk as-
sessment such as failure mode event analysis (FMEA), fault tree 
analysis.  
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Once the chemical risk assessment has been completed, the 
chemical is either accepted on the site with specific risk controls 
or prioritised for specialised risk assessments.  
The proposed risk assessment for the sound management of 
chemicals addresses key challenges such as quality assurance of 
the hazard information provided through safety data sheets. Inte-
grated environmental, health and safety risk assessment which re-
views EHS risks involving multiple stakeholders, stages, machin-
ery and equipment and is applicable to end users of chemicals. 
The risk assessment methodology utilises regulatory tools and 
provides a robust step by step assessment of chemical risks. The 
proposed framework for the sound management of chemicals em-
beds regulatory requirements, quality assurance and risk assess-
ment methodologies to provide a robust decision-making frame-
work. Once a chemical has been approved using this process, 
there is confidence in the risk assessment, quality of the SDS and 
regulatory review.  
8.1 EVALUATION AND APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK  
The conceptual framwork for the sound management of chemicals 
in Figure 22  has been developed by customising SAICM 
objectives of risk reduction, governance and knowedge 
management. The overarching relation between SAICM, 
sustainable development and the sound management of 
chemicals has been presented in Figure 23.  
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Figure 23: The proposed framework and sustainable development  
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The first step in this research was to define what is the sound 
management of chemicals. The aim of the sound management of 
chemicals as defined by UNEP is to prevent (where possible), re-
duce and eliminate the exposure to human health and the envi-
ronment from hazardous chemicals (including hazardous wastes). 
The Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management 
(SAICM) has been significant for developing an ‘umbrella’ policy 
framework for implementation by national levels. The objectives of 
SAICM - risk reduction, governance, knowledge and information 
and capacity building provide a framework which can be adopted 
at various levels in the supply chain. This research focuses on 
downstream users of chemicals.  
The study into the quality of Safety Data Sheets aimed to assess 
the quality of hazard information. The study of Safety Data Sheets 
is linked to knowledge management.  Prior to reviewing the quality 
of SDS, a methodology was developed to assess the quality of 
hazard information provided in the 16 sections of an SDS. Given 
the importance of the SDS in informing downstream user risk as-
sessments and corresponding risk management, it is imperative 
to assess the quality of this primary source of downstream user, 
hazard information. A review of 200 Safety Data Sheets (refer to 
section 6) has identified significant differences in the quality of 
content of the various SDS sections. No statistical significance 
was found between the quality of the Safety Data Sheets based 
on region of origin and the SDS compiled before and after 2010 
(other than the hazard classification).  Hence there is limited evi-
dence to support the improvement in quality of SDS under the Eu-
ropean CLP Regulation and the GHS system.  
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The review of SDS involved developing a methodology for as-
sessing and ranking the quality of Safety Data Sheets to provide 
a level of confidence in the information provided and its corre-
sponding impact on risk reduction. The SDS study raises aware-
ness of the quality issues of critical hazard information. SDS serve 
as the primary source of hazard information, any deficiencies in 
this information can have ripple effects further in the assessment 
and management of risk. The SDS case study was published in 
October 2015 in the Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, (Na-
yar et al, 2015).  
The proposed risk assessment methodology (refer to section 6) is 
designed for downstream users of chemicals. The methodology 
integrates health, safety and environmental hazards under a sin-
gle framework established across the generic risk assessment 
stages of hazard identification; hazard characterisation; exposure 
assessment and risk characterisation. A pilot study of Metal Work-
ing Fluids is used to demonstrate the application and procedures 
of the framework including consideration of multiple stakeholder 
groups involved in the management of chemicals within a manu-
facturing environment and across multiple stages of transporta-
tion, storage, use and disposal. The methodology adopts the Glob-
ally Harmonised System for the Classification and Labelling of 
chemicals (GHS) system for classification of hazards and provides 
initial screening of highly hazardous chemicals, activities and 
tasks. This methodology enables quick and robust prioritisation of 
potential exposure pathways useful when a large variety of chem-
icals are used.  
The SDS review together with the risk assessment methodology 
embedded within the conceptual framework for the sound man-
agement of chemicals (refer to Figure 16) provides end users with 
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a one stop solution to effectively manage chemicals. Specific chal-
lenges such as conducting EHS chemical risk assessment, man-
aging robust SDS quality, regulatory compliance, multiple stake-
holders, multiple control stages are addressed by this conceptual 
framework. The framework for the sound management of chemi-
cals can be applied to any end user of chemicals operating in any 
sector and is not specific to the aerospace sector.  
The framework provides technical knowhow and a level of flexibil-
ity to meet sector specific legal compliance requirements (such as 
industry specific substance lists). The framework can be applied 
across multiple geographical regions. 
The proposed framework for approving new chemicals and ena-
bling the sound management of chemicals can be converted into 
a management system or embedded into existing EHS manage-
ment systems such as OHSAS 18001 and ISO 14001. The pro-
posed framework can also be embedded within a regulatory con-
text to enable the sound management of chemicals or be applied 
as standalone system for managing chemicals in a global environ-
ment.    
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8.0 CONCLUSION  
The use of chemicals in our daily lives is inevitable and ubiquitous. 
However, the uncontrolled and irresponsible use of chemicals can 
result in deterioration of basic life support systems. The unsound 
management of chemicals has a direct impact on people, the 
planet, human well-being, prosperity, peace and partnership (In-
ter-organization programme for the sound management of chemi-
cals, 2018), the key focus areas for sustainable development.  
Whilst, progress has been made to eliminate, prevent and reduce 
human health and environmental exposure to hazardous chemi-
cals and hazardous wastes, there are still gaps and challenges in 
the sound management of chemicals. These gaps include, but are 
not limited to, communication of chemical hazards, risk assess-
ment, risk management and implementation of regulatory frame-
works (UNEP, 2013). There are initiatives such as Responsible 
Care and Global Product Strategy aimed at achieving the objec-
tives of SAICM and the sound management of chemicals. How-
ever, these initiatives are focused at chemical manufacturers. 
Whilst SAICM provides a global policy framework and establishes 
the objectives on how to achieve the sound management of chem-
icals, it has certain limitations. SAICM primarily focuses on na-
tional level implementation. The SAICM global policy framework 
does not clearly outline the inter-dependencies between various 
objectives such as risk reduction, knowledge management and ca-
pacity building. Further, the topics covered in the SAICM objec-
tives have a very broad scope of implementation and it is important 
to define the methodology for achieving each objective. 
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This research defines the methodology within the objectives of risk 
reduction, governance, knowledge and capacity building and ap-
plying the SAICM global policy framework to downstream users of 
chemicals.  
A review of the management of chemicals in Rolls-Royce high-
lighted that the various objectives of SAICM were being ad-
dressed. However, in the absence of a common framework for 
management of chemicals, there is potential for trade-offs be-
tween environmental, health and safety risks. Chemical risk as-
sessments are primarily focused on human health hazards and 
complying with regulatory requirements. Whilst, various compo-
nents are manufactured and assembled in a global environment, 
differences in risk assessment methods, regulatory enforcement, 
could result in different risk management strategies which under-
mines the concept of sustainable development and the sound 
management of chemicals. 
The site visits highlighted the importance of developing a concep-
tual framework for the sound management of chemicals. A review 
of companies operating in the aerospace was conducted to gain a 
broader understanding of challenges in managing chemicals. The 
study identified that regulatory compliance was a key driver for 
change together with product safety and innovation requirements. 
One common trend was the lack of a single methodological ap-
proach to assess environment, health and safety risks in a single 
assessment. There are multiple challenges associated with the 
lifecycle of the chemicals, hazard information, innovation, product 
safety, compliance. Addressing these challenges independently 
without a holistic, integrated approach would result in increased 
costs, resource use and questions the ability to sustain the sound 
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management of chemicals. This study also highlighted that the or-
ganisational level challenges listed in Table 1 applied to a wider 
group of companies across the aerospace sector. This is important 
as it enables us to generalise the solutions. Whilst, the focus of 
this research is on the aerospace sector there is no reason to sug-
gest that the conceptual framework for the sound management of 
chemicals will not apply to downstream users of chemicals in other 
sectors. 
Safety Data Sheets are a primary source of hazard information for 
downstream users of chemicals. Assessing the quality of this pri-
mary source of hazard information provides confidence in the risk 
assessment and risk control strategies. The content of Safety Data 
Sheets is defined in REACH regulation and the Globally Harmo-
nised System for the Classification and Labelling of chemicals, An-
nex 4 (United Nations, 2017). There is no existing methodology to 
assess the quality of content of SDS. A methodology was defined 
by evaluating various studies on assessing the quality of toxicol-
ogy, ecotoxicity studies. The Klimisch categories were coded and 
customised to assess the quality of SDS. Further, environment, 
health and safety hazard statements were banded together in a 
hazard group to enable comparison of hazardous and non-haz-
ardous chemicals.  
The review of 200 SDS suggests that a majority of the SDS have 
been compiled to meet regulatory requirements and avoidance of 
liabilities rather than provide primary hazard information to inform 
risk assessment and management measures. The lack of refer-
ences to industry best practices or industry guidelines is a recur-
ring limitation in the SDS Sections such as the lack of substance-
based monitoring techniques in section 8 of the SDS.  These mon-
199 
 
 
itoring and observation techniques are significant when the occu-
pational exposure limits are low and the inherent health hazards 
are very severe (e.g. fatal if inhaled, carcinogenic). Whilst, it can 
be argued that it is the role of an occupational hygienist to deter-
mine and recommend the monitoring and observation measures, 
not all end users would have access to occupational hygienists.  
The next step was to define a chemical risk assessment method-
ology. The proposed risk assessment methodology was applied to 
a widely used Metal Working Fluid. In comparison to the existing 
risk assessment used by Rolls-Royce that focused on human 
health hazards and only applied to a single stakeholder group. The 
proposed risk assessment methodology is more robust, effective 
and enables a multi-faceted review of EHS hazards, participation 
of multiple stakeholders and review of multiple stages in the man-
agement  
The proposed framework for the sound management of chemicals 
delivers a step by step methodology to assess the quality of haz-
ard information, review and apply regulatory requirements and as-
sess environment, health and safety chemical risks within a man-
ufacturing environment. The framework enables the downstream 
users to apply robust hazard information to conduct a chemical 
risk assessment. The regulatory review stage screens out chemi-
cals of concern. In situations where there are no technically viable 
alternatives, companies may choose to seek authorisation, ex-
emption to use hazardous chemicals which in turn should be gov-
erned through stringent regulatory controls and processes. The 
proposed chemical risk assessment enables environment, health 
and safety hazards to be given equal attention and follows the 
stages of hazard identification, hazard characterisation, exposure 
assessment and risk characterisation. The use of tools such as 
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cause and effect analysis and bow tie analysis integrates systems 
thinking in the risk assessment process. 
The proposed framework provides downstream users with the 
methodology to eliminate, prevent and reduce human health and 
environmental exposure to hazardous chemicals and hazardous 
wastes thereby implementing the sound management of chemi-
cals. The sound management of chemicals is central to achieving 
sustainable development goals.  
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10.0 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This research has defined, developed and tested a methodology 
to assess the quality of safety data sheets. The methodology has 
been applied to verify the quality of 200 safety data sheets and the 
summary of findings have been presented in section 6 and pub-
lished in the Journal of Chemical Health and Safety. The process 
for assessing the quality of safety data sheets can be applied 
across industry and is applicable to all end users of chemicals. 
The assessment of 200 safety data sheets provided verification 
that the methodology can be successfully applied to verify the 
quality of information provided in Safety Data Sheets. 
The second contribution to knowledge has been made by devel-
oping an end-user specific risk assessment methodology. A re-
view of risk assessment frameworks has identified generic stages 
in conducting a chemical risk assessment. Whilst, the stages are 
generic, the methodology used to conduct the risk assessment 
within the generic stages of hazard identification; hazard charac-
terisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation vary de-
pending on the role of the organisation in the chemical supply 
chain. Hazard identification for a chemical supplier requires a dif-
ferent methodology as compared to an end-user of chemicals. The 
proposed risk assessment methodology is simple, robust, and can 
effectively prioritise environment, health and safety risks for further 
risk management. It integrates multiple stakeholder groups, multi-
ple stages in the management of chemicals within a manufacturing 
environment and uses regulatory tools used in COSHH and 
REACH Regulation. The proposed methodology is under publica-
tion review in the Journal of Safety Science.  
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SAICM and its principles and objectives provide a framework for 
achieving sound management of chemicals. These objectives of 
risk reduction, governance, knowledge management have been 
addressed by this research through the development of a process 
to verify the quality of hazard information (Safety Data Sheets) 
which addresses the objective of knowledge management. The 
proposed methodology for conducting chemical risk assessments 
directly addresses the requirement for risk reduction.  
The proposed process for SDS quality assurance and methodol-
ogy for conducting end user chemical risk assessments have been 
integrated into a framework for the approval of chemicals which 
addresses the SAICM objectives of risk reduction, governance, 
knowledge management. The proposed framework for the ap-
proval of chemicals enables the sound management of chemicals 
and is a contribution to knowledge.   
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Annex 1: Chemical Inventory of 200 chemicals 
Product 
Name 
Date of 
issue or 
re-issue 
Supplier 
name 
Dangerous 
or not dan-
gerous  
GHS  
com-
plaint ? 
  CLP or 
DPD/ DSD 
Directives 
Section 
6 
Code  
(4,3,2,1 ) Section 8 
Code 
(4, 3, 2, 
1) Section 7 
Code 
(4, 3, 2, 
1) 
Section 
13 
Code 
(4,3,2
,1) 
Total 
quality 
score 
Does the 
SDS have 
DNEL/PNEC Code 
Country of 
origin 
10P2-3 
Epoxy Coat-
ing Anti-
Static 2013 
Akzo Nobel 
Aerospace 
Coatings Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No   Netherlands 
2- Propanol 2013 Anachemia Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not  
reliable 2 
not  
reliable 2 10 n/a   Canada 
22-77-700 
Series Cur-
ing Agent  2011 Cromadex Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
2pk Epoxy 
Golden Yel-
low 356 
Gloss 2012 
Industructi-
ble Paint Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not  
reliable 2 10 No 1 UK 
3D AVIA-
TION FORM-
A-GASKET 
#3 SEALANT 
1PT 2010 Permatex  Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
3M Scotch 
Weld EC 
3524 Voild 
filling com-
pound 2013 3M Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 UK 
3M Scotch-
Weld 3500-2 
PMF 2013 3M Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
3M Scotch-
Weld AF-
163-2 Struc-
tural Adhe-
sive Film 2013 3M 
Not danger-
ous  No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
3M Super 
Weather-
strip and 
Gasket Ad-
hesive - 
Black, P.N. 
08008, 
08581 2012 3M 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
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5-Minute 
Epoxy resin 2008 Devcon Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No   Ireland  
640 Retain-
ing Com-
pound 2012 Henkel  
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a 1 Canada 
A92 paint 2010 
Trimite 
Global 
Coatings  Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Abrasive 
compound  
OC 502 2005 
MacDermid 
PLC  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Acetic acid 
(glacial) an-
hydrous 2011 
RCI labscan 
Limited 
Not danger-
ous  Yes N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   Thailand 
Acetone 
GPR 2012 VWR Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Actane AAA 2010 Enthone Ltd 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 no   UK 
Additive 
1529 2013 Houghtons 
Not danger-
ous  Yes 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Additive 
3947 2013 Houghtons Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Additive B3/ 
Blaser B3 2009 
Blaser Swiss 
Lube Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Switzerland 
Adhesive 
NP-50, Com-
pound A 2009 
Tokyo Sokki 
Kenkyujo 
Co 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 n/a 1 Japan 
Adipic Acid  2012 Science Lab Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
Aeroshell 
caliberating 
fluid 2 2011 
Shell Uk Oil 
Products  Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
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Aeroshell 
Fluid 41 2012 
Shell Uk Oil 
Products  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Alkaline 
deruster 
salts 2005 
MacDermid 
PLC  
Not danger-
ous  No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 UK 
Alodine 
1200S 2010 Henkel Dangerous No N/A 
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not  
reliable 2 
not  
reliable 2 9 n/a   Canada 
Alphasyn 
T68 2014 Castrol 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
without 
re-
striction
s  4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 16 No 1 UK 
Aluminium 
Lead Free 
Enamel 2010 
Industructi-
ble Paint Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Not 
reliable 2 
not  
reliable 2 9 No 1 UK 
Aluminium 
Oxide pow-
der  2006 
Clarke In-
ternational  
Not danger-
ous  No None 
not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Not  
reliable 2 
not  
reliable 2 9 No   UK 
Amdry 100, 
Amdry 100C, 
Amdry 100F, 
Amdry 100 
Type 
II/0V1002 2013 Suzler Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
AMDRY 780, 
790, 7901, 
AMDRY 780 
TYPE 
II.OV1082, 
AMDRY 790 
TYPE 
II/OV1092 2012 Suzler Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
Ammonium 
Dichromate 2013 
ACAMCHE
M Dangerous No N/A 
Not  
reliable 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 n/a   Canada 
Anderol 555 2013 
Chemtura 
Manufac-
turing  UK 
limited  
Not danger-
ous  No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Anderol FG 
XL 100 2011 
Chemtura 
Manufac-
turing  UK 
limited  
Not danger-
ous  No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Anderol FGC 
Series 2007 Anerol Inc 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Denmark 
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Antifoaming 
Agent 60 2013 Houghtons 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives 
Reliable 
without 
re-
striction
s  4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 16 No 1 UK 
Araldite in-
stant clear 
resin  2011 
Bostik Lim-
ited Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No   UK 
Ardrox 985 
P12 2011 Chemetall Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 No 1 UK 
Ardrox 9881 2013 Chemetall Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 12 No 1 UK 
ARDROX 
9D4A 2011 Chemetall 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 13 No 1 UK 
Argon Gas 2013 Air products Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Armakleen® 
M-Aero 2006 
The Ar-
makleen 
Company 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 13 n/a 1 USA 
Axiom 100 
sa Compo-
nent A 2008 
Bostik Lim-
ited Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
Barium chlo-
ride  99.995 2010 Merck KgAa 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
BEHR® Oil-
Base Inte-
rior/Exterior 
Semi-Gloss 
Enamel 
A ccent Base 
No. 3860 2011 BEHR 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   Canada 
Belzona 
1121 2013 
Belzona 
Polymerics 
Limited  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Benzoic acid  2011 
Fisher Sci-
entific 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
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Blasoclean 
AF 2012 
Blaser Swiss 
Lube 
Not danger-
ous  No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 13 No 1 Switzerland 
Bloc Jelt 
Vert 2012 
ITW Spray-
tec  Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No   France  
Blue Tinted 
Stop Off Lac-
quer 2010 
Industructi-
ble Paint Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 UK 
BOELUBE 
70307; 
70302 2011 
Caleb Man-
agement 
Services Ltd 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 N/A   USA 
Boric Acid 2012 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 Yes 0 UK 
Bostik 2402 2011 
Bostik Lim-
ited Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 No   UK 
Britemor 
4455 2011 Chemetall Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Buffer Solu-
tions pH 
4.00 (used in 
the labora-
tories) 2014 
Reagecon 
Diagnostics  
Ltd 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
without 
re-
striction
s  4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 16 No 1 Ireland  
C5-A Copper 
based anti- 
seize 2012 Henkel  
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   Canada 
Calcium hy-
droxide 2012 
Avantor 
Perfor-
mance Ma-
terials 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 no   Netherlands 
Calcium sul-
phate dihy-
drate 2012 VWR 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
CANTESCO® 
365 LOW 
TEMP TYPE 
II / LOW 
TEMP LPGAS 2012 
Kemper 
System 
America 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 n/a 1 USA 
Caustic soda 2011 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 13 Yes 0 UK 
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Cautic Pot-
ash Liquor 5-
50% 2013 Brenntag  Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
CC 4314 2012 
Control-
Chem Can-
ada  
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 n/a   Canada 
CEE-BEE 
Cleaner Alko 2013 
McGean 
Rohco  
Not danger-
ous  No  
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 10 No   UK 
Cerium AAS 
Standard 2009 Alfa Aesar 
Not danger-
ous  No CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
CHEMAIDE) 
RAP-EVAP 2012 Chemaide Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
Chevron Au-
tomatic 
Transmis-
sion Fluid 
MD-3 2012 Chevron  
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 N/A   USA 
Chevron 
standard 
solvent 2007 
Chevron 
Canada Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 N/A   Canada 
Chromium 
standard so-
lution 2012 VWR  
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Clarocit 
powder  2012 Struers 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 10 no   Denmark 
Class B2 
Rapid Cure 
fuel tank 
sealant 2011 
PPG indus-
tries Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Cobalt (II) 
Chloride 
Hexahydrate 2013 
Acros Or-
ganics  Dangerous No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Belgium 
Cobalt Alu-
minate 2012 
Prince min-
erals 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Compound 
SVRB-1 2013 Rosler Dangerous No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
COMPOUND 
ZF 113 2013 Rosler Dangerous No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
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Condaero/ 
condat 190 
B 2013 Condat 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
without 
re-
striction
s  4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 16 no 1 France 
Copper (II) 
Chloride Di-
hydrate 2014 
Sigma-al-
drich Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Copper sul-
phate pen-
tahydrate  2014 VWR Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Cosmolube 
EP2 Grease  2011 Houghtons  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Cupric Chlo-
ride 2008 
MallinKrodt 
Baker 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
DAG 6003 2013 Henkel 
Not danger-
ous  Yes 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 13 Yes 0 UK 
Decon 75 2011 VWR 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Deltaglaze 
FB -417 2014 Henkel 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 13 No 1 Netherlands 
Deltaglaze 
FB -667 2009 Henkel 
Not danger-
ous  No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 Netherlands 
Diakon Braz-
ing Cement 2010 
Industructi-
ble Paint Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No 1 UK 
DOW CORN-
ING(R) 3-
6548 SILI-
CONE RTV 
FOAM KIT 2012 
Dow Corn-
ing 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Belgium  
Easy-flo® 
Stainless 
Steel Grade 
Flux Powder 2013 
Johnson 
Mathey Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 No 1 UK 
Eccobond 
104 Part B 2009 Henkel Dangerous No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Belgium 
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Ecocut EMC 
517 2006 
Fuchs Lubri-
cant 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 No 1 UK 
EDM 1 spark 
erosion fluid 2013 Lubriserv 
Not danger-
ous  Yes  CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 No 1 UK 
Electrodag 
1415 2009 
Agar Scien-
tific Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
Epoxy Stov-
ing Primer 2008 J&L 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Ethyl Acety-
lene  2010 
Praxair Can-
ada Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   Canada 
Ethylene Ox-
ide 2010 
Praxair Can-
ada Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   Canada 
Everlube 
10027 2013 Everlube  
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No 1 UK 
Fastblock 
900 2012 
TA aero-
space, 
eaterline 
corporation Dangerous Yes N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 n/a   USA 
Ferric Chlo-
ride Anhy-
drous 2013 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 Yes 0 UK 
Ferric Chlo-
ride Hexahy-
drate 2013 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 Yes 0 UK 
FERRIC SUL-
PHATE 30-
44% 2012 Brenntag 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 No 1 UK 
FIBERFRAX® 
HIGH PU-
RITY PAPERS 
(RCF) prod-
uct 2009 Unifrax LLC Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
Fluid ounce 
Plasti Dip 2011 Performix  
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 n/a   USA 
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Fueltank 
sealant Base 
Class B 2009 
PPG indus-
tries 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Furfuryl al-
cohol 2012 
ACROS Or-
ganics  Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Belgium  
Green stop 
off type II 2012 
Wall Colmo-
noy 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 no   UK 
Guyson Hon-
ite 2011 
Guyson In-
ternational 
Limited 
Not danger-
ous  No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Hexweb A1 2009 
Hexcel 
Composites 
Not danger-
ous  No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Hocut 768 2013 Houghtons 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 No 1 UK 
Houghto-
clean 15S 2013 Houghtons 
Not danger-
ous  Yes 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 No 1 UK 
Houghto-
Drive HM32 2013 Houghtons 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 No 1 UK 
Houghto-
Drive HM68 2013 Houghtons 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
HYDRO-
CHLORIC 
ACID 32% 
CG [2.9KG] 2011 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Not relia-
ble 2 11 Yes 0 UK 
HYDROFLU-
ORIC ACID 
70-75% 
[28KG] 2012 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 Yes 0 UK 
Hydrogen 
Peroxide 35- 
50% 2014 Brenntag  Dangerous Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 Yes   UK 
Industrial 
Methylated 
Spirits 2013 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 Yes   UK 
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IonoPlus 
IME-MH 2011 
Oelheld 
GmBH 
Not danger-
ous  Yes 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
Isopropanol 2010 Brenntag Dangerous No N/A 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 N/A   Canada 
Jet A-1 2013 TOTAL  Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Jotaproof 
Topcoat 
Comp-B 2011 Jotun Paints 
Not danger-
ous  No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
K 05 2011 
SMW Au-
toBlok  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
KALIC HIGH 
REACTIVITY 
MILK OF 
LIME  2002 
Buxton 
Lime Indus-
tries 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 12 No 1 UK 
Klube GH6- 
220 2009 Kluber 
Not danger-
ous  No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
Krytox" XHT-
BDX 2009 Dupont 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
LDC 2820 
Nickel Sul-
phamate 2013 
Liquid De-
velopment 
Company Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
Leak detec-
tor spray 2011 Rocol  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Lithium hy-
droxide  2012 Science Lab 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 n/a   USA 
Loctite 242 2011 Henkel 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Ireland  
Loctite 243 2011 Henkel Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Ireland  
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Loctite 515 2011 Henkel 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
Loctite 574 2014 Henkel Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Loctite 577 2014 Henkel 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Magna 2 2011 Castrol  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
without 
re-
striction
s  4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 3 15 No 1 UK 
Magnafloc 
155 2010 BASF 
Not danger-
ous  Yes clp 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
Magnaglo 
410 HF 2012 Magnaflux 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 No 1 UK 
Magnesium 
standard so-
lution 2012 VWR 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 No   UK 
Makino 
Spindle Lub-
ricant 2013 
JX Nippon 
oil and En-
ergy Corpo-
ration Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Maxistab 
NT-1 2010 Univar Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 UK 
Metal Pro-
tective Var-
nish - Clear. 2010 
Industructi-
ble Paint Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 UK 
METCO 
307NS 2013 Suzler Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
METCO 43C 2014 Suzler Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 Germany 
Methanol 
ACS 2012 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 no   UK 
229 
 
 
Methyl Bro-
mide 2010 
Praxair Can-
ada Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   Canada 
Methyl Chlo-
ride 2010 
Praxair Can-
ada  Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 N/A   Canada 
Methyl red 
sodium salt 2012 VWR 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 no   UK 
Microlube 
00 2008 
Kluber Lu-
brication 
Not danger-
ous  No CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 Germany 
Microset 
101 Silicone 
Polymer 
Compunds  2012 
Microset 
Products 
Limited 
Not danger-
ous  No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Mobil SHC 
629 2012 Mobil 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a 1 Canada 
Mobil Ve-
locite Oil No 
6 2011 Mobil 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a 1 USA 
Molyb-
denum 2011 Plansee 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Austrian 
Molydag 
709 2013 Henkel  Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 Yes   UK 
Molykote D-
321 R Spray 2014 
Dow  Corn-
ing Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 n/a   China 
Molykote P-
37 2014 
Dow Corn-
ing 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 n/a   USA 
Molyslip co-
paslip 2012 Molyslip Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
N-1000 High 
Purity Anti-
Seize 2010 Henkel 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
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Nalco 71605 2012 Nalco 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
without 
re-
striction
s  4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 3 15 Yes 0 UK 
Nalco 77171 2013 Nalco 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
without 
re-
striction
s  4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 4 
Reliable 
without 
re-
strictions 3 15 Yes 0 UK 
NALCO 8539 2013 Nalco Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 Yes 0 Netherlands 
NEU-TRI E 
SOLVENT 2012 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 Yes 0 UK 
Nickel Chlo-
ride Hexahy-
drate 2011 
Celtic 
Chemicals 
Ltd Dangerous Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
NITRIC ACID, 
70%, 2011 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Not relia-
ble 2 11 Yes 0 UK 
Nitroben-
zene 2012 
Acros Or-
ganics  Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Not relia-
ble 2 10 No   Belgium  
Nitrogen  2010 Air products Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Novaclean 
909 2009 Henkel  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
O5E Copper 2010 
Metallisa-
tion 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Orobraze™ 
950 Powder 2012 
Johnson 
Mathey Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 UK 
PENETRANT 
REMOVER S-
76 AEROSOL 2013 Chemetall Dangerous Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 10 Yes 0 UK 
Perchloric 
acid  2014 
Sigma-al-
drich Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No 1 UK 
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Peridite H1 2011 3M Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
PL237-R1 
MOLYB-
DENUM DI-
SULPHIDE 
DRY FILM 
LUBRICANT 2011 
Industructi-
ble Paint Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No 1 UK 
Potassium 
Chromate 2012 
Fisher Sci-
entific Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Potassium 
Hydroxide  2012 
Fisher Sci-
entific 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 10 No   UK 
POTASSIUM 
PERMANGA-
NATE 2011 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 10 Yes 0 UK 
ProSeal 870 
Class C12 
Corrosion 
Resistant 
Sealant 2013 
PPG Coat-
ings  Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   France 
PSX 700 FD 
CURE 2011 
PPG protec-
tive and 
Marine 
Coatings 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 n/a   USA 
QU50 Syn-
thetic un-
dercoat 2010 
Trimite 
Global 
Coatings  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Rocol Flaw 
Finder 
Cleaner 
Spray  2007 Rocol  Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 n/a   New Zealand 
ROCOL 
FLAW 
FINDER VW 
SPRAY NO.2 2006 
ITW Poly-
mers and 
Fluids 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   Australia 
Rustguard 
Epoxy 
Enamel 2008 
PPG archi-
tectural 
coatings 
Not danger-
ous  No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 n/a   Australia 
sermeTel W 
(FX-2) 2012 Praxair Dangerous No N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a 1 USA 
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Shell 
Harvella T 
10W-30 2007 
Shell Uk Oil 
Products  
Not danger-
ous  No None 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Shell Tonna 
Oil S 68 2007 Shell 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
Silver Ni-
trate 2012 VWR 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Silver Paint 
Diluent 2009 
Agar Scien-
tific Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
SL450 2012 
Hottinger 
Baldwin 
Messtech-
nik GmbH Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
Socopac 2013 Socomore Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Sodium Ace-
tate Anhy-
drous 2012 Merck KgAa 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
Sodium cya-
nide 2012 Brentagg  Dangerous Yes CLP 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Not relia-
ble 2 9 Yes   UK 
Sodium di-
chromate 
anhydrous 2014 Brentagg Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 Yes   UK 
SODIUM HY-
POCHLORITE 
10% - 15% 
(ALL 
GRADES) 2013 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Not relia-
ble 2 11 No 1 UK 
Sodium Ni-
trate 2012 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 Yes   UK 
Sodium Thi-
ocyanate 2012 
Fisher Sci-
entific Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Sta-Put G68 2013 Houghtons 
Not danger-
ous  Yes 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No 1 UK 
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SULPHAMIC 
ACID 2013 Brenntag Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 11 No 1 UK 
Teresstic 
T68 2012 
Exxon Mo-
bil  
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Belgium 
Titanium Ox-
ide 2014 Merck KgAa 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
Triethanola-
mine 2009 Alfa Aesar 
Not danger-
ous  Yes N/A 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 n/a   USA 
Triton DF-12 
Surfactant 2012 
Dow Chemi-
cal 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Tungsten Di 
Sulphide  2011 
Industructi-
ble Paint Dangerous No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
not relia-
ble 2 9 No   UK 
WL-200 
wash 2012 
Domino UK 
Ltd  Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
not relia-
ble 2 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 11 No   UK 
Xylenol or-
ange tetra-
sodium salt 
metal indi-
cator  2011 Merck KgAa 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
Zinc chloride 2013 
Fisher Sci-
entific Dangerous Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
Zirconium 
Standard So-
lution  2012 Merck KgAa 
Not danger-
ous  Yes CLP 
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   Germany 
Zyglo  ZL-19 2012 Magnaflux 
Not danger-
ous  No 
DPD/DSD 
Directives  
Reliable 
with re-
striction
s 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 
Reliable 
with re-
strictions 3 12 No   UK 
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